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Abstract 
The term ‘sexual harassment’ has been treated as key to victim resistance against 
normalising constructions of unwanted sexual/gendered attention as ‘just sex’ and 
as a ‘trivial’ part of everyday life. The act of labelling unwanted conduct as sexual 
harassment has been constituted as an important political step in reframing 
normalised problematic conduct as gendered violence as well as legitimising 
recipient access to formalised routes of amelioration. However concerns have 
been raised that recipients, particularly women, are ‘reluctant’ to use the term 
‘sexual harassment’ to describe their experiences and resist unwanted attention 
using laws and policies designed to deal with this issue. 
Drawing on resources from discursive, postmodern and feminist approaches, this 
thesis explores how constructions of the term ‘sexual harassment’ and strategies 
to deal with it shape, enable and constrain resistances against gendered/sexualised 
power relations inscribed in manifestations of unwanted attention. It unpacks how 
discourses of sexual harassment polarise labelling and non-labelling behaviour to 
produce the former as an act of resistance and the latter as non-resistance. This 
project moves away from this polarisation to consider boundary construction 
around the issue of sexual harassment. Through discursive analysis of narratives 
identified through Q methodological analysis and constructions produced in 
interview data, this thesis examines the how both inclusion and exclusion of 
relevant issues in multiple understandings of sexual harassment and policy 
considerations impact challenges that can be made to unwanted conduct.   
Central to this examination is critical consideration of the operation of gendered 
power relations within sexual harassment discourses. I pay particular attention to 
how various constructions of resistance within sexual harassment discourses 
become embedded in and re(produce) gendered binaries of dominance-
subordination. This thesis considers how gendered binaries might be transgressed 
and destabilised by articulating alternative spaces for the performance of 
resistance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 My Story 
My interest in sexual harassment began in the mid- to late-1990s amidst what 
appeared to me to be a public preoccupation with the issue. It seemed to be rarely 
out of the news – several high-profile sexual harassment complaints were brought 
to public attention and became a matter of debate. One which gained particular 
notoriety was the case against Bill Clinton where press interest reached fever pitch 
when he was alleged to have lied under oath about his sexual relationship with 
intern Monica Lewinsky. It was not just pending legal cases that were given 
airspace. Fictional cases of sexual harassment frequently featured in the story 
lines of popular TV shows such as South Park (1999) and Ally McBeal (1997 & 
1998).  The complexities of the issue of sexual harassment were also explored in 
films and books. For example, Michael Crichton’s controversial book Disclosure 
(1993) that was subsequently released as a film (1994) tells the story of a man 
sexually harassed by his woman boss – a scenario differing from predominant 
understandings of sexual harassment as something that is done to women by men. 
Alongside these depictions which focused specifically on sexual harassment, I 
began to notice the more subtle references to the issue in the media, often in the 
form of one-off jokes. 
What became apparent to me was how sexual harassment was variously ‘sexed’ 
up, made funny, or understood as a ‘blip’ in the dating process in media portrayals 
as well as by many of the people around me. During the time of the Clinton case, 
what I remember most clearly was the importance given to the lurid, salacious 
details of Clinton’s relationship with Lewinsky, the jokes that were for some time 
told about sex acts which featured in the case. I remember the first time I watched 
the movie Disclosure and how a couple of male friends jovially pointed out that 
they would be happy to switch places with Michael Douglas, who played the 
victim of sexual harassment by woman boss Demi Moore. Above all else, I 
remember feeling genuinely puzzled about how sexual harassment could be 
understood as an expression of violence but at the same time somehow ‘normal’. 
As I began to research the topic for this project, I was often confronted with 
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descriptions of sexual harassment that were in many ways alien to me, that 
seemed very much at odds with popular portrayals of it. I was particularly struck 
by the significance given to the emergence of the term ‘sexual harassment’ in 
some accounts of its history. In such accounts, sexual harassment was often 
represented as problem, particularly for women. An issue that until relatively 
recently could not easily be described as a problem and had no clear ‘solution’ 
because this phenomenon had no name. For example, this can be seen in 
Mackinnon’s (1979) claim that: 
“It is not surprising ... that women would not complain of an 
experience for which there has been no name ... lacking a term to 
express it, [workplace] sexual harassment was literally 
unspeakable, which made a generalised, shared and social 
definition of it inaccessible. The unnamed should not be mistaken 
for the nonexistent” (pp. 27-28). 
Similarly, Thomas and Kitzinger (1995) contend that “Before the 1970s ... the 
label [sexual harassment] didn’t exist and the behaviour it identified was ‘just part 
of life’ – a problem without a name” (p. 32). Such descriptions of the problem of 
sexual harassment both resonated and diverged from my understandings of how it 
was commonly talked about. Whilst it seemed clear to me that unwanted sexual 
attention is a problem for many people, I did not know how or whether to 
reconcile this with the sense I’d gleaned from many ‘everyday’ accounts that the 
issue was somehow both a problem and part of ‘normal’ life. Where should I draw 
the line? How should I distinguish ‘good’ behaviour from ‘bad’ behaviour? Had 
people simply missed the point about sexual harassment? Was it really my place 
to tell them that?  
The question of how to make sense of particular academic representations of 
sexual harassment became increasingly complex when I contextualised it in my 
own observations and experiences. More specifically, the ‘term’ sexual 
harassment is framed within a body of research as intended to cover an entire 
spectrum of problematic gendered/sexual behaviour, ranging from ‘routine’, 
mundane forms such as gendered/sexual jokes, leering, wolf-whistling, to more 
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extreme instances such as making job-related rewards contingent on sexual 
activity (Thomas and Kitzinger, 1997: Lee, 2001; Hinze, 2004). However, I was 
increasingly aware that the term was not being used, at least by the people around 
me, to refer to ‘routine’ manifestations of unwanted sexual attention. Friends and 
acquaintances seemed all too aware of the problem of unwanted sexual attention – 
a trip to the local pubs and clubs were often euphemistically referred to as “a visit 
to the local meat-market”, we had code words for ‘save me’ if unwanted sexual 
attention got a little too much, we would glare, swear or leave in response to a 
range of problem behaviours – but we did not call them sexual harassment. 
Not only did such observations prompt me to think about why the term might be 
used or not used in particular instances but also to question how it would, in 
practical terms, help to deal with scenarios in a variety of contexts such as those 
outlined above. At the beginning of this project, I noticed that research in the area 
has tended to focus predominantly on workplace sexual harassment, legal routes 
of amelioration and grievance processes in this context (see, for example, 
Mackinnon, 1979; Bingham, 1994; Williams, Guiffre and Dellinger, 1999; Paludi 
and Paludi, 2003; Dougherty 2006). However, it appeared that the question of 
how one might deal with sexual harassment became less clear outside of the 
organisational settings. Work which did discuss other forms of unwanted sexual 
attention such as street harassment did not seem to me to translate easily into 
practical steps for challenging behaviour encountered (Larkin, 1994; 1997; Mui & 
Murphy, 2002). 
Indeed, some research left me with a sense of pessimism about what women in 
particular could do to challenge and prevent particular problematic experiences 
outside the workplace. For example, in her analysis of street harassment, Larkin 
(1997) draws attention to how unwanted sexual attention by men to women often 
sexually objectifies women, functioning to reduce the feminine body to a 
commodity for consumption through the male gaze. She argues that instances of 
unwanted sexual attention remind women about the possible threat of further 
sexual violence from men, how street harassment might escalate to more extreme 
behaviour and concludes: 
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“when a young woman is continually reminded of the risks that 
accompany her developing body, when she is constantly under 
scrutiny and surveillance, and when she lives in a state of constant 
vigilance, it’s unlikely she’ll ever develop a sense of herself as a 
powerful and autonomous person. Unlikely, too she’ll ever develop 
the strength to work against the process of her subordination” 
(p. 128). 
Whilst, as will become apparent in this thesis, I found some of the theoretical 
ideas which emerged in such work useful in making sense of sexual harassment at 
various points in my exploration of it, I was nevertheless troubled by some 
descriptions of the subordinated woman depicted in accounts such as Larkin’s.  
The positioning of women in relation to men within particular instances of 
unwanted sexual attention seemed to me to be much more complex than was 
captured by references to power differentials between men and women in some 
academic accounts. While I could see how, in the course of everyday life, 
feminine identities were often positioned as subordinate to masculine ones, I 
could also recount instances where women had directly challenged behaviours 
like street harassment. Some of these challenges drew more attention to gender 
inequality than others; some were more successful than others on particular 
occasions.  
Alongside these issues, I struggled to make theoretical sense of stories which 
differed from the predominant representation in the literature of women as victims 
and men as perpetrators of unwanted sexual attention. Occasionally, I heard the 
stories of men where sexual attention from their woman partners, friends and/or 
colleagues were framed as unwanted, as not a joke, as something that needed to be 
stopped. However, there did not seem appear to be ‘room’ for these particular 
accounts in a large body of literature on the topic. As Lee (2000) points out the 
sexual harassment of heterosexual men by women or other men had not received a 
great deal of attention from scholars, largely because sexual harassment has been 
commonly conceptualised as a manifestation of male oppression of women. 
Women’s accounts of sexual harassment by other women more generally 
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appeared to be similarly marginalised (Brewis and Linstead, 2001). Such marginal 
accounts of unwanted sexual attention seemed to me to point to the complexities 
of gendered/sexualised power differentials between victims and perpetrators in 
sexual harassment scenarios. 
These experiences of my initial engagement with sexual harassment as a topic for 
research frame the broad focus of this project. In this thesis, I explore the multiple 
ways in which the construct of ‘sexual harassment’ and strategies for dealing with 
it are socially defined, explained and constituted. Drawing on resources from 
feminist, postmodern and discursive approaches, I focus on how and why 
particular issues, debates and behaviours become relevant to or excluded from 
conceptualisations of sexual harassment. This includes a critical consideration of 
how problematisation of unwanted behaviour occurs in the absence of the term 
‘sexual harassment’. The aim of this exploration is to unpack the implications that 
different ways of framing unwanted sexual attention as a problem have for 
recipients and initiators of it. I also explore the possibilities afforded by and 
limitations associated with particular strategies for dealing with sexual 
harassment, how particular contexts shape and constrain what can be done about 
it, as well as the possible consequences that using certain methods for dealing 
with it have for recipients. Before moving on to outline how these particular 
focuses and aims have been addressed in the following chapters, I will provide a 
broad discussion of core conceptualisations from the theoretical and 
methodological resources mentioned above which played a key role in shaping the 
direction of this thesis. More detailed discussion of these ideas is provided 
throughout. 
1.2 Discoursing Gender, Gendering Discourses 
The ideas, readings and analyses presented in this thesis are explicitly informed 
by the broad political commitment of feminism(s) to engage in analysing, 
challenging and transforming power relationships which maintain forms of gender 
inequality. As I alluded to above, sexual harassment has predominantly been seen 
in the literature as a means with which gender inequity is sustained, as a set of 
behaviours in which men can subordinate women. However, in this project, I 
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wished to deviate from the predominant way in which sexual harassment is 
commonly understood and researched; instead, I wanted to explore and unpack a 
range of gendered/sexualised power relations. I wanted to focus not only on 
instances of male sexual harassment against women but also on women-men and 
same-sex initiators/recipients. What I found to be particularly useful for this 
purpose was insights from postmodern feminist work around gender and 
sexualities. 
Broadly speaking, such work challenges essentialist notions of gender difference, 
of fixed and stable genders, and gendered identities. Gender and gender identity is 
not simply understood as determined by the biological features and process of our 
bodies, nor do they map on to the physical body in a one-to-one fashion (e.g. 
Nicolson, 1990;  Crawford, 1995; Butler, 1990; 1993; Gardiner, 2002). Instead, 
the gender identities that become available to us are seen as fluid, shifting, 
fragmented and contested. Rather than arising intrinsically from us, gendered 
identities can be thought of as ‘performatively’ (re)produced and (re)constituted in 
our social practices and relationships, in situated and local contexts (Butler, 1990).  
In this project, Butler’s (1990, 1993) work on the heterosexual matrix has been 
drawn on to articulate the ways in which normative gendered identities and 
positionings are inextricably tied to predominant notions of heterosexuality. More 
specifically, Butler (1990) uses the term heterosexual matrix to: 
“designate that grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, 
genders, and desires are naturalized … a hegemonic 
discursive/epistemological model of gender intelligibility that 
assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a 
stable sex expressed through a stable gender (masculine expresses 
male, feminine expresses female) that is oppositionally and 
hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of 
heterosexuality” (p. 151) 
The presumption of heterosexuality embedded with normative notions of 
femininities and masculinities is integral to notions around what is permissible 
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for each gender. However, ‘deviations’ from normative gendered ways of being 
throw into doubt compulsory heterosexuality and highlights its instability. The 
heterosexual matrix is maintained through the policing and punishment of those 
who deviate from compulsory heterosexuality and become marked as other. 
Such conceptualisations present a challenge to universalised gendered/sexualised 
dichotomies of men and women, of masculinity and femininity, of clear and fixed 
patterns of gendered dominance and subordination. Indeed, the binary of 
powerful/powerless becomes increasingly difficult to maintain in a 
straightforward or rigid manner when the intersection of gender with other 
positions and identities, such as those around race, class, disability and other 
points of difference, is considered (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1996; Gardiner, 2002; 
Yuval-Davis, Kannabiran and Vieten, 2006). Using such theorisations of 
gender/sexualities, it is possible to make sense of a range of gendered/sexualised 
configurations of victim-perpetrator relations mentioned above. More specifically, 
conceptualising gender as unstable, shifting, variously intertwined with various 
forms of power, makes possible understandings of men as not always powerful 
and women as not always powerless.  
The move away from notions of enduring ‘truths’ about gender in general and 
sexual harassment in particular to local and situated knowledges of these broad 
constructs underpins this research. Central to this approach to research has been 
insights from discursive analytic traditions. As is discussed at various points 
throughout this thesis (and in particular detail in chapter 5), this project treats 
sexual harassment as a discursively (re)produced construct, shaped by and 
situated in particular social, political and historical contexts. Some accounts of the 
history of sexual harassment described earlier allude to sexual harassment as pre-
existing the definition of it, as having some sort of objective existence prior to its 
‘discovery’. In contrast, this project takes as its starting point the construct of 
sexual harassment as produced and reproduced in and through discourses. This is 
not to say that problematic, unwanted gendered/sexualised behaviours did not 
exist prior to the circulation of the term ‘sexual harassment’. Rather, this thesis 
begins with the consideration of how sexual harassment as a phenomenon 
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becomes discursively (re)produced. From within this framework, it is possible to 
move away from issues around the ‘truth’ of particular versions of sexual 
harassment, of what sexual harassment ‘is’ and how we should ‘solve’ it. Instead, 
it becomes possible to focus on the possibilities and constraints (re)produced by 
particular constructions of sexual harassment for challenging problematic 
gendered behaviour and gendered inequalities. 
1.3 Chapter Outline 
The broad theoretical ideas described above from various strands of feminist 
theory and discourse analytic approaches provide the backdrop for this research 
and are webbed though the chapters in this thesis. The following overview of the 
organisation of this thesis will provide a sense of how the theoretical and 
methodological approaches outlined above shaped the overall project. 
In Chapter 2, I explore broad scholarly concerns centring on the reluctance of 
individuals, particularly women, to contextualise their experiences as sexual 
harassment. I discuss how these concerns are embedded within the construction of 
the term ‘sexual harassment’ as a tool for resisting gendered subordination and 
how the absence of the term in accounts often becomes interpreted as suggesting 
that unwanted behaviour is going unchallenged, being normalised or both. I 
present a re-reading of some such interpretations and consider how the 
problematisation of unwanted behaviours may occur in the absence of the label 
‘sexual harassment’. I also argue that the predominant focus on the issue of non-
labelling has functioned to distract attention away from the ways in which the 
label is used to describe behaviours and experiences. Running through this 
chapter, I critically consider how the focus on women’s non-labelling specifically 
can work to (re)produce potentially problematic versions of femininities. 
In Chapter 3, I move on to consider strategies for dealing with sexual harassment 
in the form of discrimination laws and policy. I explore how particular strategies 
become limited and constrained by particular constructions of masculinities and 
femininities which variously frame key assumptions within these formalised 
routes of amelioration. I discuss how gendered constructions operating in laws 
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and policies may act as a barrier to their use. I also discuss other barriers to 
reporting such as the possibility of secondary victimisation.  
Taken together, Chapters 2 and 3 provide the backdrop for the aforementioned 
broad aims of this project. However before moving to the specific analytical 
focuses of this thesis, I attempt to outline key theoretical, methodological and 
reflective considerations which guided the development of knowledge production 
in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 describes the location of this project within the broader institution of 
psychology. More specifically, I outline the ways in which this project, as a 
feminist and qualitative informed piece of research on what could be described as 
a sensitive project, is positioned as marginal in relation to mainstream 
psychology. I discuss how this project’s marginal position means that the issues 
and concerns around the process of doing such research are also marginalised 
within, for example, advice on conducting ethical work. In this chapter, I provide 
a reflexive account of pertinent issues that shaped the production of this thesis. 
This account includes critical reflection on how my own assumptions around 
gender and sexualities, specific gendered/sexualised positionings in which I am 
variously located impacted my relationships with my participants. 
In Chapter 5, I go on to provide an account of the methodologies employed in this 
project. I begin by outlining the rationale for the use of Q methodology in this 
thesis and provide a description of the methodological features of the two Q 
studies carried out as part of this project. I then move to the rationale for using 
Foucauldian discourse analysis to explore patterns in the interview data collected 
as well as including a description of procedural aspects of the interview study. 
This chapter ends with a discussion of how ethical issues raised by all three 
studies were addressed. 
The analytical chapters of this thesis begin with Chapter 6. Here, I explore 
narratives identified using Q methodology which centre on the question of what 
constitutes sexual harassment. I explore the ways in which issues and behaviours 
become relevant to or excluded from narratives of sexual harassment. I explore 
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the implications of the inclusion or exclusion of particular issues from specific 
narratives of sexual harassment, as well as the ways in which narratives identified 
enable or constrain challenges to be made to unwanted behaviour. 
Chapter 7 continues with the focus on boundary construction by examining the 
ways in which the public-private dichotomy is discursively deployed within 
interview data to construct sexual harassment as impermissible in formalised 
public spaces and relationships but as both permissible and a problem in personal 
informal relationships. I discuss how strategies for dealing with it are constructed 
as more problematic in the private sphere than in public, formalised spaces. 
Specific attention is paid in Chapter 8 to dealing with sexual harassment. I provide 
an interpretation of policy narratives identified in the second Q methodological 
study conducted.  Of particular importance to my interpretation of these narratives 
is the issue of secondary victimisation which has been argued to be a significant 
barrier to lodging complaints against problematic behaviour. I examine these 
narratives with a view to articulating the barriers they might present to those faced 
with dealing with sexual harassment, paying particular attention to how certain 
narratives open up the possibilities for secondary victimisation. 
Chapter 9 explores how heterosexualised gendered relations become interwoven 
in constructions of victims and perpetrators of sexual harassment. Discursive 
analysis of the interview data highlighted how women victims/male perpetrators, 
women offenders/male victims, and same-sex victims/perpetrators become 
constructed through a heterosexualised gaze. Constructions of victim-perpetrator 
relations in both heterosexual and same-sex sexual harassment (re)produce 
versions of heterosexualised femininities as passive/powerless and 
heterosexualised masculinities as active/powerful. I unpack how these normative 
gendered positionings of active and passive can work to support and maintain the 
conditions under which more extreme gendered power relationships of 
dominance-subordination are made possible. 
I conclude in Chapter 10 by drawing together the main theoretical, 
methodological and practical implications of this thesis. I end by making 
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suggestions for how particular problematic gendered patterns identified in this 
thesis that appear to maintain the phenomenon of sexual harassment may be 
challenged and undermined. 
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Chapter 2: Constructing Sexual Harassment: Gendered Power and 
(Un)resistance 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, key issues and debates within the field of sexual harassment will 
be described and explored. In doing so, I will delineate the ways in which gender, 
sex and power become constituted within theorisations of sexual harassment. The 
purpose of this exploration is to highlight the ways in which the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ becomes coupled with notions of resistance. Of particular importance 
to this examination are the ways in which women in particular become framed as 
agents of this form of resistance as well as victims of sexual harassment through 
labelling their experiences as ‘sexual harassment’. More specifically, I will 
unpack how these particular positionings of women enable or disable challenges 
to be made against this form of sexual violence. This chapter begins by describing 
the ways in which the term ‘sexual harassment’ has been treated as integral to 
victim resistance. I will then discuss how the construct of sexual harassment has 
been framed and constituted within key strands of work within the field. Lastly, I 
will discuss the issue of women recipient non-labelling of experiences as ‘sexual 
harassment’. 
2.2 Sexual Harassment as a Social Problem 
The recognition of sexual harassment as a significant social problem has been 
attributed to women activist groups in the 1970s. Mackinnon (1979) credits the 
Working Women United Institute with coining the term ‘sexual harassment’ to 
describe a pattern of unwanted gendered/sexual conduct described in women’s 
accounts of their employment experiences. The coining of the term marked a 
reframing of unwanted gendered/sexual harassment which, up until the 1970s, had 
been routinely trivialised in social/political discourses as ‘just sex’. For example, 
sexual harassment has often been constructed as the product of men’s natural 
drive for sex and as a ‘natural’ problem in sexual encounters which functions to 
normalise manifestations of sexual harassment (Mackinnon, 1979; Tangri, Burt 
and Johnson, 1982; Talbot, 1997; Crouch, 2001; Kurth, Spiller and Brown Travis, 
2001; Samuels, 2003). Thus, the advent of the term ‘sexual harassment’ has been 
seen as a critical step in repositioning a range of normalised behaviours as sexual 
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violence. 
The emergence of the term is often described as part of a broader shift in 
academic, activist and public focus from more extreme forms of gendered/sexual 
violence such as rape, to a broader spectrum of unwanted behaviours which 
variously impact individuals – particularly women – in the course of their 
everyday lives (Kitzinger and Thomas, 1997). For example, conduct variously 
described under the rubric of sexual harassment have included a wide range of 
acts, such as leering, ogling, wolf-whistling, sexism(s), gendered/sexualised 
comments, physical touching, sexual bribery and/or coercion, to name but a few 
(Fitzgerald, et al, 1988; Thomas and Kitzinger, 1994; 1997; Crouch 2001). Whilst 
there is no universally-agreed definition of sexual harassment, common to 
predominant definitions is the representation of it as any unwanted behaviour that 
is sexualised and/or gendered.  
The construction of sexual harassment as a form of violence drew attention to 
how the phenomenon is firmly embedded within relations of gendered power.  
Drawing on notions of patriarchy, the predominant pattern of women as victims 
and men as perpetrators of sexual harassment became theorised within a body of 
literature as a manifestation of a wider system of gender inequality in which men 
dominate women (MacKinnon, 1979; Wise and Stanley, 1987; Thomas and 
Kitzinger, 1994; 1997; Superson, 2001; Timmerman, 2005).  Following a similar 
trajectory to feminist theorisations of rape, the positioning of sexual harassment as 
inextricably linked to power gave rise to debates over whether sexual harassment 
is used by men to dominate women in order to gain sex, or whether sex is used to 
maintain gendered power. These debates point to the complexities of making 
sense of how gender, sex and power become interwoven within expressions of 
sexual harassment. However, I would argue that the distinction between these two 
positions has been somewhat overstated in relation to descriptions of some early 
theorisations of this issue. For example, MacKinnon’s (1979) ground-breaking 
work on sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination has been located by 
some scholars in the former camp described above (Lee, 2001; Roscigno, 2007). 
The basis for this claim appears to lie in MacKinnon’s predominant focus on quid 
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pro quo harassment in the workplace which involves giving rewards or the 
withholding of punishment in exchange for sexual activity. However, 
Mackinnon’s analysis does not simply state that men use power so as to obtain 
sex. Rather, Mackinnon points to how relations of masculine dominance and 
feminine subordination are imbued within normative heterosexual practices. 
Similarly, as Gavey (2005) points out in relation to rape, the claim that unwanted 
sex acts are about power rather than sex within much feminist work in the area 
has been closely tied to the examination of power dynamics operating within 
heterosexuality. This claim, I would argue, is also true of much work on sexual 
harassment. 
This is not to say that I am arguing that analyses of power within the field of 
sexual violence in general and sexual harassment in particular have been 
uniformly unproblematic. For example, particular notions of patriarchy have been 
used to construct relations of dominance-subordination within sexual harassment 
as a form of sovereign power (e.g. MacKinnon, 1979; Superson, 1993, 2001). As 
Reavey and Warner (2001) argue, the focus on patriarchy as a form of sovereign 
power within the sexual violence literature does not account for the ways in which 
power can work to (re)produce particular versions of sexual violence and 
gendered subjectivities therein. Nor does it focus on the subtle shifts and 
movements within power relations in which men and women are embedded (see 
also Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 for a discussion of power). However, such 
limitations of this work should not distract attention from the ways in which these 
theorisations of gendered power dynamics placed the issue of sexual harassment 
firmly on the political agenda. The analysis of accounts of unwanted 
sexual/gendered attention, particularly those of women’s experiences of 
victimisation by men in the workplace, provided the basis for the 
conceptualisation of sexual harassment as a form of workplace sex discrimination 
(MacKinnon, 1979; see also Chapter 3), and laid the ground for a plethora of 
research focused on the theorisation of the sexual harassment of women by men in 
employment contexts.  
Underpinning a large body of work within this field are the ways in which 
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workplace organisation (re)produces opportunities for the manifestation of gender 
inequalities which predominately work to position women as subordinate to men. 
For example, it has been argued that the dominance of men in this context is 
reflected in, and perpetuated by, the horizontal segregation of women and vertical 
stratification of employment positions (e.g. Blackman, Brown, Brooks and 
Jarman, 2003). Vertical stratification refers to a typical employment pattern in 
which women are largely employed in lower ranking positions to men within the 
workplace hierarchy. Horizontal segregation refers to the employment of women 
in predominately feminised jobs such as nurses, child-minders and so on. Such 
jobs often prioritise ‘feminine characteristics’ such as care, communication and 
nurturance (MacKinnon, 1979; Hearn and Parkin, 2001). This kind of work has 
generally been constructed as ‘women’s work’ which has often been less valued 
than masculinised professions. Such feminised characteristics are often 
constructed as at odds with masculinised professions where highly masculinised 
‘traits’ such as individualism, aggression and competition are equated with 
employee productivity and success in particular workplace cultures (e.g. 
Cockburn, 1991; Hearn and Parkin, 2001). Thus, in this context, the feminine 
becomes marginalised and subordinated (Ball, 2004).  
Broadly speaking, the ways in which organisational power relations become 
infused with gendered/sexualised ones has been conceptualised as creating the 
conditions under which sexual harassment is made possible (MacKinnon, 1979; 
Wise and Stanley, 1987; Thomas and Kitzinger, 1994; 1997; Superson, 2001; 
Timmerman, 2005). Thus, the workings of organisational and gendered/sexualised 
power have been a central focus in sexual harassment research. To explore this 
point more fully, the following section will review key areas of research. I will 
begin by discussing mainstream psychological research before moving to insights 
from organisational theories variously influenced by sociological, postmodern and 
feminist strands of thought. 
2.3 Workplace Sexual Harassment: Gender, Sex & Power 
Within some strands of mainstream psychology, gendered and organisational 
power relations operating within and framing manifestations of sexual harassment 
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have been conceptualised from within an individualistic framework. More 
specifically, a body of research has focused on identifying problematic gendered 
beliefs and attitudes, which predispose individuals to exploit power derived from 
greater hierarchical job status for the purpose of sexually harassing a person or 
persons in a subordinate employment positions. The Likelihood to Sexually 
Harass (LSH) scale, developed by Pryor (1987), has been highly influential in the 
investigation of individual attributes associated with the proclivity towards 
workplace sexual harassment. The LSH scale comprises of 10 hypothetical 
scenarios in which participants are asked to imagine themselves as having the 
organisational power to reward or punish a woman employee in various 
professional settings. Participants are then asked to rate the likelihood that they 
would use their greater power to exploit the woman employee sexually, if there 
was no risk of negative consequences for sexual harassment. The hypothetical 
scenarios focus on quid pro quo harassment which involves the exchange of 
employment-related rewards or the withholding of punishment in return for sexual 
activity (Mackinnon, 1979). It should be noted that the actual term ‘sexual 
harassment’ is not explicitly used in this scale. A number of researchers have 
argued that men who gained a high LSH score also scored highly on measures of 
adversarial sexual beliefs (i.e., the belief that men and women's relationships are 
antagonistic), acceptance of rape myths (i.e., the belief that women like, deserve, 
or seek to be raped), tolerance for sexual harassment, endorsement of traditional 
male sex-role stereotypes, and likelihood to rape (Pryor, 1987; Pryor and Stoller, 
1994; Bargh, Raymond, Pryor and Strack, 1995; Driscoll, Kelly and Henderson, 
1998; Woodzicka  LaFrance, 2005).  
More recently, researchers have explored whether high LSH scores are associated 
with particular personality traits (e.g. Pryor and Meyers, 2000; Bennett and 
Robinson, 2000 ). For example, Lee, Gizzarone and Ashton (2003) argued that the 
personality dimension of honesty-humility is correlated with scores from the LSH 
scale. According to Lee, Gizzarone and Ashton (2003), the honesty-humility 
dimension is defined by adjectives that suggest sincerity and trustworthiness 
versus deceit, greed, and conceit. High scores on this personality dimension 
suggest that an individual is sincere, trustworthy and is reluctant to exploit others 
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for personal gain whereas low scores indicate that an individual is deceitful, 
greedy, conceited and exploitative of others. For Lee, Gizzarone and Ashton 
(2003), the honesty-humility dimension is strongly and negatively correlated with 
questionnaire measures of exploitative-related traits such as primary psychopathy 
and Machiavellianism. They argue that in their study there was a negative 
correlation between LSH scores and scores on the honesty-humility measure 
which in this study is interpreted as indicating that those with exploitative 
personality traits are more likely to engage in sexual harassment. Lee, Gizzarone 
and Ashton (2003) conclude that such personality measures might be usefully 
deployed in the making of administrative decisions around the management of 
workplace sexual harassment. They suggest that once individuals with a 
predisposition to sexually harass have been identified, this information can be 
then be used to locate such individuals within working contexts considered ‘low 
risk’ for sexual harassment, such as those working units with low levels of such 
complaints.  
One difficulty arising from Lee, Gizzarone and Ashton (2003) study and indeed 
within this body of work in general, is the assumption that actual sexual 
harassment can be predicted from self-reported proclivities. As Gavey (2005) 
points out, a frequent criticism of self-reported tendencies to sexual/gendered 
violence is that is that this does not automatically translate into actual expression 
of sexually aggressive behaviour. Thus, the claim that sexual harassment can be 
predicted by self- reported propensity to harass is tenuous. 
The general implication of this body of work is that it is possible to identify a 
certain ‘type’ of individual who engages in sexual harassment. The negative 
connotations associated with this representation of the ‘sexual harasser’ positions 
this ‘type of man’ as deviant which serves to distance them from ‘ordinary’ men 
who do not engage in such conduct. The construction of the sexual harasser as 
deviant also positions the individual harasser as non-normative which functions to 
rarefy such conduct. Indeed, as Thomas (1997) points out, what further functions 
to rarefy sexual harassment is the focus on more extreme forms of it. As discussed 
earlier the LSH scale describes explicit and intentional sexual exploitation and 
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coercion. Thomas (1997) argues that the focus on such extreme manifestations 
works to divert attention away from less extreme, routine instances of sexual 
harassment. Thomas (1997) suggests that individualistic accounts that focus 
exclusively on ‘extreme’ forms of problematic conduct are unhelpful in terms of 
theorising ‘less dramatic instances of the phenomenon. This is because these ‘less 
dramatic’ instances appear to be expressed with relative frequency in the course of 
everyday life by ‘ordinary’ individuals, particularly men. In addition to this, the 
focus on sexual harassment as an individual problem or pathology can also 
distract attention away from the ways in which wider systems of 
organisational/gendered power can give rise to sexual harassment – in research 
working within more individualistic frameworks, it is the individuals misuse of 
gendered and/or organisational power which is framed as the problem rather than 
organisational/gendered structures per se. 
Consideration of such limitations of individualistic explanations of sexual 
harassment have turned attention to the theorisation of gendered roles and 
composition of occupational roles as a basis for sexually harassing behaviour. One 
such theory which has gained considerable popularity in the literature is Gutek’s 
sex-role spillover thesis. For Gutek (1985), sex-role spillover can be defined as 
“the carryover into the workplace of gender-based expectations that are irrelevant 
or inappropriate to work” (p. 17). More specifically, Gutek (1985) argues that 
spillover occurs when women are expected to behave in stereotypically feminine 
ways despite this not being an official requirement of particular employments. 
Sexual harassment may occur when a woman’s role as a sexual object spills over 
into the employment setting. As Gutek and Morasch (1982)  argue: 
“when women are propositioned by men at work, touched sexually 
or made the object of sexual comments or gestures, that is an 
indication of a spillover of sex-role expectations and behaviour 
into the work-role” (pp. 58-59). 
It has been argued that sex-role spillover is more likely to manifest in two kinds of 
employment contexts. Firstly, a woman employed in a traditionally masculinised 
job may experience spillover because her gender becomes perceptually 
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prominent. In this case, according to Gutek (1985), it is likely that the woman 
employee’s status as woman will be prioritised over her working role. Secondly, 
women working in traditionally-defined ‘woman’s jobs’ are also likely to 
experience spillover because the job itself is feminised. 
Whilst sex-role spillover theory has amassed considerable support from a body of 
experimental studies (e.g. Gutek and Cohen, 1987; Ragins and Scandura, 1995; 
Burgess and Borgida, 1997), it is not without problems. As Mott and Condor 
(1997) point out, within this theory, the notion of traditional sex-roles becomes 
problematised only when it spills over into the formalised, public sphere of the 
workplace. The theory does not problematise traditional gendered roles for men 
and women more generally. Indeed, the phrase sex-role spillover appears to tacitly 
imply that gendered roles may well be legitimate in contexts unrelated to work. 
Mott and Condor (1997) argue that sex-role spillover theory appears to draw on 
notions of the workplace as a public domain which is distinguishable and 
separable from the private sphere. In this way sex-role spillover theory can be 
seen as legitimising and (re)producing the public/private distinction (Samuels, 
2003). 
The public/private dichotomy and its conflation with masculine and feminine 
dualisms respectively have been conceptualised as central to traditional gendered 
divisions of labour. More specifically, it has long been argued that traditional 
understandings of wage labour as a male preserve have historically acted as an 
exclusionary mechanism against women’s participation in the workplace as well 
as preventing women from reaching higher positions within employment 
hierarchies (Mackinnon, 1979; Nicolson, 1997; Hearn and Parkin, 2001). The 
privileging of the masculine in this context has been broadly argued to reflect, 
(re)produce and maintain a wider system of gender inequalities in which men 
subordinate women. The phenomenon of workplace sexual harassment has been 
interpreted within some feminist theorisations as a means by which male 
dominance over women can be asserted and maintained in the workplace (e.g. 
Cockburn, 1991). Indeed, the public/private distinction has functioned to support 
the manifestation of unwanted gendered/sexualised behaviour on the job. As 
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Baker (2007) points out, women have often been denied legal recourse for sexual 
harassment because such behaviour has been deemed a ‘private’ concern or 
‘personal’ dispute. The troubling of the public/private dichotomy within feminist 
theory provided the basis for the phenomenon of sexual harassment to be 
recognised as not simply personal but also as political. More specifically, a 
number of feminist theorists have drawn attention to the ways in which sexual 
harassment is not ‘just’ a private interaction between individuals but a (power) 
relation embedded within social, historical and political contexts that shape and 
structure gendered/sexualised relationships (e.g. Thomas and Kitzinger, 1997; 
Hinze, 2004; Baker, 2007).  
The unsettling of boundaries between the public and private is reflected in 
arguments that the workings of organisations are thoroughly gendered and 
sexualised. As Brewis and Linstead (2000) note, gender/sexualities variously 
impact, shape and constrain the jobs people have and perform, employee 
relationships, the language used and spatial arrangements. Drawing on 
postmodern insights on gender, sex and organisational culture, a body of work has 
argued that workplaces are predominantly masculinised spaces in which 
masculinised ‘characteristics’ and identities such as individualism, rationality and 
competition are valued and prioritised. Hearn and Parkin (2001) argue that the 
prioritisation of the masculine within organisational discourse is reflected in 
metaphorical and literal references to gender and sexuality. They point to how 
organisational discourse draws on notions of heterosexuality in which ‘proper’ 
masculine sexuality is positioned as dominant and active and ‘proper’ feminine 
sexuality is positioned as subordinate and passive. As an example, Hearn and 
Parkin (2001) point to how terms such as ‘penetrating’ markets are used in 
business discourses and how in particular organisations, such as the military, male 
workers are encouraged to be more ‘masculine’ through a range of practices in 
which those who fall short of ‘proper’ masculinity are positioned as “poofs” or 
“women” (p. 50).  
More recently, there has been a shift within some organisations to work practices 
which have become gendered as feminine. This includes those which attempt to 
   29 
move away from masculine individualism and hierarchical stratification to those 
which emphasis team-working, delegated decision-making and individual 
empowerment (Benschop and Doorewaard, 1998; Metcalfe and Linstead, 2003). 
However, the deployment of feminised working strategies has variously been met 
with resistance by employees and/or has been re-located and embedded within 
masculinised social practices (Sheppard and Pringle, 2004). According to 
Ball (2004), the re-appropriation of feminised ways of doing work within 
normative masculinised organisational practices has functioned to reinforce rather 
than challenge traditional gendered orderings and structures within the workplace 
setting. 
How heterosexualised masculine ways of being become interwoven, prioritised 
and maintained within organisational culture opens up spaces within which sexual 
harassment is made possible. Sexual harassment is predominantly understood as 
working as a mechanism for the continued dominance of masculinity over 
femininity in the workplace and this is reflected in the typical expression of it as a 
gendered relation, as something that men do to women (Hearn and Parkin, 2001, 
2005; Stockdale, 2005).  For example, sexual harassment has been described as a 
means for individuals – particularly men – to assert masculinised identities at 
work. More specifically, the feminisation/sexualisation of women through 
sexually harassing behaviours works to distance the harasser from the feminine 
which has traditionally been seen as the antithesis to organisational life. Sexual 
harassment can also work to undermine women’s professional identities by 
drawing attention in various ways to their subordinate positioning in the gendered 
work hierarchy so that they come to be seen as women, feminine and sexualised 
bodies rather than workers (Nicolson, 1996).  
2.4 Sexual harassment as an adult, workplace relation 
Common to the literature outlined above is the coupling of the phenomenon of 
sexual harassment with working life. Indeed, whilst some research briefly notes 
that sexual harassment can occur in a number of contexts, it has nevertheless 
become inextricably intertwined with employment. The reification of sexual 
harassment as a workplace phenomenon has served to marginalise the study of it 
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outside this setting. As Fairchild and Rudman (2008) point out, this is 
demonstrated in the ways in which the sexual harassment of women by men in 
public places other than the workplace has been largely ignored in the social 
science literature. For Larkin (1997), the minimal attention paid to sexual 
harassment outside the work setting may function to downplay the occurrence of 
it in other spheres of women’s lives.  
As well as being predominantly constituted as a workplace phenomenon, sexual 
harassment is typically positioned as an adult relation. As alluded to above, the 
body of work on sexual harassment tends to focus on adult employees. When 
young people’s experiences of sexual harassment have been researched, it is 
adolescents rather than children that are focused on. In addition to this, adolescent 
and childhood experiences of sexual harassment have often been subsumed under 
the rubric of bullying. The problem with the absorption of sexual harassment 
within broader bullying discourses is the ways in which bullying literature more 
generally has tended to ignore how gender and sexualities shape incidents of 
harassment (Renolds, 2002). Johnson and Epstein (1998) argue that the lack of 
analysis of problematic, harassing gendered/sexualised behaviour between 
children reflects and (re)produces discourses of childhood innocence. 
In its predominant construction as an adult interaction, sexual harassment is also 
constructed as a specific kind of gendered relation – as something that men do to 
women. As Brewis and Linstead (2000) point out “the use of the female third 
person pronoun when referring to recipients of sexual harassment is so 
widespread in ... [sexual harassment] discourse as to almost escape detection” 
(p. 86). The same could also be said in relation to the use of the male third person 
pronoun to refer to initiators of sexual harassment within the literature. Indeed, 
some research claims imply that men cannot be sexually harassed. For example, 
Herbert (1992) maintains that men cannot be sexually harassed as men in general 
tend to have both institutional and personal power over women which, for 
Herbert, are preconditions to the manifestation of such behaviour. In contrast to 
Herbert, whilst many studies acknowledge that men can be sexually harassed, the 
focus generally remains on the sexual harassment of women by men. Lee (2000) 
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suggests that the focus on this particular gendered relation within much of the 
sexual harassment literature is embedded within the conceptualisation of sexual 
harassment as a power relation within which women are subjugated by men. 
Some studies have begun to explore the sexual harassment of men by drawing 
attention to the ways in which sexual harassment is used to regulate and police 
gendered/sexualised identities. Underpinning such work is theorisations of 
gendered/sexualised identities as inextricably connected to predominant notions of 
heterosexuality in which notions of normative femininities and masculinities are 
presumed to be heterosexual (see also Chapter 1). Within such work, sexual 
harassment of women/girls by men/boys has been conceptualised as a key site for 
the constitution of heterosexualised masculine identities. In a similar vein, it has 
been argued that sexual harassment can be used by both men/boys and 
women/girls to subordinate othered men/boys who do not embody hegemonic 
heterosexualised forms of femininity and masculinity (Epstein, 1997; Renolds, 
2002). Whilst such insights point to how sexual harassment is a key tool in the 
(re)production and regulation of gendered/sexualised identities, research 
specifically focusing on ‘non-typical’ gender configurations of victim-perpetrator 
relations remains a marginalised area of study.  
The construction of sexual harassment as a workplace phenomenon and as an 
adult relation in which men are the initiators and women are the recipients is 
webbed through a specific body of work focusing on a core concern within the 
literature: recipient non-labelling of experiences as sexual harassment. As 
mentioned above, the use of the term sexual harassment has not only been viewed 
as important because it enables women to trouble a variety of incidents but 
because it allows a specific kind of problematisation to take place. More 
specifically, a number of researchers have argued that the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ draws attention to the ways in which manifestations of sexual 
harassment are gendered and subordinating (e.g. Wise and Staney, 1987; Thomas 
and Kitzinger, 1995; 1997; Lee, 2001; Dougherty, 2006). The phenomenon of 
non-labelling has raised concerns that sexual harassment is being normalised 
and/or otherwise going unchallenged. These concerns have given rise to a 
growing body of research attempting to explain why non-labelling might occur. It 
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is this body of research which will be explored in the following sections. 
2.5 Feminising the Other: Professional identities  
As mentioned above, sexual harassment has been argued to work as a tool for 
undermining women’s professional credibility by locating women as 
feminised/sexualised beings which minimises their status as worker. Whilst the 
term ‘sexual harassment’ has been positioned as a means to challenge such 
expressions of gender inequality, it has been argued that non-labelling of 
experiences as sexual harassment variously functions as a way for women to stake 
claim to a professional identity within masculinist organisational cultures 
(Mumby and Clair, 1997).  
This can be seen in Mott and Condor (1997) which focused on constructions of 
sexual harassment in accounts by women secretaries. More specifically, 
participants in this study described instances where their position as woman-
secretary was treated as inferior to their male co-workers This was demonstrated 
in their positioning as primarily responsible for domestic tasks such as tea-making 
and/or their positioning as an irrational sexual object in which they were treated as 
‘dolly birds’, ‘bimbos’ and as something for men to ‘look at’ (p. 66). However, 
Mott and Condor suggest that these secretaries were reluctant to label these 
behaviours ‘sexual harassment’. Instead, such behaviours were dismissed as 
harmless because such comments were located as part of a humorous exchange 
with colleagues. This reluctance was bound up with constructions of the secretary 
as an equal work colleague and understandings of the ideal colleague. More 
specifically, constructions of workplace equality allowed women secretaries to 
situate themselves as an active equal participant rather than the passive object of 
male humour and sexualised fantasy and as such allows sexually harassing 
behaviour to be dismissed as ‘harmless’. Moreover, joviality was constructed in 
these accounts as an important characteristic of the ideal colleague and team 
member. Thus, Mott and Condor argue that secretaries who wanted to be treated 
as a full member of the working team cannot afford to be excluded from such 
workplace banter. However, the descriptions of sexual joking in this study appear 
to position women as inferior. This can be seen not only in the ways in which 
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women secretaries are positioned as the object of sexual banter but also in 
gendered dynamics of such interaction in which men are positioned as active joke 
tellers and women are the passive recipients of such jokes, that is, the men joke 
and the women laugh. For Mott and Condor, the acceptance and engagement with 
such humour as a means of maintaining or asserting status of equal colleague may 
be problematic because such banter can serve to reproduce and maintain images 
of the woman secretary as sexual object.  
Women entering traditionally masculine professions also have to work at having 
their status as equal colleague accepted. This is demonstrated in Hinze’s (2006) 
work on the ways in which the medical profession as a traditionally masculinist 
arena impacts and shapes doctors’ understandings of their experiences of sexual 
harassment. Hinze argues that women physicians who experience a range of 
gendered behaviour such as unwanted physical touching, sexist remarks and 
suggestive comments come to doubt their initial feelings of discomfort with the 
behaviour and question whether they are overreacting or being oversensitive. 
Rejection of the label ‘sexual harassment’ by these women doctors arose out of 
concerns that oversensitivity is the antithesis of constructions of the ‘good doctor’ 
which emphasise logic, objectivity and rationality. Thus by avoiding the framing 
of these experiences as sexual harassment, women were able to lay claim to an 
acceptable professional identity in this context. 
For Nicolson (1997), the socialisation of women doctors into the patriarchical 
culture of medicine has profound implications for the ways in which sexual 
harassment is viewed by those women who have broken through the glass ceiling 
into senior positions within the profession. She suggests that senior women were 
less aware of sexual harassment of other women doctors compared to more junior 
women staff and only paid attention to it if they were on the receiving end of it. 
As women gained more senior positions in the professional hierarchy they not 
only reject the label ‘sexual harassment’ to describe experiences but also dismiss 
problematic gendered behaviour as easily dealt with (see also Quinn, 2000; 
Nicolson, 1997). Nicolson (1997) argues that the framing of sexual harassment as 
easily dealt with suggests that these senior women have learnt to cope with such 
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behaviour. This coping strategy positions senior women as competent because 
they can successfully handle such incidents. This serves to distinguish senior 
women from other ‘incompetent’ women who cannot cope with such behaviour. 
However, Nicholson concludes that by privileging their professional identity over 
their identity as a woman, senior women fail to engage and maintain the ways in 
which the medical profession continues to position them as ‘other’.  
2.6 Locating blame 
As well as contributing to the negotiation and management of professional 
identities, women’s non-labelling has also been attributed to the issue of blame. 
According to Harned (2005), some women explicitly reject labels such as ‘sexual 
harassment’ or ‘sexual abuse’ because they feel at least partially culpable for their 
experiences of ‘unwanted sexual attention’. More specifically, Harned (2005) 
argues that some women did not feel that their experiences constituted a form of 
gendered/sexualised violence because they felt that they had “led the guy on” or 
“felt like a tease” (p. 396). Thus, it would appear that some women interpret their 
behaviour in some contexts as ‘provocative’ of men’s actions which positions the 
woman recipient as accountable and/or responsible for incidents of unwanted 
sexual attention.  
A plethora of experimental research has suggested that the endorsement of 
particular sexist attitudes by some women recipients may explain why they see 
themselves as provocative of unwanted sexual attention from men. It has been 
argued that such sexist attitudes are based on stereotypical beliefs about gender 
appropriate behaviour in sexual relationships (see, for example, Adams, Kottke 
and Padgiit, 1983; Baker, Terpstra and Larntz, 1990; Walker, Rowe and Quinsey, 
1993) . These stereotypical beliefs include the idea that it is a male prerogative to 
initiate sexual behaviour and to use pressure to gain sex with women (e.g. Gutek 
and O’Connor, 1995; De Judicibus and McCabe, 2001). Particular myths, where 
women provoke sexual harassment by misleading men into believing that they are 
interested in having sex, are also a feature of such sexist attitudes (e.g. Gutek and 
O’Connor, 1995; Koss, Goodman, Browne, Fitzgerald, Keita and Russo, 1994; 
Judicibus and McCabe, 2001). According to Jensen and Gutek (1982), women 
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recipients who hold such sexist beliefs are more likely to blame themselves and 
place responsibility on ‘victims’ more generally for their experiences of sexual 
harassment compared to women who held ‘feminist’ beliefs. Similarly, other 
studies have suggested that both men and women with sexist beliefs tend to place 
blame on the recipient for ‘provoking’ sexually harassing behaviour (e.g., De 
Judicibus and Mccabe, 2001). 
Some studies have also claimed that there are particular psychological features of 
women who engage in victim-blaming behaviour. For example, Cowan (2000) 
argues that the women in her study who engaged in victim-blaming behaviour 
“appear to have a predisposition to dislike and distrust women” and are generally 
‘hostile’ to women as a group (p. 244). Cowan (2000) further claims that some 
women’s hostility to other women is rooted in personal factors rather than 
political commitments. That is, women’s hostility towards other women is 
associated with low self-esteem and low levels of happiness and satisfaction with 
their own lives (see also, Cowan, Neighbours, Delamoreaux and Behnke, 1998). 
For Cowan (2000), such women are problematic because by blaming the woman 
victim and exonerating men perpetrators they are legitimising gendered violence 
and thus participating in the maintenance of such acts. Here, women who exhibit 
victim blaming behaviours are explicitly labelled as ‘hostile’ and lacking ‘normal’ 
psychological attributes. This serves to construct particular individual women as 
non-normative which works to distance them from ‘ordinary’ women. More 
generally, within this body of work, sexism is rooted firmly in the attributes of the 
individual. This serves to create the impression that it is only particular 
individuals who endorse sexism and engage in victim-blaming behaviours. By 
locating the problem of victim-blaming within individuals, the ways in which 
normative practices concerned with femininity, masculinity and heterosexuality 
produce and re-produce gendered patterns of victim-blaming, are overlooked.   
In contrast to individualist explanations outlined above, other researchers have 
explored the ways in which the location of blame in sexual harassment scenarios 
is constructed in relation to representations of masculinity and femininity in 
heterosexualised practices. For example, Barter (2006) argues that the way in 
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which feminine and masculine sexuality is constructed is inextricably tied to how 
blame is allocated to women recipients and men initiators of gendered violence. In 
her 2006 study, Barter conducted interviews with men and women based on a 
vignette which depicted a female resident – Helen – in a children’s home wearing 
her nightdress to the breakfast table. Helen proceeded to be ‘flirty’ with male 
residents in general but was particularly flirtatious with one male resident, John. 
Later on, Helen pushes past John and John touches her breast as she passes by 
him. Barter (2006) argues that the fictional character ‘Helen’ was constructed in 
the interview data as culpable for John’s actions. For example, Helen was 
portrayed in interviews as “asking for it”, “winding him up letting him think he’s 
in there” and “acting like a slag” (pp. 5-6)). In contrast, John was depicted as 
“acting like a normal lad”, and unable to “stop himself” because “it’s hard for 
boys that age” cause their hormones rule everything” (p. 5). Blame for the 
incident is placed on Helen rather than John because “she shouldn’t be allowed to 
act like that” (p. 5). For Barter (2006), traditional representations of feminine 
sexuality as passive mediate responses to sexual harassment through discourses of 
blame. ‘Helen’ is constructed as ‘provocative’ which sits uncomfortably with 
passive feminine sexuality. Thus, Helen’s ‘unfeminine’ behaviour is constructed 
as responsible for instigating boy’s ‘natural’, ‘uncontrollable’ masculinity which 
‘inevitably’ leads to sexual violence. Barter (2006) argues that, within this 
discourse, boys are positioned as victims of not only female provocation but also 
their own hormonally-driven sexuality. Paradoxically, women are constructed as 
in control of their sexuality. Given this, women are expected to protect themselves 
from male violence by altering their own behaviour. Thus, women who ‘fail’ to 
alter their behaviour are positioned as deserving of blame. For Barter (2006), 
these victim-blaming discourses ultimately leave women unprotected from, and 
responsible for, sexual harassment, whereas men remain unaccountable for such 
actions.  
Such victim-blaming discourses may translate into women recipients’ 
understandings of their experiences of sexual harassment. As mentioned above, 
some women recipients’ descriptions of the reasons why they had not labelled 
their experiences as ‘sexual harassment’ draw on victim blaming discourses – the 
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women recipient is represented as provoking unwanted sexual attention from men 
in some way (e.g. Harned, 2005). Thus, some women recipients become 
positioned within such discourses and come to understand themselves as 
ultimately culpable for sexual harassment (Cairns, 1997). Representations of 
women recipients’ culpability have become embedded within constructions of 
victimhood. More specifically, Richardson and May (1999), argue that women 
recipients of gendered violence become constructed as ‘innocent’ victims and 
‘accountable’ victims. Representations of the ‘innocent’ victim include women 
who subscribe to traditional feminine behaviours and who modify their own 
behaviour to protect themselves from male sexual violence. ‘Accountable’ women 
victims, in contrast, behave in a sexually provocative manner towards men and 
thus make themselves vulnerable to sexual assault by failing to modify their 
behaviour. According to Barter (2006), the consequences of being an 
‘accountable’ victim include the removal of particular ‘privileges’ which are 
reserved for innocent victims. Such ‘privileges’ include professional support 
services, recognition, and understanding. Given that women who are seen as 
culpable for their experiences of gendered violence do not necessarily obtain help 
and support, it would appear that such recipients would have little to gain by 
labelling their experiences as ‘sexual harassment’. 
2.7 Victim identities  
It appears that it is not only representations of the ‘accountable’ ‘victim’ that 
feature in accounts as a reason why women choose not to identify themselves as a 
recipient of ‘sexual harassment’. According to Kitzinger and Thomas (1995), 
some women refuse to use the label ‘sexual harassment’ to describe their 
experiences because they are unwilling to identify themselves as a victim more 
generally because of its associations with powerlessness, vulnerability and 
subordination. Similarly, other researchers have argued that some women refuse 
to identify themselves as the victim in sexual harassment scenarios because they 
wish to avoid particular connotations of powerlessness and passivity associated 
with victim status. Such negative depictions of victims include being weak, 
vulnerable, frightened, emotionally needy and out of control (see, for example, 
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Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983; Morgen, 2001).  
For Kitzinger and Thomas (1995), the term sexual harassment describes the ways 
in which women are subordinated by men through particular gendered acts. In 
light of this, Kitzinger and Thomas claim that women recipients who reject victim 
status by refusing to use the label ‘sexual harassment’ to describe their 
experiences are exercising the limited power that their subordinated position will 
allow. Since the rejection of both victim status and the label ‘sexual harassment’ 
forecloses access to formal routes of amelioration, Kitzinger and Thomas argue 
that this may lead such women recipients to cope with sexual harassment by 
making a joke of it, playing along or by ignoring it. According to Kitzinger and 
Thomas, these strategies for dealing with sexual harassment are potentially costly 
because they fail to problematise conduct explicitly and thus normalising such 
acts. It seems that for Kitzinger and Thomas, women’s rejection of powerless 
positionings are potentially problematic because it may lead to the adoption of 
particular coping strategies which fail to challenge sexually harassing behaviour.  
In a similar vein, the adoption of victim status has been seen by some researchers 
as playing a central role in legitimising various forms of gendered violence as 
problematic. For example, Burt and Estep (1981) argued that dominant 
representations of a range of coercive gendered practices typically normalise such 
acts. This serves to deny women a legitimate basis for problematising experiences 
of such behaviours. For Burt and Estep, the adoption of ‘victim status’ allows 
women recipients to be recognised as people who have been unfairly and unjustly 
treated which is important  for destabilising relations of power that deny that 
gendered acts are a form of victimisation. Whilst Burt and Estep acknowledge that 
the victim role can have negative connotations, they argue that victim status 
allows women recipients access to a range of benefits that are more difficult to 
obtain without it. These benefits include “the right to claim assistance, sympathy, 
temporary relief from other role responsibilities, legal recourse and other similar 
advantages” (p. 16). More recently, researchers have suggested that the 
positioning of women recipients of gendered violence as ‘victims’ has had 
enormous benefits in terms of allowing those who challenge such violence access 
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to funds and legislative apparatus for combating the problem (Ryan, 1992; Nolan, 
1998). Reich (2002) also claims that according victim status to women recipients 
of gendered violence has raised public awareness of violence against women more 
generally.  
Despite the potential that victim status has for legitimising women’s experiences 
of gendered violence, the presentation of victimhood as a tool for resisting sexual 
harassment has been questioned. More specifically, other researchers have 
suggested that representations of women recipients of sexual harassment as 
powerless victims work to consolidate patterns of male dominance and female 
subordination inscribed in gendered practices in general and gendered violence in 
particular (e.g. Gavey, 2005). However, women’s adoption of the labels ‘victim’ 
and ‘sexual harassment’ are framed differently in relation to the particular ways in 
which power, resistance and gender are constituted within this body of work. 
These issues will be addressed in the following sections. 
2.8 The problem of passivity 
Some researchers have argued that the labelling of particular acts as sexual 
harassment can be detrimental to women precisely because it serves to position 
women recipients as ‘victims’ (Gavey, 2005; Brewis and Linstead, 2000). Here, 
the accordance of victim status to women is seen as a problem because of its 
connotations with weakness, powerlessness and dependency. Since women have 
been traditionally represented as weak and passive in relation to men, the adoption 
of victim status is seen to reinforce such depictions of femininity.  
It has been argued that the reinforcement of such images of women is further 
compounded by arguments for ‘special protection’ in the form of legislation and 
policies. As Elshtain (1986) points out, conceptualisations in which women 
recipients are treated as victims in need of protection from sexual harassment 
perpetuate the idea that women are helpless and incapable of fighting sexual 
harassment on their own. Elshtain rejects this view of women recipients and 
instead argues that such protectionism should be abandoned in favour of 
consciousness raising empowerment. For Elshtain, women are capable of dealing 
with sexual harassment themselves and efforts aimed at dealing with sexual 
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harassment should be targeted at encouraging women to develop skills to tackle it 
at a personal level.  
Like Elshtain (1986), Roiphe (1993) suggests that arguments, rules and legislation 
which portray women recipients of sexual harassment as victims and depict legal 
protection as a necessity only serve to strengthen the image of women as weak 
and powerless. According to Roiphe, the label ‘sexual harassment’ and associated 
legislation should be reserved for coercive acts of power abuse such as quid pro 
quo sexual harassment which is defined by the ways in which employment 
opportunities are made contingent on employees submitting to unwanted sexual 
attention. However, Roiphe (1993) is particularly concerned about the ways in 
which ‘ordinary’ behaviours such as “leering and ogling, whistling, sexual 
innuendo and other suggestive or offensive or derogatory comments, humour and 
jokes about sex” (p. 100) have been constituted as ‘sexual harassment’ and those 
who experience such acts are treated as ‘victims’.  Roiphe suggests that these 
behaviours function as a normal part of everyday interaction and the danger of 
according victim status to women who experience such behaviours is that it 
suggests that women are incapable of coping effectively with any form of 
unwanted sexual attention. This, she argues, only serves to perpetuate women 
recipients as helpless, hapless and dependent. Given this, Roiphe argues that the 
label ‘sexual harassment’ and associated legislation is inappropriate for resisting 
and dealing with ‘ordinary’ behaviours outlined above.  
To deal with such ‘ordinary’ behaviours, Roiphe (1993) suggests that: 
“Instead of learning that men have no right to do these terrible 
things to us, we should be learning to deal with individuals with 
strength and confidence. If someone bothers us, we should be able 
to put him in his place without crying into our pillow or screaming 
for help and counselling … we should at least be able to handle 
petty instances like ogling, leering and sexual innuendo at a 
personal level” (pp. 101-102). 
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Here, Roiphe’s assertion suggests that women are not only able to control their 
own behaviour but that they are also able to regulate men’s sexually harassing 
behaviours. In Roiphe’s account, women are constructed as responsible for 
communicating to men that sexual harassment is unwanted which serves to 
position them as accountable for men’s behaviour.  
According to Brewis and Linstead (2000), discourses which construct women as 
individually and primarily responsible for stopping sexual harassment and 
discourses of victimisation which position women as weak, powerless and 
dependent are equally problematic. For Brewis and Linstead (2000), discourses 
which position women recipients as primarily responsible for regulating men’s 
sexually harassing behaviour serve to construct perpetrators as unaccountable for 
their actions. As Kurth, Spiller and Brown Travis (2001) point out, the emphasis 
on unwantedness in sexual harassment cases places the burden of responsibility 
on women for monitoring not only their own behaviour but also the behaviour of 
men. As mentioned above, women who are seen as failing to monitor their own 
behaviour and the behaviour of others often become constructed as culpable for 
sexual harassment and thus may be seen as an ‘accountable’ victim (e.g. 
Richardson and May, 1999). The location of blame within women recipients of 
sexual harassment works to undermine their claim to harm because ‘they didn’t 
stop it’ or because ‘they asked for it’ (e.g. Harned, 2005). This, as argued above, 
may discourage such women recipients from labelling their experiences as ‘sexual 
harassment’.  
Discourses of female victimisation and of female culpability seem to perpetuate 
conditions for the (re)production of sexual harassment. As Gavey (2005) points 
out, the construction of women recipients of gendered violence as helpless victims 
may work at a broader cultural level to maintain and perpetuate ways of being and 
acting that make behaviours like rape, sexual coercion and sexual harassment 
possible. For example, Gavey (2005) argues that such constructions of 
victimisation may reinforce representations of women as weak, passive and 
asexual, and depictions of men as having uncontrollable sexual urges and as 
potentially dangerous. Similarly, representations of women as primarily 
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responsible for regulating sexual harassment may reinforce images of men’s 
‘unruly’ sexual impulses. These representations are embedded within predominant 
discourses of heterosexuality in which women are positioned as passive and men 
are positioned as active (e.g. Gavey, 1993; 2005). For example, Jackson (1999) 
argues that within dominant constructions of heterosexuality, it is: 
“men who are expected to initiate sexual encounters and to 
determine the direction in which they develop…[the women’s] part 
is merely to acquiesce or refuse. Aggression is part of the man’s 
activity. He is not only expected to take the lead but to establish 
dominance over the woman, to make her please him…sexual 
conquest becomes an acceptable way of validating masculinity, of 
demonstrating dominance of and superiority over women” (p. 48). 
Such versions of heterosexuality have been drawn on in accounts of sexual 
harassment. For example, some forms of unwanted sexual attention directed at 
women by men have been represented as a reflection of those active and passive 
positions evident in ‘normal’ heterosexual relationships and can thus be thought 
of as ‘normal’ ‘courtship’ behaviour (e.g., Tangri, Burt and Johnson, 1982). 
Jackson (1999) further argues that if heterosexuality was not bound up with power 
and aggression, gendered violence such as sexual harassment and rape would not 
be possible. For Gavey (2005), such representations of passive femininity and 
active masculinity are further perpetuated by predominant representations of 
sexual violence which privilege women’s vulnerability to acts such as rape and 
sexual harassment over their potential for resistance.  
The construct of ‘survivor’ of sexual violence has been treated by some 
researchers as an means to counter predominant representations of women as 
passive, vulnerable victims. More specifically survivor discourses have been 
conceptualised as a space within which recipients of sexual violence can be 
positioned as agentic (e.g. Dunn, 2005; Hampton, Jenkins and Vandergriff-Avery, 
1999). However, the construct of survivor is not without issue. For example, 
representations of the ‘survivor’ can produce and reproduce a false dichotomy 
within which women are either passive objects or active agents (Reich, 2002; 
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see also Alcoff and Gray, 1993; Spry, 1995). Importantly, in contrast to other 
forms of violence such as rape, the construct of survivor is not widely used in 
sexual harassment discourses, particularly in cases where harassment is 
constituted as less extreme. Given the limitations of both the constructs of 
‘victim’ and ‘survivor’ for recipients of sexual harassment, the question is how 
recipient experiences can be legitimised whilst avoiding the (re)production of the 
victim as passive and powerless. 
The question of how we can move past representations of women as powerless, 
passive victims is further complicated by a predominant representation of women 
as ‘confused’ about the issue of sexual harassment. While women in general have 
been argued to classify a greater number of behaviours as sexual harassment 
compared men (Dougherty, 2006), a body of research has suggested that women 
recipients are uncertain and confused about what sexual harassment ‘is’ and need 
assistance in order to understand their experience of victimisation. For example, 
as Kitzinger and Thomas (1995) note: 
“despite decades of work surrounding sexual harassment issues, 
surveys repeatedly find that many women are uncertain as to which 
behaviours properly qualify as ‘sexual harassment’, and are 
unwilling to label male behaviour in this way” (p. 33).  
Brewis and Linstead (2000) argue that the construction of women as ‘helpless’ 
and ‘confused’ in sexual harassment scenarios “implies a learned helplessness, an 
understood inability to prevent or even understand men’s behaviour towards them 
and an understood dependency on others” (p. 89). This, Brewis and 
Linstead (2000) argue, may translate into women’s understanding of themselves 
as unable to confront such behaviour. Arguably, this may also translate into the 
ways in which some women define their experiences as something other than 
‘sexual harassment. For example, the ways in which some women question 
whether their experiences of sexual harassment are legitimately problematic 
and/or look to others to validate their experiences can be framed in relation to 
constructions which position women recipients as ‘unable’ to understand sexual 
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harassment ‘for what it is’ and as dependent on others (e.g. Brewis and Linstead, 
2000; Hinze, 2004; Madison and Minichiello, 2000). 
2.9 Revisiting Problematisation 
What is common to the body of work on the issue of non-labelling of sexual 
harassment reviewed is the tendency to represent women who do not label their 
experiences using this term as problematic. The problematisation of some 
women’s non-use of the label can be read as inextricably linked to notions of the 
term ‘sexual harassment’ as integral to victim resistance discussed earlier. This 
can be seen in the above literature which often couples the absence of the term 
‘sexual harassment’ in women’s descriptions of their experiences of unwanted 
gendered/sexualised attention with a failure to enact resistance to such conduct. 
This can not only be seen in claims made in the body of work discussed above but 
also in more subtle references to the problem of non-labelling. For example, part 
one in Kitzinger and Thomas’s (1997) book on the issue of non-labelling is 
entitled “refusing the label, declining to protest” (p. 19).  
For Lee (2001), the absence of the label ‘sexual harassment’ in women’s accounts 
of unwanted gendered/sexualised attention does not necessarily mean that such 
behaviour is going unchallenged. She points out that, in her own studies as well as 
other studies on the issue, women use a range of different means to constitute 
unwanted behaviour as problematic as well as a non-trivial experience. These 
terms includes “sexism” and “working in a sexualised environment” (p. 35). She 
argues that perhaps what is needed is an extension of the political vocabulary for 
describing instances of unwanted gendered/sexualised attention to allow recipients 
to label their experiences in ways that are meaningful to them. Similarly, Epstein 
(1997) argues that many expressions of unwanted conduct may not be labelled as 
sexual harassment because particular forms of gendered behaviour do not resonate 
with ‘everyday’ understandings of the term ‘sexual’. She argues that the use of 
other terms such as “sexist harassment” might resonate more with particular 
experiences (p. 156) 
In addition to Lee (2001) and Epstein’s (1997) work which points to alternative 
explanations for women’s non-labelling behaviour, I would argue that it is also 
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important to explore the implications of the predominant research focus on both 
women and non-labelling. More specifically, the focus on women recipients acts 
of (un)resistance against male power re-inscribes gendered discourses of women’s 
accountability for men’s behaviour – it is women that are constituted as primary 
in preventing men from doing sexual harassment. Examination of men’s role in 
the prevention of sexual harassment is rarely discussed. As aforementioned, the 
focus on women and importantly their possible culpability for unwanted conduct 
serves to redistribute accountability for sexual harassment. The focus on women 
as recipients more generally within this body of work functions to locate and 
(re)produce women as passive victims and men as active agents within hetero-sex 
which, as argued earlier, reflects the gendered power dynamic which has been 
argued to sustain the conditions under which sexual harassment is made possible.  
The problematisation of women in accounts of non-labelling also, as Lee (2001) 
and Epstein (1997) note, is based on a conceptualisation of non-labelling as 
problematic. Building on aforementioned researchers’ positions in relation to this 
argument, I would argue that implicit within the literature is a dichotomy which 
positions non-labelling as ‘bad’ and labelling as ‘good’. However, it appears that 
the implicit position of labelling as ‘good’ has functioned to distract attention 
away from the issue of how the label is applied and how the phenomenon of 
sexual harassment is variously defined and understood within the current cultural 
context. Importantly, the ways in which gendered notions of conduct and of power 
may become relevant, included or excluded from particular constructions of what 
sexual harassment ‘is’ in everyday accounts have lacked sustained critical 
analysis. To address this issue, this thesis seeks to explore the various ways in 
which sexual harassment is understood and defined in the current cultural context 
as well as focusing on how particular issues and concerns are excluded from such 
understandings.  In doing so, this project seeks to move away from the implicit 
dichotomy of labelling/non-labelling mentioned above.  
2.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to trace a path through current debates to make 
explicit the ways in which sexual harassment are predominantly constituted as a 
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specific kind of adult relation in which men subordinate women that occurs 
primarily in the context of the workplace. I have argued that the construction of 
sexual harassment as a workplace phenomenon can function to distract attention 
away from its occurrence outside this setting. In addition to this, the positioning of 
women as victims of sexual harassment serves to locate them as central to the 
project of resisting this form of sexual violence. This positioning of women can 
work to redistribute notions of accountability for the expression and prevention of 
sexual harassment as well as (re)producing the gendered power dynamic of 
feminine subordination/masculine domination. In a related vein, I have articulated 
the ways in which women’s resistance to unwanted acts have focused on the 
importance of labelling phenomena as sexual harassment. This particular 
conceptualisation of resistance appears to have produced a dichotomy in which 
labelling is conceptualised as ‘good’ and non-labelling as ‘bad’. In this thesis, I 
attempt to address this issue by exploring how the inclusion and exclusion of 
particular issues and concerns frame a multiplicity of narratives and accounts 
around the question of what constitutes sexual harassment. 
In the following chapter, attention is shifted from the issue of labelling 
experiences as ‘sexual harassment’ to a critical consideration of laws and formal 
policies designed to resist problematic gendered/sexualised conduct. 
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Chapter 3: Exploring ‘Solutions’ to Sexual Harassment 
3.1 Introduction 
The identification of sexual harassment as a significant social problem resulted in 
the formal recognition of this issue as a cause for concern, particularly in the 
workplace. During the early 1980s, sexual harassment was legally prohibited in 
the workplace in a number of countries. For example, in the USA, sexual 
harassment was construed as unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII Civil 
Rights Act and as a violation of the Human Rights Act in Canada (e.g. 
Mackinnon, 1979; Dzeich and Weiner, 1990). It was also taken up as an issue for 
trade unions (Trade Union Congress, 1983).  
In 1986, UK Courts ruled that sexual harassment fell under the rubric of the 1975 
Sex Discrimination Act which was designed to protect employees in the 
workplace from discriminatory conduct based on sex. According to Kitzinger and 
Thomas (1997), the constitution of sexual harassment as unlawful forced 
organisations and institutions to incorporate strategies for dealing with it. This can 
be seen, for example, in the widespread adoption of sexual harassment policies in 
the workplace (e.g. Hearn and Parkin, 2001). Indeed, legal prohibition of sexual 
harassment has sometimes been seen as a sufficient framework for its eradication 
(Collinson and Collinson, 1992). However, this position appears to be over 
simplistic in light of research which suggests that sexual harassment it is still 
endemic in all kinds of employment settings (e.g. Morgen, 2001).  
More recently in the UK, the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act was 
introduced which is intended to provide protection from any form of harassment 
in or outside the workplace. However, the ability of this law to deal with less 
extreme instances of sexual harassment has been questioned (e.g. Fairchild and 
Rudman, 2008).  
Given this, it appears that formal policies have been less than successful in 
eliminating sexual harassment. Despite the limited success of formalised 
interventions, there appears to be a general lack of research on effective policy 
implementation or sustained analysis of particular kinds of policies themselves 
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such as workplace grievance procedures (e.g. Thomas, 2004; Bagilhole and 
Woodward, 1995).  
In this chapter, I explore the ways in which formal prohibitions allow or constrain 
challenges to be made against sexual harassment. This chapter will begin by 
examining key influences on the development of sexual harassment employment 
law. I focus on employment law because formal prohibitions have primarily been 
developed to deal with sexual harassment in this context. Laws that have more 
recently been developed to deal with sexual harassment outside the workplace 
will then be discussed. Lastly, I will explore issues pertaining to the formulation, 
development and implementation of sexual harassment workplace policies. 
Throughout this chapter, I will unpack the various ways in which laws and 
policies may shape recipient experiences of seeking amelioration. It should be 
noted that US legal developments have impacted prohibitions in the UK. 
Therefore, this chapter will discuss aspects of US law in relation to sexual 
harassment in the UK. 
3.2 Issues of Equality 
Issues of gender equality have been explicitly raised as the basis on which sexual 
harassment is generally prohibited in law and many policy initiatives. More 
specifically, according to Zippel (2006), the positioning of sexual harassment as a 
form of sex discrimination underpins legal prohibition of it. This can be seen in 
the ways in which the issue has been taken up in law. As mentioned earlier, in the 
UK, sexual harassment has been primarily regulated by the 1975 Sex 
Discrimination Act which deals with sex discrimination against employees at 
work. This act does not outlaw sexual harassment per se. However, it prohibits 
any form of sexual harassment which can be read as a form of sex discrimination. 
According to the 1975 Sexual Discrimination Act, Section 1, sexual harassment 
has occurred when: 
“a person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances 
relevant for the purposes of any provision of this act if on the 
grounds of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or 
   49 
would treat a man” (p. 1)  
It should be noted that whilst the act specifically refers to discrimination against 
women, the law does provide the same protection for men. Thus, to subject a man 
to sexual harassment because of his gender could potentially amount to less 
favourable treatment and unlawful gender discrimination. According to Edmunds, 
Hopkins and Williams (1998), the way in which courts have made decisions about 
whether sexual harassment constitutes gender discrimination under the provisions 
of the act is to assess whether the conduct in question could be directed at 
individuals regardless of their gender. If conduct is deemed to be ‘gender neutral’ 
then, according to this version of UK law, sexual harassment has not occurred. 
According to Crouch (2001), the description of gender discrimination in this act 
resonates with the way in which equality is broadly conceptualised within liberal 
perspectives. Broadly speaking, liberal perspectives often draw on a version of 
equality which would argue that equals should be treated alike and unequals 
should be treated differently. However, for unequal treatment to be justified, the 
differences must be relevant to the issues at hand (e.g. Mappes and Zembaty, 
1992). The act resonates with this version of equality insofar as it appears to 
assume that men and women are or should be equal and thus should be treated 
alike (e.g. Samuels, 2004). 
Arguments which suggest that differential treatment on the basis of gender is 
necessary for a claim for sex discrimination to be upheld have been questioned. 
For example, Ranney (2000) suggests that this view of equality allows for what he 
terms the “equal opportunity harasser” defence. This defence rests on the 
requirement that, for sexual harassment to have occurred, behaviours must not 
only be offensive but discriminatory in the legal sense of the term. The distinction 
made between offensive and discriminatory behaviours allows initiators to make 
the claim that because their behaviour offends both men and women they are not 
guilty of unlawful gender discrimination.  
According to Edmunds, Hopkins and Williams (1998), this defence was used 
successfully in the case of Stewart vs. Cleveland Guest Ltd, where a woman 
   50 
complained about visual displays of nude or partially nude women in her place of 
work. In this case, sexual harassment was deemed not to have occurred because it 
was argued that a man may have been equally offended by these images. The 
logic of this argument suggests that for the law to be successfully used there must 
be a clear gender difference in men and women’s understandings of what counts 
as sexual harassment. What seems to be overlooked in this argument is that whilst 
men and women may be offended by a particular form of conduct this does not 
preclude that such conduct maintains forms of inequality that impact women and 
men in specific ways (Samuels, 2003).  
3.3 Sameness and Difference  
It is precisely consideration of the ways in which men and women’s lives are 
gendered that led Mackinnon (1979) to explore the limitations of the versions of 
equality which posit that equals should be treated alike and unequals should be 
treated differently. For Mackinnon (1979), this view of equality, which she terms 
the differences approach, is problematic because it fails to consider the 
complexity of gendered power relations. More specifically, she argues that gender 
is a hierarchically organised power relation with men occupying dominant 
positions relative to women more generally. This, she claims, is particularly 
salient in the workplace which has predominately been a masculinised culture. 
Thus the standards for acceptable behaviour in this context have largely been 
determined from a male perspective.  
According to Mackinnon, the differences approach fails to take into account this 
hierarchical organisation of gender relations. Instead, it posits men as the norm in 
relation to which women are compared and determined to be similarly or 
differently situated. Thus, for Mackinnon, if women are treated as if they were the 
same they may be disadvantaged. This is because their experience will be judged 
by a standard based on men’s lives which may not necessarily reflect women’s 
lives. However, if they are treated as different within the context of the 
differences approach they may also be disadvantaged. This is because they will 
still be judged in relation to the male norm and may thus be seen as demanding 
unequal protection or consideration. For Fredman (1997), this view of equality 
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accepts male as the norm without challenge which means that women are required 
to adhere to masculinised terms. 
In addition to this, particular inadequacies of the differences approach have been 
highlighted when applied to cases of sexual harassment in which expressions of 
gender inequality become interwoven with differential treatment based on 
sexualities (Beger, 2004). This can be seen in the 2003 case of Pearce vs. 
Governing Body of Mayfield Secondary School. Pearce was a lesbian teacher who 
was subjected to derogatory comments by the children which included ‘lesbian’, 
‘lemon’ and ‘lezzie’. She claimed that that treatment constituted discrimination 
under the provisions of the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act. According to Samuels 
(2004), this claim proved to be complex precisely because it was not only gender 
that was at issue but also sexual orientation. The specific difficulty that arose was 
with the legal requirement that individuals must be compared to another who is 
similarly situated. The argument was made that the correct comparator in this case 
was not a heterosexual man because this was not comparing like with like. Instead 
it was deemed that the correct comparator was a gay man. Moreover, it was 
argued that Pearce was subjected to a range of problematic behaviour which was 
inextricably connected to sexuality. Only some of these behaviours were regarded 
by the courts to have a gendered dimension. It was argued that this treatment must 
be looked at as a whole rather than being broken down to specific instances. 
Therefore it was concluded that a gay male teacher would have been treated no 
more favourably than Pearce in these circumstances. It appears then the 1975 Sex 
Discrimination Act provides little recourse for those subjected to heterosexist 
discriminatory practices precisely because it excludes non-heterosexual sexuality 
from understandings of gender discrimination.  
The Equal Treatment Amendment Directive (E.T.A.D) (2002) was introduced to 
address the difficulties outlined above with the version of equality incorporated in 
the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act. The E.T.A.D., unlike the Sex Discrimination 
Act, explicitly names sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination and 
prohibits manifestations which centre on gender and/or sexual orientation. 
Moreover, Samuels (2004) argues that it does not require a comparison with a 
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member of the opposite gender for conduct to be considered gender 
discrimination. This according to Samuels (2004), not only removes the 
possibility of the ‘equal opportunities harasser’ defense but also removes the 
problematic requirement highlighted by Mackinnon that involves women having 
to be compared to masculinised norms. However, like the Sex Discrimination Act, 
the E.T.A.D., relies on the establishment of conduct as more or less objectively 
‘unreasonable’ and ‘unwelcome’ for a complaint of sexual harassment to be 
upheld. It is to these issues that the discussion now turns. 
3.4 Unreasonable Behaviour? 
Notions of reasonableness have been drawn on in US and UK law in 
determination of sexual harassment cases. More specifically, court assessment 
involves whether it can be considered ‘reasonable’ to find the conduct in question 
offensive and unwelcome (Crouch, 2001). In US law, court assessment of 
reasonableness explicitly takes place not only from the perspective of the recipient 
but also from an objective standpoint. The need to assess conduct from the 
recipient’s perspective was meant to contextualise why behaviour was found to be 
offensive and unwelcome. The rationale for viewing conduct from an objective 
standpoint was based on the possibility that the complainant might be over 
sensitive and unreasonably offended by innocent behaviour (e.g. Samuels, 2004).  
In contrast, UK law adopts what Samuels (2003) refers to as a ‘subjective’ 
approach to the issue of reasonableness of conduct. According to Samuels, the 
subjective approach relies on the recipient’s perception of what is reasonable and 
acceptable conduct. This approach acknowledges that tribunals may differ from 
the recipient in their assessment of reasonable behavior. However, this does not 
mean that because the tribunal regards conduct as to a greater or lesser extent 
acceptable that the recipient’s complaint would be dismissed. Despite 
emphasising the importance of the recipient’s subjective point of view on the 
unacceptability of behavior, it appears that the need for objectivity is in implicit 
operation in court assessment. This can be seen in the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal’s claim that in assessment of conduct: 
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“any sensible adult [who] would know that the remark made was 
unwanted unless there were very exceptional circumstances. The 
word ‘unwanted’ is essentially the same as ‘unwelcome’ or 
‘uninvited’. No one, other than a person used to indulging in 
loutish behaviour, could think that the remark … was other than 
obviously unwanted” (EAT, as cited in, Gillow, Hopkins, Edmund 
and Williams, 2003: 10). 
However, this inevitably begs the question of who is this sensible adult? 
In the above quote, the construction of two distinct categories of people serves to 
create the impression that it is only a certain type of person who engages in 
sexually harassing behaviour. The ‘type’ of person that initiates sexual harassment 
is constructed, by virtue of the label ‘lout’, as deviant which serves to distance 
them from the sensible adult who knows, understands and follows normative 
standards of appropriate conduct. The construction of the ‘sensible adult’ does not 
fit in with other accounts of sexual harassment which have argued that behaviour 
that could be labelled as such is a common occurrence in many individuals, 
particularly women’s, lives (see Chapter 1). This is because ‘loutish’ behaviour is 
non-normative and thus rarefied.  
The construction of the ‘sensible adult’ resonates with the ‘reasonable person’ 
standard that is used to judge whether an incident counts as sexual harassment in 
USA legislation (e.g. Crouch, 2001). The reasonable person standard in sexual 
harassment cases refers to a hypothetical individual who is neither hypersensitive 
nor impervious to particular kinds of conduct in the workplace. It is this 
perspective of this hypothetical person which is drawn on by courts to assess 
cases. The description of the ‘reasonable person’ and the ‘sensible adult’ suggests 
a gender neutral perspective. However, many scholars and professionals question 
the presumption that the reasonable person standard is as neutral as it purports to 
be. 
As Debruin (1998) points out, using the word ‘person’ does not automatically 
make it genderless. Rather, the reasonable person perspective often embodies 
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masculinist assumptions. More specifically, objectivity and rationality which 
appear to define the reasonable person are often privileged in discourses around 
hegemonic masculinity. Connell (1995) argues that hegemonic masculinity refers 
to an idealised image of what it is to be a man in relation to representations of 
femininity and marginalised masculinities. The hegemonic idealised masculinity 
in the current western culture is heterosexual, aggressive, risk taking and rational.  
The feminised other is by contrast characterised as its binary opposite in that she 
is emotional, subjective and irrational.  
Women have often been characterised as: 
“inconsistent, emotionally unstable, lacking in a strong conscience 
or superego, weaker, ‘nurturant’ rather than productive, ‘intuitive’ 
rather than intelligent...suited to the home and the family. In short, 
the list adds up to a typical minority group stereotype of 
inferiority” (Weisstein 1993, p. 207). 
Such discourses around masculinity and femininity can work to prioritise 
masculinised identity and experience as the standard of what it is to be a ‘proper’ 
person. Similarly, other scholars have noted that the reasonable person standard 
represents the viewpoint of those who have the power to determine what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour. According to various research such as Crouch 
(2001), these individuals are largely men. The problem with this, according to 
Crouch is that particular masculinist perspectives may fail to see particular forms 
of sexual harassment as a cause for concern.   
Discourses of the masculine ideal and feminised other in their various 
manifestations have been used to validate discrimination against women. For 
example, Wilson (1992) argued that men are more likely than women to reach the 
higher echelons of the professional hierarchy because men are biologically 
predisposed to be competitive and because dominance is a personality trait which 
is determined by male hormones. The obvious implication of such ‘findings’ is 
that women by virtue of their biology can never enjoy the same successes within 
   55 
the workplace as men. Thus it seems that the reasonable person standard may 
serve to maintain discourses of male privilege that it seeks to undermine. 
Given concerns that the ‘reasonable person’ or ‘sensible adult’ perspective lacked 
impartiality, Monti (2000) argues that UK courts should adopt the ‘reasonable 
woman’ standard which has been used in legislation in the USA. The hypothetical 
‘reasonable woman’ was introduced to address the shortcomings of the reasonable 
person standard. The reasonable woman standard is predicated on the idea that 
men and women’s perspectives on the issue of sexual harassment are different. 
More specifically, it is based on the idea that women label a greater range of 
behaviours as sexual harassment than men do. Thus, the argument goes that 
particular conduct will not be understood as sexual harassment precisely because 
it is being judged from the perspective of men rather than women. The purpose of 
viewing cases from the perspective of the reasonable woman was to encourage the 
courts to take into account the perspectives of women who had not previously had 
a say in determining appropriate workplace behaviour. However, the employment 
of the reasonable woman standard as a solution to the problem of previous 
standards appears to be questionable. It is predicated on the assumption that men 
and women are fundamentally different monolithic categories and ignores 
similarities between men and women as well as differences in perspectives within 
gendered groups. 
This assumption of gender difference could reinforce particular forms of sexism 
that it seeks to counter. As Debruin (1998) points out, the introduction of a 
separate standard for women may support problematic representations about them 
which infer that they are sensitive, fragile and in need of more protection than 
men. As mentioned above, it is precisely such representations that were used to 
justify women’s subordinate position in the workplace. It would seem then that 
the reasonable woman standard does not directly tackle the main issue with the 
reasonable person standard, that is, that the latter standard represents the 
viewpoint of ‘men’. It appears to side-step the issue by introducing the notion of 
gender difference rather than challenging representations of the reasonable person 
as a masculinised standard.  
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3.5 Welcome or Unwelcome? Issues of consent  
For behaviour to constitute sexual harassment in UK law, it not only needs to be 
seen as unreasonable but also as unwelcome. According to Edmunds, Hopkins 
and Williams (1998), court assessments of early sexual harassment cases 
generally required evidence that the recipient had attempted to communicate to 
the initiator that conduct was unwelcome. This is because absence of the 
communication of unwelcomeness allows the initiator to make the argument that 
they could not know that particular conduct was offensive before they have 
performed it. The implication of this argument is that it is unreasonable to invoke 
legislative intervention at the outset because the initiator must have received 
feedback to know that their conduct is offensive. This, of course, potentially 
allows the manifestation of a variety of forms of problematic conduct to be 
performed and rejected at least once for the initiator to know that their behaviour 
was unwelcome.  
Despite the problems with the reasonableness standard in US law described 
above, it arguably functions to at least partially release the recipient from the 
responsibility of making it clear to the initiator that their conduct is unwelcome. 
However, there still appears to be the requirement that recipients of sexual 
harassment clearly reject problematic conduct (e.g. Samuels, 2004).  
Monti (2000) described guidelines that were designed to deal with the issue of 
consent in court cases. The guidelines state that with regard to ambiguous 
behaviour in particular the recipient must communicate to the initiator that the 
behaviour is unwelcome. However, these guidelines take into account that women 
may be afraid of the initiator and thus an indirect act such as leaving the room 
rather than direct confrontation would be sufficient in signalling unwelcomeness. 
Monti (2000) argues that these guidelines may well be seen as more sympathetic 
to difficulties around communication of welcomeness for recipients. For example, 
the lack of requirement for direct refusal of problematic conduct can be viewed as 
sensitive to some research findings which suggest that women use indirect 
strategies to cope with sexual harassment which include ignoring or avoiding 
behaviour rather than direct strategies which include confrontation (e.g. Gutek and 
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Koss, 1996).  
It is not only within court procedures that a clear statement of unwelcomeness has 
been required. In workplace policies and grievance procedures the initial step in 
dealing with sexual harassment often involves encouraging the recipient to ask the 
initiator to stop. In resources which give advice to employers on how to formulate 
‘effective’ policies this is sometimes positioned as a means to ‘empower’ the 
recipient (see, for example, Herbert, 1994). The possibility of the recipient’s 
reluctance to do this is often drawn attention to in these documents. In this case, it 
is often suggested that unwelcomeness is communicated by a third party such as a 
line manager (see, for example, Herbert, 1994). However, it could be argued that 
there are a number of problems with the representation of non-consent. 
Whilst the strategies do not require direct confrontation it could be argued that 
active demonstration of unwelcomeness is necessary to successfully win a claim. 
For example, the action of leaving a room to signal unwelcomeness could be 
described as an active manifestation of non-consent. The need for an active clear 
display of non-consent resonates with discourses around masculinities in which 
men are positioned as incapable of controlling ‘natural’ sexual urges (e.g. 
Hollway, 1989). As Pateman (1980) argued: 
“it is always women who are held to consent to men. The 
“naturally” superior, active and sexually aggressive male makes an 
initiative, or offers a contract, to which naturally subordinate, 
passive women “consents” (p. 164). 
The need for a clear display of non-consent can also be read in terms of the 
positioning of men as inept at tuning into the subtleties of social situations which 
require feminised attributes such as empathy and deep understanding of 
relationships (e.g. Walkerdine, 1990). 
In the above constructions of masculine and feminine sexualities, women are 
positioned as accountable for men’s behaviour. As Kurth, Spiller and Brown 
Travis (2001) point out, the emphasis on unwantedness in sexual harassment cases 
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places the burden of responsibility on women for monitoring not only their own 
behaviour but also the behaviour of men. Furthermore, women are often 
positioned as responsible for communicating explicitly otherwise subtle shades of 
meaning to initiators who would prefer to remain obtuse on such issues. This is 
evident in one manual on sexual harassment policy which stated that: 
“men often do not realise that their behaviour might be 
objectionable and stop the behaviour as soon as they are confronted 
with it” (Rubenstein and De Vries, 1993, p. 62) 
 
The emphasis on the recipient for making it known to the initiator that their 
conduct is unwelcome appears to prioritise the initiators belief about consent over 
and above the treatment that the recipient is subjected to. This resonates with the 
ways in which the issue of consent has been treated in sexual violence cases more 
generally. Historically, the legal test of consent in rape trials has been that if a 
man honestly believes that the woman is consenting then he cannot be convicted 
of the crime (Duncan, 1995; Raitt and Zeedyk, 2000). This serves to imbue men 
with the power to decide if a non-consenting woman is consenting without having 
to make reference to any external standard of reasonableness. This argument 
resonates with the ways in which consent is constructed in sexual harassment 
policy and law in that it appears to start with the premise that the initiator believes 
that consent has been given. Thus, it seems that it is the responsibility of the 
recipient to communicate standards of reasonableness. 
This issue of accountability is reflected in Dine and Watt’s (1995), argument that 
the potential impact of these guidelines is that the courts will assess whether the 
form of refusal was sufficient to display rejection of the initiator’s behaviour. 
Moreover, Monti (2000) argues that the guidelines fail to protect women who use 
alternative coping strategies such as participating in behaviour to defuse the 
situation or aligning themselves with the initiator to avoid being the recipient of 
problematic conduct. These kinds of strategies may be used to prove to the courts 
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that no objection was presented to the conduct in question. 
As has historically been the case in rape trials, the assessment of conduct as 
unwelcome in sexual harassment cases rests on the extent to which recipients’ 
conduct can be read as ‘open’ to and accepting of sexualised behaviour. As argued 
in Chapter 1, constructions of ‘provocative’ feminine sexuality are often 
positioned as problematic in that such behaviour deviates from acceptable passive 
femininities. Constructions of ‘provocative’ feminine sexualities have been drawn 
on in victim-blaming discourses to locate the women as accountable for their 
experiences of unwanted sexual attention as women recipients can be positioned 
as not discouraging male sexual attention. Edmunds, Hopkins and Williams 
(1998) argue that evidence of female ‘provocation’ has been introduced into court 
assessment. They argue that although evidence about the ‘recipient’s character 
cannot be used as a defence in a case, it can be used to reduce the potential 
compensation payout. This is because the amount of compensation awarded 
depends on court decisions about the degree of detriment suffered. This can be 
seen in the case of Wileman vs Minilec Engineering Ltd (1988) in which a woman 
complained that one of the company directors was sexually harassing her. In this 
case, it was argued that the courts need to take into account that the woman wore 
provocative clothing to work. On this basis, the detriment suffered by the woman 
was deemed to be not as great. Given this, the compensation paid to the woman 
was limited to £50. 
It appears then that representations of feminine sexuality are drawn on to establish 
the degree to which conduct could be considered to be unwelcome. The dress of 
the complainant in this case is seen to represent active seeking of sexual advances 
or conduct. As with the use of past sexual history of the victim in rape cases, 
specific constructions of the recipient’s style of dress, sexual attitudes and/or 
sexuality can be invoked to invite a response which inevitably blames the 
recipient for the predicament that they find themselves in (Gavey, 2005). It seems 
then for the complainants, particularly women, to be considered an unequivocal 
victim, they must behave in accordance to the representation of feminine sexuality 
as passive (e.g. Larcombe, 2002). The case of Wileman vs Minilec Engineering 
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Ltd appears to not only draw on this representation but reinforces the idea that 
woman should be passive by punishing what could be read as deviations from 
normative versions of femininity. 
3.6 Leaving the Office 
As has been highlighted above, in both research and policy, sexual harassment has 
been constructed primarily as a problem that arises in the workplace (see, for 
example, Mackinnon, 1979; Mott and Condor, 1997; Marin and Guadagno, 1999; 
Morgen, 2001). However, the introduction of the Protection from Harassment Act 
(1997) locates sexual harassment in the wider social context. Arguably, this has 
the potential to draw attention to the complexity of power relations and 
positionings that are not ‘determined’ or limited in any direct sense to the 
economic (see for example, Walkerdine, 1990).  
According to Budd, Mattison and Myhill (2000), the prohibition of sexual 
harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act (1997) arose from 
governmental concerns around the difficulties of seeking legal redress for stalking 
– a term which gained popularity in media portrayals of the issue  
Whilst the terms ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘stalking’ are used interchangeably 
within the legal literature, it seems that what distinguishes them is that forms of 
stalking may not necessarily have a gendered dimension (Conaghan, 1999). The 
1997 Protection from Harassment Act is intended to deal with any persistent or 
unwanted behaviour and the issue of sexual harassment becomes subsumed under 
this more general rubric. According to Conaghan (1999), “the Act does not define 
harassment with any precision” (p. 206). Instead it offers a general description of 
harassment as a “course of conduct” which must occur “on at least two 
occasions”, presumably by the same perpetrator (Conaghan, 1999, p. 206).  
The framing of the issue of sexual harassment within stalking discourses positions 
the issue outside the workplace within mental health discourses of ‘obsessional’ 
behaviour and/or within romantic discourses of the ‘unrequited lover’ (e.g. 
Gibbons, 1998). Within these discourses, the ‘harasser’ is often positioned as 
active initiator whereas the feminised other is positioned as passive. As noted in 
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Chapter 2, the positioning of masculine sexualities as active and feminine 
sexualities as passive is central to and are (re)produced within normative notions 
of heterosexuality. The power positionings of masculine and feminine sexualities 
within normative heterosexuality have been argued to be key to the (re)production 
and maintenance of sexual harassment. Issues around consent and non-consent are 
constructed in terms of presence or absence of sexual interest on the part of the 
recipient. The issue of sexual harassment can thus become framed within 
individualist conceptualisations of initiator-recipient relations – a 
conceptualisation which divorces instances of sexual harassment from wider 
social practices that sustain gender inequality (e.g. Gavey, 2005). 
Like workplace laws, the Protection from Harassment law draws on notions of 
reasonableness in assessment of evidence. However, within the latter Act, the 
reasonable person standard described above is applied to the perpetrator’s 
perception of the reasonableness of his or her actions that is the focus of scrutiny. 
More specifically, the Acts state that the harasser “knows or ought to know [that 
particular forms of conduct] amount to harassment of another”. When deciding 
what the harasser “knows” or “ought to know”, courts use the perspective of the 
reasonable person to determine whether information known to the harasser would 
subsequently contextualise behaviour(s) as harassment.  Conaghan (1999) argues 
that there are two main problems with the application of the ‘reasonable person’ 
standard in this context. Firstly, she suggests that the assumption that a reasonable 
person would know that behaviours could be deemed as harassment implies a 
degree of consensus on the issue of what counts as harassment in particular 
contexts which may not exist. Secondly, the Act only considers what is reasonable 
from the initiator’s viewpoint, not from the perspective of the ‘reasonable’ 
recipient. Conaghan argues that, given that sexual harassment is highly gendered 
with women predominantly positioned as victims and men as perpetrators, 
consideration of behaviour from the perpetrators viewpoint most probably 
assumes normative masculinised assumptions of appropriate behaviour. Therefore 
problems with the reasonable person standard outlined above also apply to the 
application of this Act. 
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3.7 Challenging Sexual Harassment? 
The arguments presented above indicate that the law reproduces and maintains 
specific forms of gendered/heterosexualised assumptions that it was intended to 
counter. More specifically, it appears to reproduce heterosexualised gender 
differences that position the masculine and feminine in binary opposition such as 
active-passive, subjective-objective, rational-irrational, emotive-non-emotive. As 
argued above, these representations have worked to exclude the feminised other 
from privileged positions in the workplace. However, legal prohibition has 
appeared to be a primary motivator in encouraging the regulation of this 
behaviour in the workplace. This issue will be addressed in the following sections. 
3.8 Workplace policies  
According to Ranney (2000), in recent years there has been a proliferation of 
resources for employers available on how to draft and implement a sexual 
harassment policy. The opening pages of some resources on how to tackle sexual 
harassment in the workplace make reference to cumulative costs that may result 
from failing to deal with it effectively. These costs include loss of employee 
productivity, paying sick leave and/or replacing staff that choose to leave as a 
result of their treatment (e.g. Edmunds, Hopkins and William, 1998). The legal 
implications for organisations arising from failure to tackle sexual harassment are 
primarily described in terms of financial losses in the form of compensation if the 
employer is found liable (e.g. Herbert, 1994). The potential for damage to an 
organisation’s reputation is also highlighted in some literature as a likely inhibitor 
of economic productivity (e.g. Levy and Paludi, 2002). More specifically, an 
organisation that gains a reputation for allowing conditions that give rise to sexual 
harassment runs the risk of losing potential employees, investors and customers 
all of which are constructed as potentially impacting a company’s desired 
financial productivity. Thus, the importance of adopting formalised procedures to 
deal with sexual harassment in the workplace is primarily embedded within profit 
and loss discourses within much of the literature on sexual harassment policy. 
Sexual harassment policies are thus warranted by the extent to which such 
conduct presents a barrier to profitable business rather than as a challenge to 
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gendered power relations per se.  
Whilst the profit and loss discourse appears to be ‘gender-neutral’, it can be 
argued to be embedded within constructions of the workplace as masculinised. 
Hearn and Parkin (2001) argue that success in the workplace is central in the 
expression of particular masculinities. For example, competition and 
ambitiousness, which are typically constructed as ‘masculine traits’, are expressed 
through hierarchical advance, careerism and economic productivity. According to 
Hearn and Parkin (2001), competition often reflects the ways in which those in 
masculine positionings are constructed as the ‘breadwinner’. The profit and loss 
discourse appears to resonate with particular masculine ideals of competitiveness 
and success within the organisational setting (see also Connell, 1995).  
Indeed, the profit and loss discourse has been credited by some researchers as one 
impetus for some organisational engagement with the development of sexual 
harassment policy. For example, Williams, Cocking and Davies (1989) argued 
that universities were generally complacent about the implementation of equal 
opportunities policies which at the time were partly designed to provide protection 
against sexual harassment. However, Morley (1997) notes that during the 1990s 
many organisations began to market themselves as investors in equal 
opportunities. For example, in universities there was a rapid proliferation of 
slogans such as ‘working towards equal opportunities’ on stationery and on 
adverts (e.g. Thomas, 2004). According to Morley (1997), the concern within 
universities about sexual harassment reflects the move towards managerialism 
that was beginning to take root in these institutions. Universities were increasingly 
positioning themselves as a business and because of this they were becoming 
more sensitive to the need to market themselves both to the student ‘clientele’ as 
well as towards potential employees. Therefore, through the adoption of equal 
opportunities and sexual harassment policies, universities were able to present 
themselves as ‘forward looking’. 
Morley’s work draws attention to the ways in which the constitution of sexual 
harassment within a profit and loss discourse resonates with the concerns of 
particular organisations. This discourse positions sexual harassment policy as 
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central to the functioning of a profitable business rather than as a peripheral 
concern. Thus, the constitution of the need for policies within a profit and loss 
discourse may encourage organisational engagement with this issue. 
Whilst organisational concerns about potential costs of sexual harassment may 
give rise to policy development, these issues may be translated into policy and 
practice in variable ways which do not necessarily represent an effective 
challenge to such conduct. This can be seen in what Thomas (2004) identified as a 
‘top down’ approach to policy development. According to Thomas, this approach 
is associated with concerns about employer liability which gained increased 
emphasis during the 1990s. These concerns appear to be reflected in the content of 
‘top down’ policies. What appear to be emphasised are the legal implications of 
sexual harassment. These can be seen in the use of definitions of sexual 
harassment which highlight the legal repercussions of harassment as a form of 
discrimination under the provisions of the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act. The 
distinctly legalistic tone of such policies is further reflected in accounts of specific 
procedures to deal with sexual harassment. For example, in Thomas’s study, one 
policy document described dealing with sexual harassment as: 
“a very serious matter and must be handled properly through 
defined procedures. Anyone considering making a complaint … 
should seek guidance (pursuant to paragraph 4 above) and, if a 
complaint is made under the appropriate complaints procedure … 
and is upheld, it will be handled in accordance with … disciplinary 
procedures.” (p. 150). 
Issues that appear to be prioritised in this extract are formality of protocols and 
due process which serve to create the impression that the organisation is working 
in line with legislation.  
Thomas (2004) points to a contrast between the legalistic tone of ‘top down’ 
policies and a more recipient-orientated stance adopted by ‘consultative’ 
approaches to policy development. In policies developed from a ‘consultative’ 
approach, there appears to be less emphasis on legal implications. This can be 
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seen in the use of definitions that highlight that sexual harassment is a problematic 
and contested concept. Thomas (2004) argues that by emphasising the ambiguity 
of some forms of sexually harassing conduct, this approach may encourage 
individuals to seek advice in ‘grey area’ situations. 
In ‘consultative’ approaches sexual harassment is constructed as a community 
concern. This can be seen in an extract from Thomas’s study where the policy 
stated that 
“the university is committed to acting positively to resolve the 
issue of sexual harassment and is involved in a programme of staff 
training to heighten awareness about this important issue and to 
contribute to its prevention…All staff and students are responsible 
for helping to ensure that individuals do not suffer sexual 
harassment and that they are encouraged and supported in any 
legitimate complaint” (p. 149) 
Unlike in top down policies, sexual harassment is constructed as a social problem 
which requires all individuals to take some responsibility for tackling it. This 
approach draws on notions of care when describing responses to the recipient 
which are absent in the ‘top down’ policies. 
According to Thomas (2004), these two styles of policy development impact 
levels of reporting with institutions that use the consultative approach reporting 
more usage of policies to report incidents of sexual harassment than those using 
top down approaches. It could be argued that the legalistic tone of ‘top down’ 
policies functions as a sufficient deterrent which would explain low reporting 
levels. However, given that there is a large body of research which suggests that 
sexual harassment is widespread despite formal mandates against it, it would seem 
that this interpretation is unlikely (e.g. Thomas and Kitzinger, 1997). Thomas 
(2004) argues instead that ‘top down’ policies may inhibit reporting while 
‘consultative’ approaches may serve to encourage reporting or at least be less 
discouraging of it. She suggests that the language used in the policy may be 
important in terms of the degree of support that it conveys to potential 
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complainants. Some research suggests that individuals are reluctant to report 
sexual harassment because they lack confidence in the policy and its ability to 
provide them with support in dealing with the situation at hand (e.g. Thomas, 
1997). Therefore policies which prioritise recipient care rather than legal 
ramifications may encourage reporting.  
A further aspect of these two policy styles that may affect reporting is the way in 
which sexual harassment is constituted as a problem. Thomas (2004) argues that 
‘top down’ policies tend to construct sexual harassment as a personal problem 
resulting from interpersonal conflict which will be arbitrated by employers if the 
problem becomes sufficiently bothersome. This particular message may not be 
conducive to facilitating reporting. The framing of sexual harassment as an 
individualised predicament may heighten recipient concerns about the impact that 
complaining will have on other people’s perceptions and responses of them. Some 
research suggests that recipients will often not report incidents and instead choose 
to leave their employment rather than run the risk of acquiring a reputation for 
being a troublemaker or ‘making a fuss’ (e.g. Morgen, 2001). In contrast 
‘consultative’ policies construct sexual harassment as detrimental to the 
organisational community at large which positions it as a wider social problem. 
Thomas (2004) argues that this in itself may reduce the sense of personal shame 
that those experiencing sexual harassment often feel which in turn may facilitate 
reporting and taking action against it. In addition to the style of policy adopted, 
the specific procedures for reporting used appeared to impact whether recipients 
complained about sexual harassment. It is to these different procedures for 
reporting sexual harassment that the discussion now turns. 
3.9 Formal or Informal? 
Resources for employees on how to deal with sexual harassment tend to depict 
informal and formal strategies for redress as dichotomous stages in the grievance 
procedure. The first stage is informal where, as mentioned above, the recipient is 
encouraged to ask the initiator to stop. If the recipient is reluctant to do this, 
mediation between the two parties by a third person is suggested. In the event that 
the incident(s) alleged to have occurred is considered too serious for informal 
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resolution or when this route fails to remedy the situation then formal procedures 
are suggested. The formal procedure involves an investigation into the incident(s) 
and could potentially result in disciplinary measures against the initiator.  
In Thomas’s study, top down approaches to policy development were associated 
with more formal reporting procedures which involves recipients filing a 
complaint with their immediate superior such as a line manager. The obvious 
problem with this approach is that the immediate superior to whom the recipient 
should complain could be the initiator of sexual harassment. For this reason, 
policies that use this kind of reporting procedure typically outline other superiors 
that can be approached with a complaint (e.g. Nobile, 1994).  In contrast, 
consultative policies tended to employ an informal advice network which is 
intended to enable individuals to discuss incidents or problems. Responsibility for 
dealing with cases at least in the first instances rests with an equal opportunities 
body rather than with line managers or personnel departments (e.g. Herbert, 
1994). This reporting procedure does not have any official implications and 
allows the recipient to work through  a course of action with an advisor to deal 
with sexual harassment that they feel comfortable with. Thomas (2004) suggests 
that the informal reporting procedure is associated with higher levels of reporting 
compared to the more formal approach. Similarly, other researchers have 
suggested that informal resolution is the preferred procedure by many recipients. 
This appears to be because it avoids the possibility of conflict, confrontation and 
hostility that may result from accusing someone formally of sexual harassment. 
Instead, the informal approach concentrates on mediation and negotiation of 
problematic relationships with a view to making those relationships ‘workable’. It 
is often emphasised that records of the meeting or accusation should not be kept 
on the initiator’s file (e.g. Herbert, 1994).  
Informal resolution is often presented as a desirable approach because of the lack 
of success of more formal reporting procedures in encouraging individuals, 
particularly women, to make complaints. More specifically, some scholars have 
argued that the ineffectiveness of formal procedures in encouraging reporting can 
be attributed to the ways in which hierarchical and formal reporting procedures 
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incorporate male bias.  
For example, Riger (1993) claims that formal procedures involve a distinctly 
masculinised approach to dealing with conflict which are characterised by direct 
confrontation. For Riger, this style of problem resolution is inimical to women 
because it is not compatible with women’s style of conflict resolution. Women, 
according to Riger, prefer informal procedures because their ‘caring orientation’ 
makes them more interested in stopping behaviour through, for example, 
education rather than punishing offenders.  
Whilst, Riger’s (1993) work suggests that the adoption of informal procedures 
may increase the efficacy of policy intervention in terms of encouraging women 
to report, Ranney (2000) cautions against the introduction of informal procedures 
as a means of correcting gender bias. More specifically, he argues that the ‘caring’ 
orientation of women may reflect the subordinate positions that they occupy in the 
workplace. Women are often resigned to having less power at work than men. 
Thus, the reluctance to draw on formal procedures may be a reflection of their 
relative power position. Ranney (2000) argues that women may lack confidence 
that they can ‘win’ when challenging those who occupy more powerful positions. 
Accordingly, recipients of sexual harassment often develop alternative procedures 
for dealing with it. These alternative strategies include avoiding the situation by 
leaving their employment, using leave to allow the situation to ease or ignoring 
the situation with the hope that the initiator will stop.  
It would seem that both Riger’s (1993) and Ranney’s (2000) argument construct 
sexual harassment as a heterosexualised problematic behaviour in which women 
are the recipients and men are the initiators. Riger’s account appears to reproduce 
men and women as binary opposites which are characterised by active and passive 
positionings. Similarly Ranney’s account positions men as active and women as 
passive. Therefore it could be argued that both accounts reproduce positionings of 
men and women that are often constructed as crucial to the maintenance of sexual 
harassment itself.  
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Within some resources for employers on how to deal with sexual harassment, 
informal resolution appears to be constructed as a means of resuming normal 
working relationships. For example, Herbert (1994) argues that the aim of the 
informal stage is for “swift resolution, stop the behaviour from being repeated and 
enable working relationships between all parties to be resumed” (Herbert, 1994, 
p. 44). As Herbert’s quote emphasises, the informal resolution phase is presented 
in resources as being about the facilitation of productivity of workers rather than 
necessarily challenging gendered conduct per se. Indeed, Mitchell (1997) raises 
concerns about the ways in which informal resolution has been deployed as a 
strategy for dealing with sexual harassment. More specifically, informal 
resolution may serve to trivialise complaints. This is because informal resolution 
is often framed as a process of working through an interpersonal problem. This 
may serve to set sexual harassment up as a conflict or emotional problem to be 
resolved by both parties rather than as an infringement of civil or equal rights. 
Mitchell argues that this downplays sexual harassment as an unlawful act of 
discrimination and reframes it instead as an impropriety. This resonates with the 
problems around formalised ‘top down’ approaches outlined earlier. It seems then 
that informal and formalised approaches can potentially trivialise sexual 
harassment as a private problem depending on the way in which that they are 
framed and deployed in policy and practice.   
Mitchell’s (1997) concern about informal resolution is that, when it is presented 
as a prerequisite to formal procedures, this might serve to trivialise complaints of 
sexual harassment. She argues that it may also serve the interest of organisations 
rather than the interests of the complainant themselves. This is because 
organisations may be able to successfully avoid being embroiled in legal 
procedures and potentially negative publicity through the informal route. In 
contrast formal procedures may highlight the importance of the recipients 
experience by positioning it as a potentially unlawful act. 
The formal stage of policy is presented as an investigation that is not unlike some 
police procedures for dealing with sexual violence. This stage involves collecting 
evidence in the form of interviews with the recipient, alleged initiator(s) and 
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witnesses. The evidence will then be presented to a panel that make a decision 
about whether sexual harassment has occurred. In the case where there is no 
corroborative evidence, sexual harassment can be inferred if the initiator has been 
accused of similar behaviour before (Herbert, 1994). In practice Herbert’s 
suggestion may be difficult to institute. As mentioned earlier, it appears that not 
only is reporting of incidents low but also if they are reported and resolved 
through the informal route there will be no record of similar accusations. 
Therefore it can be argued that in practice many cases would lack this basis from 
which inferences can be made. Thus it could be argued that this practice 
effectively erases experiences as well as potential corroborative evidence. This 
lack of record-keeping may also function to create the impression that sexual 
harassment is rare (e.g. Gregory and Lees, 1999). Importantly, a decision at this 
stage that sexual harassment has not occurred due to insufficient evidence may 
serve to discredit the recipient and create the impression that the complaint was 
false. This may shape how the recipient is understood by the wider social network 
of which he or she is a part. For example, Gavey (2001, 2005) argues that 
dominant understandings of false complaints in rape cases represent men as in 
need of protection from lying scheming and vindictive women. This 
representation is echoed in Eisenman’s (2002) work which represents men as 
frequent victims of a system that investigates false complaints made by women 
about sexual harassment. Thus the ways in which formal procedures are deployed 
and understood may also work to trivialise experiences.  
3.10 Summary 
In this chapter, existing ‘solutions’ to the issue of sexual harassment have been 
delineated and evaluated. The ways in which formalised codes of practice and 
legislation are often treated as a complete and sufficient framework for bringing 
about an end to sexual harassment have been questioned. More specifically, I have 
explored the challenges posed by and limitations of these forms of redress with 
reference to how they may produce and reproduce dominant assumptions about 
gender and sexuality.    
The question that could be asked at this point is how manifestations of sexual 
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harassment can be eliminated if the search for ultimate watertight solutions is 
abandoned. It should be noted that I am not arguing that policies and legislation 
are totally futile. Rather, I view such efforts as a necessary and important phase in 
the process of challenging such behaviour. Legal challenge against sexual 
harassment can be considered useful in terms of drawing attention to the 
unacceptability of this form of behaviour as well as providing a system of 
recourse. However, I would argue that to view the implementation of policy as 
essentially ‘good’ is simplistic. Instead, I suggest that perhaps a more fruitful 
approach is to open up understandings of how this issue should be dealt with to 
critical scrutiny (see Chapter 8). In the next chapter, I will introduce core 
theoretical and reflexive issues that shape and frame this project in general and 
data collection in particular. 
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Chapter 4: Locating the Project: Psychology, Power and the Production of 
Otherness 
4.1 Introduction 
One issue I have sought to highlight in the preceding chapters is the ways in 
which the feminine often becomes othered in relation to the masculine. Broadly 
speaking, it has been noted that the femininised other routinely becomes 
problematised and positioned as subordinate in relation to normative masculinities 
within sexual harassment discourses. In this chapter, I shift focus somewhat to 
issues of otherness which impacted and shaped the development of this project.  I 
begin by locating this research within the broader institution of psychology. More 
specifically, the positionings of this work as feminist, qualitative and ‘sensitive’ 
have predominantly been situated as other in relation to mainstream psychology. 
The othered status of these areas of study is reflected in the ways in which 
specific research concerns arising from such work are often marginalised within 
formal guidelines and advice. To illustrate this point, I discuss the limitations of 
the British Psychological Society’s guidelines on ethical conduct for dealing with 
issues that faced me in the production of this research. Lastly, the ways in which 
issues around otherness impacted participant relationships and recruitment in this 
project is reflexively considered. 
4.2 Feminism(s) as ‘Other’ 
The location of this project within feminist theorisations positions this work more 
broadly within a complex, often turbulent relationship between feminism(s) and 
psychology. More specifically, feminist psychological work has simultaneously 
both influenced and been marginalised from the mainstream of the discipline. For 
example, feminist psychological perspectives on the centrality of gender in 
understanding and making sense of aspects of the social world are, to some extent, 
impacting mainstream psychology practice. As Burman (1998) points out: 
“feminist critiques of the white, middle-class, male, rational, 
problem-solving subject of psychology are currently having some 
impact [on mainstream psychology]. This is reflected in academic 
psychology courses on gender and psychology, and especially the 
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‘psychology of women’, and in the statutory sector of health and 
welfare provision with the funding and organisation of specialist 
services for women, including women’s therapy centres” (p. 1).  
However, the success of feminist critiques of problematic mainstream 
psychological thinking is curtailed by the ways in which feminist psychologies are 
variously positioned as a ‘special’ interest (Marecek, 1995) “optional extra” 
(Burman, 1998: p. 1), and as ‘other’ in relation to the mainstream. 
Wilkinson (1997) notes three exclusionary practices operating within psychology 
which has functioned to ‘other’ feminist psychologies. According to Wilkinson 
(1997), these practices include: (1) physical exclusion and hostility, (2) exclusion 
by definition and, (3) exclusion by liberal rhetoric. The first of these practices 
refers to the physical exclusion of women in general and feminist psychologists in 
particular from the mainstream. Wilkinson (1997) argues that physical exclusion 
manifests in women’s minimal representation in academic and practice posts in 
the psychological profession. For example, Wilkinson (1997) suggests that while 
women outnumber men on undergraduate psychology courses, men tend to 
outnumber women in the academic psychology faculty as well as in other higher 
level posts such as senior positions within clinical psychology (see also Blaine, 
2007). Wilkinson (1997) argues that this inequality in women’s representation in 
psychology is underpinned by a wide range of practices including, negative or 
gender-biased representation of women in many mainstream textbooks and 
minimal representation of women in senior membership grades on the BPS. It 
should be noted that Wilkinson (1997) does not appear to equate women in 
general with feminism or feminist psychologies. Rather, the argument presented 
here suggests that women’s general exclusion from the mainstream coupled with 
problematic representations of women within the literature make it difficult to get 
feminist issues on the agenda and taken seriously because women and issues 
related to them are othered in this process of exclusion. 
The second practice of marginalisation discussed by Wilkinson (1997) –  
exclusion by definition – centres on epistemological concerns of what legitimately 
counts as psychological knowledge. According to Wilkinson (1997), the 
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thoroughly politicised position(s) of feminism(s) are constructed as at odds with 
psychology as an objective science. Thus, by drawing on a series of dichotomies – 
political/non-political, subjective/objective, science/non-science – feminist work 
can be legitimately excluded from the mainstream because it does not produce 
‘objective’ knowledge.  The possibility that subjective bias on the basis of gender, 
race, disabilities and so on may operate within psychology is defused by recourse 
to the ways in which psychology operates in accordance to non-discriminatory 
stances, policy and law. Wilkinson (1997) argues that such arguments often draw 
on the ‘exclusion by liberal rhetoric’ which refers to the ways in which 
psychological institutions such as the BPS draw on liberal conceptualisations such 
as  non-discrimination, meritocracy and equal opportunities to deflect political 
challenges made by feminist work to the mainstream.  
The legitimacy of feminist knowledges in psychology is called into question by 
these various processes of marginalisation. The positioning of feminist 
psychologies as Other may mean that feminist knowledges are trivialised, not 
engaged with and/or misunderstood by mainstream researchers. To de-marginalise 
feminist informed work, to legitimise feminist knowledges, “to make effective 
interventions in mainstream psychology, to have an impact through journals, 
books and conferences, then...[feminist psychologists] have to engage (to varying 
degrees) with the mainstream” (Wilkinson, 1997b: p. 248). This engagement can 
be costly with politicised messages being downplayed and/or lost (Wilkinson, 
1997b).  
4.3 Qualitative methodologies as ‘Other’ 
Like feminist influences in psychology, qualitative methodologies have also 
occupied a marginal position in relation to mainstream psychology. The outsider 
status of qualitative methods in psychology is intimately bound with psychology’s 
own history as ‘other’ in relation to the ‘hard’ sciences of biology, chemistry and 
physics. In its pursuit of recognition as a ‘proper’ science, hypothetico-deductive, 
quantitative methods of knowledge production became positioned as normative 
within psychology. Whilst qualitative methodologies have always been used 
within the discipline, they have been variously othered as ‘soft’ and ‘unscientific’ 
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(e.g. Griffin and Phoenix, 1994) and trivialised as an “an intellectual flirtation” 
(Kidder and Fine, 1997, p. 35). Thus, the positioning of qualitative and 
quantitative methods as polar opposites draws on a series of dichotomies such as 
objective/subjective, rational/irrational and science/non-science which function to 
position qualitative methods as the subordinate other.  
Capdevila (2003) points out the presentation of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies as a dichotomy is problematic because it relies on a series of 
potentially misleading distinctions between the two methodologies. As a case in 
point, Capdevila (2003) discuss the ways in which quantitative analysis is 
presented as a macro-level exploration which is positioned as a polar opposite to 
the micro-level analysis of qualitative psychology. She argues that “the 
assumption that an analysis requires only two levels, and that methodologies 
should occupy one of these, is highly contentious and unnecessarily constricting” 
(p. 7). 
The positioning of qualitative methods as non-science calls in to question the 
legitimacy of qualitative work as ‘proper’ psychological knowledge. Thus, as with 
feminist psychological work mentioned above, those using qualitative 
methodologies have been faced with the task of establishing such work as credible 
knowledge. Within debates of the qualitative/quantitative divide, some arguments 
attempting to legitimise qualitative methodologies in relation to mainstream 
psychology have drawn attention to the ‘sameness’ between some qualitative and 
quantitative methods. This can be seen in Capdevila’s (2003) discussion of 
discursive strategies deployed in the qualitative/quantitative debate which 
construct similarities between the ‘two’ methodologies. For example, some 
methodologies such as Q methodology have been positioned as a bridge between 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies (e.g. Sell and Brown, 1984). As 
Capdevila (2003) notes, Q methodology has been described as a flexible 
technique which can be used within constructionist or realist frameworks and as 
combining “the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research traditions” 
(Dennis and Goldberg, 1996, p. 104). Capdevila and Lazard (2006) argue that the 
appeal to sameness used in such arguments functions to position such 
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methodologies as legitimate in relation to the mainstream. However, this strategy 
does not question the dichotomous relationship between qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies on which it is premised.  
Legitimising strategies which draw on notions of sameness and ‘difference’ 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches are undoubtedly politically useful 
in terms of getting qualitative methodologies on psychology’s agenda. However, 
as argued above, the credibility of qualitative approaches depends on its 
relationship with mainstream quantitative methodologies. As with the case of 
feminism(s)’ engagement with psychology mentioned above, the relationship 
between qualitative and quantitative approaches can impose constraints around 
issues of methodological and theoretical acceptability for qualitative research as 
engagement depends on the negotiation of normative practices in mainstream 
research. Such constraints may function to “limit a method’s usefulness in terms 
of interpretative power and theoretical authenticity and, as a result, 
methodologically” (Capdevila, 2003, p. 9). Thus, the potential cost of de-
marginalisation is limitation and regulation by mainstream norms of knowledge 
production. 
4.4 Sensitive Research as ‘Other’ 
The above issues and implications around norms of knowledge production also 
impact sensitive research projects. The sensitive research project has been 
variously defined in psychology (Lee, 1993). For example, projects which could 
potentially fall under the rubric of sensitive research include studies which focus 
on socially taboo subjects such as sex and sexualities and or studies which are 
intrusive in the sense that it impinges on “areas which are private, stressful or 
sacred” (Lee, 1993, p. 4) or which pose potential threat or cost to those who have 
been involved in it (e.g. Renzetti and Lee, 1993). Sensitive research may also 
include that which challenges particular political alignments, “if political is taken 
in its widest sense to refer to the vested interests of powerful persons or 
institutions” (Lee, 1993, p .4). The positioning of research issues as socially 
taboo, risky and/or politicised in some way functions to position such research as 
problematic and, often, illegitimate. For example, research on sex, sexuality and 
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sexual violence has often been viewed as lacking rigor (Tiefer, 1995), stigmatised 
(Israel, 2002) and/or embarrassing (Braun, 1999). 
The stigmatisation of some sensitive research topics such as sex may function to 
locate the research and researcher in problematic positionings in the broader 
social context (e.g. Zurbriggen, 2002). This can be seen in Israel’s (2002) account 
of her research on women strippers. More specifically, she describes the ways in 
which she was unprepared for the reactions of others in her social network to her 
work and subsequently to her. For example, she argues that “my identity became 
fused with my research project, as if ‘she does work on strippers’ was my last 
name” (p. 257). For Israel, the immediate disclosure to others of aspects of her 
professional identity was often marked with titillation, amusement and a sense of 
voyeurism. This not only often led to the belittlement of her work but also to a 
sense of lack of control around the display and presentation of aspects of her 
working identity. 
Israel (2002) argues her work on women strippers did not solely impact contexts 
outside her working life but also within it. The positioning of sex research as 
entertaining and titillating can function to undermine the credibility of such work 
as serious research.  
According to Lee (1993), the positioning of sex-related research as illegitimate is 
also reflected in wider employment issues for those doing this kind of work. More 
specifically, Lee (1993) argues that sex-related research has been fraught with 
professional risk in the form of career disadvantage. For example, some job and/or 
opportunities may become difficult to access because institutions and/or 
administrators may wish to dissociate themselves from taboo, difficult or 
controversial issues associated with sex research. Lee (1993) also notes that sex-
related work often transcends disciplinary boundaries functioning to locate it as 
‘specialised’ which again might limit access to job opportunities. In addition to 
this, the location of such work as transdisciplinary may also work to position such 
research as distinct from ‘pure’ psychology which functions to distance such work 
further from norms around ‘proper’ or ‘acceptable’ psychological knowledge.  
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4.5 Negotiating Marginality 
The positioning of this thesis as feminist-informed, as qualitative and as sensitive 
is important because the relationship between these marginalised areas of 
scholarly activity and mainstream psychology have implications for the research 
process. More specifically, feminist, qualitative and sensitive research each raises 
particular concerns and issues around ethics, participant-researcher relations and 
power relationships therein. However, as I will argue, since these areas of study 
occupy a marginalised position in relation to the mainstream, crucial issues 
associated with research practices in these areas are often not clearly reflected in 
official guidelines and advice on how to conduct research. 
4.6 ‘Professional’ research conduct 
The advice given by the British Psychological Society on how to conduct ethical 
research is central throughout the research process. Given that the current project 
also falls in the area of sensitive research, I also looked at resources specifically 
tailored to conducting sensitive work prior to data collection for this study. 
Unsurprisingly, doing ethically sensitive research was depicted as a particularly 
thorny issue with difficulties emerging from the outset. For example, Lee (1993) 
argues that defining a project as ‘sensitive is fraught with difficulties, not least of 
which is the ways in which “different social groups attribute different meanings to 
requests for participation in research, it may well be that a study seen as 
threatening by one group will be thought innocuous by another” (p. 5).  There are 
two interrelated points I would like to raise in relation to this quote. Firstly, the 
problem of sensitive research is located in the realms of the subjective rather than 
in the study itself; the way in which it is seen by participants is constituted as the 
issue. Secondly, there is a sense in this quote that the researcher lacks control over 
how the study is seen. The researcher within this process is positioned within a 
quagmire of conflicting subjectivities, which are constructed as difficult to foresee 
and negotiate. Overall, there is the sense that it is the participant that is the 
problem here.  
Interestingly, within Lee’s argument (1993), the researcher’s subjective 
understandings of an issue are constructed within a discourse of professionalism. 
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For example, Lee (1993) comments that: 
“it is not unusual, for example, for the sensitive nature of an 
apparently innocuous topic to become apparent once the research is 
underway, nor for a researcher to approach a topic with caution 
only to find initial fears about its sensitivity have been misplaced” 
(p. 5) 
In the first part of this quote – “it is not unusual ... for the sensitive nature of an 
apparently innocuous topic to become apparent” – there is no sense of the 
researcher in this process, there is no sense of their realisation of sensitivity, no 
sense of how or why this was missed during initial conceptualisations of the issue 
or in the planning of the research. Again, the “sensitive nature” of the topic is 
constructed as difficult to predict through the description of it as becoming 
“apparent”. It is suggested that the issue becomes sensitive when participants 
become involved in the study as implied by the description of it only becoming 
“apparent once the research is underway”. Again, this construction works to 
position the participants rather than the researcher as the ‘problem’. The 
researcher throughout this quote is positioned as an ethical professional – they 
abide by ethical rules and are sometimes over-“cautious” when it comes to 
ensuring ethical treatment of participants. The participant is also constructed as 
different to the researcher in terms of emotionality. The participant is constructed 
as subjective and emotional – they may or may not feel “threatened” – whereas 
their personal sense of the researcher is limited, emotions such as ‘fear’ are 
displaced though the research process whereby they “find” that their concerns are 
‘misplaced’. In this sense, the researcher is positioned as objective. Taken 
together, the constructions described in Lee’s (1993) argument constitute the 
researcher as fair and just and thus less blameable for the possible negative 
consequences of sensitive research on participants. 
The ways in which ethics becomes constructed with professional discourses can 
be seen in the British Psychological Society’s (BPS) set of ethical guidelines 
(2006). Indeed, the opening paragraph of these guidelines states that: 
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“The British Psychological Society ... recognises its obligation to 
set and uphold the highest standards of professionalism, and to 
promote ethical behaviour, attitudes and judgements on the part of 
psychologists” (p. 1) 
Here, through the use of formal regulatory tone, the professionalism is constructed 
as neutral, authoritative and superior. Within this construction, ethical issues are 
constituted as a matter of professional identity – to be a ‘good’ professional 
psychologist you must be ethical. This construction of ethics works to prioritize it 
as a professional issue over emotionality. Indeed, the formalised language used 
serves to depoliticise and de-emotionalise the question of ethical practice in 
psychological research. 
The depoliticised, de-emotionalised construction of the professional psychologist 
is in keeping with the broad positioning of the researcher in mainstream 
psychology, that is, objective, neutral and unbiased. Indeed, within the guidelines, 
the participant is constructed within individualistic discourses of mainstream 
psychology which position “everything relevant to the actions of a person...to 
have been found a place within” (Harre, 1989: 34). To illustrate this point, I will 
draw from one section of the guidelines which describes “the standard of 
protection for research participants” (BPS, 2006: 18). Whilst all ethical guidelines 
are relevant to research in general and sensitive research in particular, this section 
is a notable concern for those researching sensitive topics because it deals with 
protecting the participant from harm during the research process. 
The construction of the participants as, to a greater or lesser extent, a bounded 
entity is reflected in the kind of harm from which psychological ethical practice 
should protect its participants from. More specifically, the guidelines state that 
“psychologists should consider all research from the standpoint of research 
participants, for the purpose of eliminating potential risks to psychological well-
being, physical health, personal values, or dignity” (BPS, 2006, p. 18). Here, risk 
for participants is constituted as potential harm to subjective, internal inner states. 
This conceptualisation of the person is re-produced further in the following 
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description in which the guidelines state that: 
“psychologists should ... undertake such consideration with due 
concern for the potential effects of, for example, age, disability, 
education, ethnicity, gender, language, national origin, race, 
religion, marital or family status, or sexual orientation, seeking 
consultation as needed from those knowledgeable about such 
effects” 
In this quote, issues such as age, disability and so on are constructed as variables 
which is accomplished through the description of the possible “effects” they 
might cause. Taken together, this construction of the participant distracts attention 
from the ways in which the individual is thoroughly embedded within the cultural 
practices, contexts, relationships and communities in which they are variously 
positioned.  
The construction of various positionings as variables works to undermine or 
obscure the ways in which they are politicised aspects of people’s experience. The 
ways in which this BPS document focuses on the risk of harm to the individual 
participant can be seen further in description of the need to “ask participants 
[about] ... individual factors that might reasonably lead to risk of harm”, of the 
need to “refrain from using financial compensation ... for research participants to 
risk harm” (BPS, 2006, p. 18) and to inform participants of ethical rights such as 
their right to withdraw. What is missing in this document is explicit reference to 
the need to consider the wider ethical issues of knowledge production which 
includes the broader implications that a research study has for particular groups, 
communities and institutions. As Sieber and Stanley (1988) note, ‘seemingly 
innocuous research’ can have far reaching political consequences, “for example, a 
study that examines the relative merits of day care for infants against full-time 
care by the mother can have broad social implications and thus can be considered 
socially sensitive. Similarly, studies aimed at examining the relation between 
gender and mathematical ability also have significant social implications” (p. 49).  
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Mainstream psychology’s disengagement with broader ethical issues of 
knowledge production appears to be related, at least in part, to the need to pin 
down ‘fuzzy’ concepts and to operationalise and measure phenomena in some 
way. This is reflected in Lee’s (1993) response to Sieber and Stanley’s argument 
in which Lee agrees with the need to assess wider social implications of research, 
but argues that: 
“the difficulty is that Sieber and Stanley do not do not specify the 
scope or nature of the kinds of consequences or implications they 
have in mind. Their definition, [of socially sensitive research] 
therefore, logically encompasses research that is consequential in 
any way” (p. 3). 
In line with Brown, (1997), I would posit that arguments such as Lee’s (1993) 
above, draw on and are bounded by dominant norms of ethics as prescribed by 
mainstream quantitative research. These norms do not address ethical issues 
raised in research informed by different theoretical and epistemological positions 
such as qualitative and/or feminist informed research (e.g. Brown, 1997) nor are 
required to consider the politicised consequences of knowledge production in 
mainstream psychology.  
In the context of this project, the ways in which ethics, the psychologist and 
participants are constructed in the BPS guidelines had a number of implications 
for setting up and running this research. On a broad level, I would argue that the 
construction of the ethical professional psychologist in these guidelines draws on 
and reproduces masculinised assumptions imbued in predominant representations 
of science and professionalism in general. For example, rationality and objectivity 
are core to hegemonic forms of masculinity which predominantly feature in 
representations of professionalism and science (e.g. Whitehead, 2001). Given that, 
in this research, I attempt to deconstruct gendered binaries of masculine-feminine 
and associated dualities and make my subjective positioning in this project 
explicit, I find myself located in ways that I do not easily fit nor are comfortable 
with.  
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My relationships with participants were often not best described as a 
psychologist-‘client’ relation as constituted in the BPS ethical guidelines. The use 
of the term client often depicts a professional business relationship (p. 5) and in 
psychology has connotations of therapy. My relationships with participants were 
more complex and ‘messy’ than alluded to by descriptions of the psychologist-
client relation. There were points of similarity and difference between myself and 
the participants along a number of fault lines, including gender, sexualities, ‘race’, 
age and class to name but a few. As argued above, these points of convergence 
and divergence are not simply ‘variables’ which can be ‘controlled’ for during the 
research process but complex, variously-intersecting positionings which shape 
and (re)produce not only particular power relations between researcher and 
researched but also the co-construction of the research process as a whole.  
In discussing aspects of researcher-participant relationships that I feel are 
pertinent to the development of this project, I am also concerned about and wish 
to avoid drawing artificial boundaries around particular ‘groups’ of participants, 
as if ‘men’, ‘women’ and so on are homogenous, static categories. Instead, I 
would stress that similarities and differences between myself and the participants 
were fluid, changing and contextualised differently during moments of interaction 
as the research process unfolded. To make the complexity of the researcher-
participant relation in this study explicit, the following sections will draw 
attention to the ways in which my participants and I were variously positioned in 
and impacted on the research process.  
4.7 Researching Others: Relationships and Representation 
The complexities of negotiating otherness within the research process have been 
well-documented (e.g. Bhavnani, 1988; Opie, 1992; Finlay and Gough, 2003; 
Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002). Broadly speaking, the location of the 
researcher as “ultimately in the (powerful) position of taking charge of the 
participants’ accounts, producing interpretations and presenting her own 
interpretations as ‘academic research findings” (Del Busso, 2007, p. 312) has 
raised concerns around the researcher’s ‘right’ to speak either for or about those 
who are variously othered. According to Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1996), within 
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feminist theorising, concerns around representing others stem from a tendency in 
early feminist work to homogenise and universalise women’s experiences which 
ignored important differences and power differentials between women. As 
Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1997) point out, within such early work “what is passed 
off as ‘our’ experience all too often turns out to be the common and 
unproblematised knowledge only of white, middle-class, able-bodied, 
heterosexual Anglo-Americans” (p. 566).  
The ways in which the researcher may occupy a privileged position in relation to 
participants, not only in terms of their status as academic, but also along other 
power differentials such as  race, class, ablebodiedness, sexualities and so on may 
mean that important aspects of the experience of others becomes misrepresented, 
minimised or ignored. Just as the assumption of ‘sameness’ between women can 
(re)produce dominant-subordinate relations between self and other, strategies 
highlighting ‘differences’ between women can be equally problematic. For 
example, as Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1996) note, one strategy employed in some 
feminist work to circumvent issues around homogenisation of women as well as 
challenging the pathologisation of others has been to ‘celebrate’ differences. 
However, the ‘celebration’ of differences may lead to positioning those others as 
exotic and/or exaggerating the heroic or tragic aspects of the experiences of those 
deemed less powerful. As Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1996) argue, “the danger lies 
in romanticising others and in using our representation of them to delineate ‘our’ 
vision of the Good Life” (p. 13). 
Issues around Sameness and Difference became relevant within various points of 
the research process in this project. In the following sections, I will discuss two 
experiences during participant recruitment where the process of Othering was 
particularly salient. These experiences were concerned with my positionings as a 
heterosexual woman researcher working with (1) heterosexual men participants 
and (2) LGBT participants. 
4.8 We are different? Working with heterosexual men participants 
Predominant concerns around othering within the research process generally 
centre on privileged positionings of the researcher in relation to less powerful 
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others. However, as Wilmot (1997) notes, “there are many contexts in which the 
dynamics of this power relationship become more complex and contradictory” 
(p. 176), where shifting relations of power may locate the researcher as other 
during particular interactions during the research process. For example, it has 
been noted that women (feminist) researchers working with (heterosexual) male 
participants may become othered because of the location of the researcher and 
researched in a gendered system of power relations in which the feminised 
occupies a subordinate position in relation to the masculinised (e.g. Marzano, 
2007).  
The gendering of women academics in research contexts more generally is 
produced and reproduced in the ways in which gender can become privileged over 
professional status in the research encounter as well as in the feminisation of 
aspects of the research process itself. For example, Wilmot (1997) argues that in 
the research context, women academics are often seen as more emotional than 
men, as listeners, as less threatening and less powerful than their male 
counterparts. Moreover, Wilmot (1997) suggests that textbook advice on 
maintaining and managing researcher-researched relationships often becomes 
intimately interwoven with representations of ‘feminised’ behaviour. For 
example, advice on the need to establish rapport with participants often alludes to 
the need for emotional labour in this interaction – a job that has traditionally been 
seen as women’s work (e.g. Hochschild, 2003). Thus, being a ‘good’ researcher 
also depends on women locating themselves in traditionally feminine ways. As 
Wilmot (1997) points out, for feminist women researchers working with 
heterosexual male participants, such advice is problematic because many feminist 
researchers wish to challenge gendered power relations underpinning traditional 
femininised-masculinised ways of being. 
In this project, my positioning as woman perhaps became more relevant, salient 
and visible when recruiting and working with men participants because the focus 
of my interactions with them was to discuss the gendered/sexualised topic of 
sexual harassment. For example, one way in which my positioning as woman 
became salient was through heterosexist joking either when being introduced to 
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potential participants or direct interaction between myself and participants. For 
example, I was once playfully introduced as “the feminist who’s interested in 
sex”, which I felt undermined my position as a researcher, my political values and 
my research focus. I was also asked jokingly by two potential participants if I 
planned to ‘sexually harass’ them or if I had asked them to participate because 
they were ‘sexperts’. Like Israel’s (2002) experiences of doing work on strippers 
mentioned above, I found that my work in these contexts was often constituted as 
titillating and a bit of a joke.  
It should be noted that I am not suggesting that ‘heterosexism’ and ‘men’ should 
be coupled as an inevitable given or that by outlining these particular experiences 
I am presupposing that woman do not engage in various forms of heterosexism. 
Rather, the point of this illustration is to explore the ways in which gendered 
power dynamics intersect with the researcher-researched relationship to 
(re)produce myself as researcher as the feminised/hetero-sexualised other. 
My experiences of such behaviour are best described by a ‘prepared 
unpreparedness’. I was prepared in the sense that I had initially decided to gently 
challenge viewpoints that I found to be politically problematic – a strategy for 
dealing with issues around difference in researcher-participant relationships 
suggested by Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1997). However, the practicalities of 
engaging in this strategy were less straightforward. I did not want to reinforce 
stereotypical versions of feminists as opinionated or difficult or be complicit in 
heterosexism (see also Braun, 2000). Nor did I want to undermine or alienate 
individuals who had previously been supportive and helpful in my work. To 
handle such encounters, I often adopted humour to defuse situations, which 
resonates with particular strategies employed by women to resist sexual 
harassment (e.g. Mott and Condor, 1997; see also Chapter 1). However, I was 
often left with the feeling of dissatisfaction in my strategies for handling such 
interactions, a feeling that I should have done more to resist but feeling utterly 
limited in the routes I could take. 
4.9 We are the same? Working with LGBT Participants 
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Particular experiences in the participant recruitment phase also drew attention to 
assumptions of ‘sameness’ operating in my own strategies for accessing 
participants. For example, during the early stages of participant recruitment, I 
organised a meeting with a LGBT community group to discuss the project and 
informally gauge any interest from members around possible participation. Whilst 
members appeared happy to informally talk with me about my work, they were all 
unwilling to take part. This experience made me reflect on my own assumptions 
around sexualities as well as my approach to gaining access to participants. I 
realised that my own liberal ideals around inclusion had lead to ‘sexuality-blind’ 
assumptions being incorporated in my approach to recruitment. I had not really 
been prepared for this unwillingness to participate because I had not fully 
considered the impact of my own heterosexualised positioning in this context – I 
had assumed that the differences between us would not be as a problem.  
My general unawareness of my own privileged positioning in relation to this 
group is reflected in my lack of consideration over certain issues. For example, it 
had not occurred to me to think about disclosing my position as a heterosexual 
researcher. In hindsight, I realise that this may have been an important issue in 
some individuals’ decisions to enter into the research process.  
In this meeting, my outsider status was made salient through the ways in which I 
had chosen to engage with this group – I was unknown to this community group 
prior to the meeting and the discussion was focused on my work, my agenda, my 
objectives. As Pitman (2002) notes in her participant recruitment experiences of 
being a white researcher doing work with racialised participants, the narrow focus 
on one’s own research agenda may lead to insensitive strategies being used for 
obtaining participants. In her research, Pitman (2002) describes the ways in which 
her over-enthusiasm for her work, lead her to adopt ‘railroad’ strategies for 
participant recruitment which skimmed over issues of otherness and were 
ultimately unsuccessful.  
Pitman (2002) argues that building trusted alliances with others, taking time to 
understand the perspectives of others that one’s research may impact on may aid 
the production of more collaborative-based research endeavours. Like Pitman’s 
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early experiences, my initial approach could also be interpreted as insensitive as I 
had not taken the time to build such alliances, I did not have a clear sense of what 
was important to these individuals, and my implicit sexuality-blind approach 
ignored and (re)produced the ways in which LGBT issues are routinely 
marginalised more generally (e.g. Lasenza, 2008; Kaplan, 2008; Monro, 2005).  
4.10 Negotiating Otherness 
Reflection on the above experiences made me question my decision to recruit 
those located in othered positions in relation to myself. As mentioned above, one 
strategy to avoid problematic interactional dynamics and representational 
concerns more generally is to study people like ‘us’ (e.g. Letherby, 2003). 
However, I would argue that this strategy is fraught with a number of difficulties, 
not least of which is where boundaries should be drawn – the positionings of 
individual participants in relation to myself were littered with points of similarity 
and difference, all of which may produce particular power issues in the 
researcher-researched relationship (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996).  
In asking this question, I also became concerned about (re)producing otherness. 
The complexity of this issue is captured by a playful comment made by an 
acquaintance in a discussion I had with her on this issue – “are you saying I can’t 
have a say [in the project] just because I’m a lesbian?”. In exploring the question 
of recruiting Others, I took the stance that there is no easy solution to power issues 
around identities and positionings of myself and participants in the research 
process. Indeed, I would argue that our similarities and differences with 
participants is not something that can be ‘solved’ but rather requires continual 
critical reflective engagement throughout the research process (Coyle, 1996). As 
Pitman points out: 
“power hierarchies are always being created and maintained 
throughout the research process ... power is not an absolute but 
instead a dynamic, ever-changing and potentially insidious force 
that serves to create and maintain hierarchies. The identities we 
claim, the aspects of our identities we choose to highlight or 
downplay, all have the potential to shift the relationship of power in the 
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research process, increase or diminish awareness, and either uphold 
or dismantle existing power hierarchies. Clearly, the question is not 
whether our identities and practices affect these relationships or 
hierarchies, but how they do so” (pp. 286-287).   
4.11 Summary 
This chapter has explored how the broad theoretical and methodological stances 
taken up in this project have been located as marginal in relation to mainstream 
psychology. I have sought to explicate how the positioning of this work as other 
works to minimise specific ethical concerns around knowledge production within 
official advice and guidelines on doing research within psychology. I then 
examined how notions of sameness and difference operated within my 
relationships with participants to (re)produce myself or my participants as other. 
Reflective engagement with issues of otherness and power in researcher-
participant relationships in this project is not intended to function as a disclaimer 
for the (re)production of gendered/sexualised power relationships in this research. 
Rather I have tried to open up these power relations for critical scrutiny and 
describe how I attempted to work with positionings of sameness/difference in the 
process of knowledge production.   
Having now described broad issues around power and otherness that became 
relevant to the collection of data for this project, the following chapter will 
provide a more detailed description of methodologies employed to collect and 
analyse data collected. The next chapter extends the discussion of power and 
otherness presented here by drawing attention to how such issues frame particular 
methodological choices made in this work. 
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Chapter 5: Methodologies 
5.1 Introduction 
The broad concern of this thesis is to explore and explicate the function and 
implications of a range of versions of the issue of sexual harassment. To do this, I 
ran three studies to collect: (1) narratives focused on understandings of sexual 
harassment; (2) narratives on sexual harassment policy interventions; and, (3) 
constructions of the issue of unwanted sexual attention more generally and 
recipient-initiator relations therein. Two Q methodological studies were 
conducted to collect and analyse narrative data. To explore constructions of 
unwanted sexual attention, I carried out a series of one-to-one interviews which 
were analysed using Foucauldian discourse analysis. In this chapter, the design 
and implementation of each of these studies will be described in turn, along with 
analytical considerations. Throughout this chapter, particular theoretical and 
methodological implications which frame these studies will be discussed. 
5.2 Q Methodology 
Q methodology was first developed by Stephenson (1935) and has been described 
and used as conceptual framework and analytical procedure for the exploration of 
subjectivity, as a means through which subjective or contestable issues can be 
studied and as a tool for examining social problems and related solutions (Brown, 
1980; Kitzinger, 1987; Curt, 1990; Stainton Rogers, 1991; Senn, 1996; Stenner 
and Marshall, 1995; Capdevila, 1999; Jordan, Capdevila and Johnson, 2005).  
The development of Q methodology is grounded in a broader critique of 
hypothetico-deductive logic as well as to address the lack of focus within 
psychology on “its proper subject matter: subjectivity” (Watts and Stenner, 2005, 
p. 71). As Watts and Stenner (2005) note, Stephenson was concerned about the 
emphasis on hypothetico-deductive forms of hypothesis formulation, 
measurement and testing of psychological phenomena. More specifically, it 
appears that Stephenson viewed measurement and testing as premature in 
psychology because the discipline “has by no means achieved a sophisticated 
theoretical status, with ideal constructs such as physics has fashioned for itself. 
The situations in psychology, therefore, call for an attitude of curiosity” (1953, 
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p. 151).  
This “attitude of curiosity” (Stephenson, 1953, p. 151) is reflected in the operation 
of Q methodology as an exploratory method. Unlike hypothetico-deductive driven 
psychometrics, the aim of Q methodology is not to ‘test’ its participants, measure 
variables or support/reject hypotheses. Rather, the focus of Q is on holistic 
patterns, variously-labelled viewpoints, perspectives or narratives, which are 
expressed and shared by specific groups of participants. To clarify and 
contextualise the way in which Q methodology represents a methodological 
departure from traditional forms of psychological testing, it is necessary to outline 
the process of Q methodology which can be conceptualised as four interrelated 
phases: (1) Item sampling; (2) Q sorting; (3) statistical analysis; and, (4) factor 
interpretation. These phases will be addressed in turn in the following section. 
5.3 Practically Q 
Q methodology is typically concerned with the manifold of perspectives that can 
be taken up in relation to a particular topic of debate. Therefore, the Q sample 
most commonly comprises of a set of statements which variously express the 
range of issues and considerations which may become relevant to given 
perspectives on the issue under study. It is the multiple, varied expressions on or 
about particular topics which Stephenson (1978) referred to as a concourse of 
communicability. Given that the statements will be used to map multiple 
perspectives on an issue, the sample of statements needs to represent the diversity 
of propositions relevant to the topic under consideration. Thus, statements are 
generally collected from a number of sources such as academic literature, literary 
and popular texts (e.g. television programmes, magazines, newspaper articles and 
so on), informal discussions, interviews and so on (e.g. Stainton Rogers, 1991; 
Stainton Rogers, 1995; Watts and Stenner, 2005). The aim of this sampling 
process is to ensure that the final set of statements represents issues that can be 
drawn on in relation to a given topic. 
Since the Q sample comprises of statements rather than participants, the focus of 
Q is on “discourses not the individual or any intra-psychic essence they may or 
may not possess” (Capdevila, 2006; Stainton Rogers, 1995).  This 
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conceptualisation of sampling is grounded within the notion of finite diversity 
which assumes that perspectives on a given issue are neither singular nor entirely 
unique to each individual. Rather, what is produced when “people are applied to a 
sample of elements ... [is] the expression of several (say 4-15) ordered patterns of 
cultural understanding” (Stainton Rogers, 1995, p. 180). Participant selection is 
thus geared around facilitating the expression of such diversity which may include 
recruiting participants who have specialised, professional or other forms of direct 
experience with the research issue. However, the inclusion of participants who 
have no particular or direct interest in the topic can also aid “hearing the 
unexpected; exposing whether certain knowledges are uniquely ‘expert’; and 
general ‘democratic’ or ‘emancipatory’ ideals” (Stainton Rogers, 1995, p. 180). 
These patterns of cultural understanding are initially expressed through the 
process of Q sorting which involves participants rank ordering statements along a 
scale ranging from statements that most represent a particular perspective of the 
issue (for example, most agree +6) through to those statements that least represent 
the perspective (for example, most disagree –6). Typically, an 11 or 13 point rank 
scale is used which range from, for example most agree (+5 or +6) through to 
uncertain (0) to most disagree (-5 or –6) (Watts and Stenner, 2005). This sorting 
procedure generally takes place on a quasi normally distributed grid. The process 
of assigning statements to rank positions culminates in the expression of a 
particular perspective on the issue being studied. Important to note, is that this 
ranking exercise can be clearly distinguished from the process of responding to 
items or statements in traditional questionnaires or attitude scales. This is because 
in such traditional methods the meaning of participants’ responses to such items 
has already been predetermined (Brown, 1980). In contrast, Q methodology does 
not assign a priori meanings to responses. Agreement and disagreement responses 
in Q become meaningful in the context of the positionings of all other statements 
in the final array. As Capdevila (2006) argues, what is constituted as meaningful 
in the process of Q sorting is the relative evaluation of importance of statements 
from the participant’s perspective. The result of this process is a gestalt patterning 
of statements and it is these configurations which comprise the data set. 
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The emphasis on gestalt patterns of response is not the only way in which Q 
differs from traditional means of obtaining response data. Q’s point of 
methodological departure lies in an inversion of the statistical technique, factor 
analysis. In its conventional form, factor analysis is used to detect associations 
between variables. For example, the statistical procedure is designed to look for 
associations between variable A and variable B. In contrast to this, Stephenson 
inverted the statistical procedure to detect associations between patterns expressed 
by persons. For example, associations identified in Q methodology will be 
between the patterns expressed by person A and person B. As Watts and Stenner 
(2005) note “as a consequence of these changes, it is also persons (not tests, traits 
or other types of variables) that load onto emergent factors of an inverted factor 
analytic study (p. 72). The factors produced in Q methodology denote Q sorts 
which share similar rank orderings of items or pattern configurations. A weighted 
average of Q sorts which load highly on a factor can be used to create a pattern 
configuration which exemplifies a given factor. It is this exemplifying Q sort 
which is then interpreted through a discursive reading of statements and their rank 
positions in the context of all others in the final array.  
5.4 Locating Q 
The use of statistics in the identification of discursive gestalt patterns makes Q a 
highly unusual and distinctive methodological tool. However, its use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods has produced difficulties in locating Q within 
methodological traditions and, as Watts and Stenner (2005) point out, has led to 
misconceptions and misrepresentations of this technique. For example, the 
positioning of Q as neither positivist nor hypothetico-deductive situates it within 
the margins of mainstream quantitative research. However, Q’s use of quantitative 
procedures has been “sufficient ground for dismissal as ‘another atomising 
numerology’ in the eyes of some qualitative researchers” (Stenner and Stainton 
Rogers, 2004, p. 101). Similarly, Watts and Stenner (2005) suggest that the Q’s 
use of statistics underpins the misrepresentation of Q methodology by some 
strands of qualitative work as a more mainstream aligned process of knowledge 
production involving conventional forms of variable relationship identification 
   94 
and measurement.  
The dismissal of Q by some researchers working within qualitative traditions may 
not only be based in its outward appearance as a more conventional quantitative 
method but also through the proposition that it does not offer anything vastly 
different or alternative to other forms of qualitative analysis (Watts and Stenner, 
2005). Watts and Stenner (2005) counter this argument by highlighting the ways 
in which Q can offer a distinct contribution to existing forms of qualitative 
methods of analyses available. More specifically, they point out that Q differs 
from forms of thematic and discursive analyses because the gestalt emphasis in Q 
does not lend itself to identifying patterns in a thematic fashion. However, it 
should be noted that this does not presuppose themes cannot be identified across 
exemplifying Q configurations. Rather, Watts and Stenner argue that the focus on 
holistic patterns in Q resonates with narrative forms of analysis (e.g. Crossley, 
2000). The link between Q and narrative analysis can be made when Q 
configurations are conceptualised as narratives composed of manifold discourses 
(e.g. Stainton Rogers, 1992).  
However, Q is not the same as narrative analysis as can be seen in the ways in 
which these methodologies diverge. More specifically, Watts and Stenner (2005) 
argue that unlike Q, narrative analysis is usually applied to what has been referred 
to as “naturally occurring discourse” (Watts and Stenner, 2005: 71). Whilst Watts 
and Stenner (2005) acknowledge that whilst the Q sorting process can be read as 
problematic because analysis is not working with ‘natural’ talk/text, they counter 
this by suggesting that the description of  some data as ‘natural’ is questionable. 
As Speer (2005) argues “all [discursive] data can be natural or contrived 
depending on what one wants to do with it” (p. 196). Watts and Stenner (2005) 
suggest that Q can also be distinguished from narrative analysis in terms of 
temporality. More specifically narrative analysis is concerned with the temporal 
structure of stories which yields insights to the function of chronologically 
organised narrative accounts (see, for example Crossley, 2000). In contrast, the 
narratives produced through Q methodology can be described as a “‘snapshot’ or 
temporally frozen image of a connected series of subject positions (or 
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viewpoints)” (Watts and Stenner, 2005, p. 71) which can be explored in terms of 
their function and implications  
As aforementioned, in the identification of narratives, Q does not presuppose that 
unidimensional or polarised positionings will be taken up in relation to a given 
issue. Instead, Q focuses on multiplicity which is reflected in the ways in which it 
can make manifest both more marginalised as well as dominant narratives that are 
in circulation in the current cultural context. According to Capdevila (2006), this 
feature of Q marks it as distinctive in relation to most other quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. More specifically, Capdevila (2006) argues in mainstream 
quantitative approaches such as surveys, marginalised perspectives tend to 
disappear from view through the processes of averaging across demographic 
variables. In a similar vein, Capdevila (2006) notes that the general aim of 
qualitative approaches is to identify dominant discourses or themes. In contrast, Q 
has no such aims and instead “treats all perspectives equally” (Capdevila, 2006, 
p 8) which makes possible the identification of marginalised and dominant 
narratives. 
5.5 The Q studies 
The rationale for using Q in this thesis is broadly based on its ability to make 
manifest the multiplicity of complex narratives that can be taken up in relation to 
the issue of sexual harassment. In this thesis, two Q studies were conducted which 
focused on: (1) understandings of what constitutes sexual harassment and, (2) 
policy issues. In both studies, materials used to complete the Q process were 
posted to participants and their contribution was send back via stamped addressed 
envelope. While postal studies using Q are not uncommon, the completion of the 
Q process which is likely to be unfamiliar to participants might be considered 
daunting (e.g. Senn, 1996). For this reason, participants were given the option of 
having the researcher present either for initial verbal guidance or for the duration 
of Q sorting. Some participants did request this option. In the following sections 
each Q study will be addressed in turn. Each description will begin with the 
rationale for employing Q to explore particular research issues before moving on 
to the specific design and procedural features of each study. 
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5.6 Q study 1: Call It What You Want? 
The first study to be described here focused on understandings of the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ that are available in the current cultural context. The basis for this 
study is grounded within arguments around the issue of non-labelling discussed in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I argued that within the labelling literature, research has 
focused predominantly on the issue of non-labelling. Discussion of what 
constitutes sexual harassment in victim accounts is limited, with non-labelling 
being read as normalising problematic gendered/sexualised acts. Given that 
versions of sexual harassment may shape and constrain the ways in which 
gendered acts are constructed, it would seem pertinent to explore the various ways 
in which sexual harassment is understood in the current cultural context. It is this 
concern with the multiplicity of understandings of sexual harassment which 
frames the use of Q methodology in this study. 
5.7 Development of the Q Sample 
The sample of statements used in this study focused on various issues brought to 
bear on the topic of what sexual harassment ‘is’. These statements were derived 
through cultural analysis which involved sampling issues on the topic from a 
number of sources including academic literature, newspaper and magazine 
articles, television programmes, and semi-structured interviews. 124 statements 
were initially produced which were pilot tested by 10 participants for: (1) balance 
– statements produce approximately the same number of agree and disagree 
responses across participants, which indicates that multiple perspectives are 
represented, (2) comprehensiveness – relevant issues are covered, and (3) clarity – 
statement are clear and easily understandable. In this study, the piloting of 
statements involved asking participants to respond to the initial sample of 124 
statements using a form which contained four categories of response which were 
‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘neutral’ and ‘not clear’ (See appendix A1). The participants 
were asked to tick the most relevant category in relation to a given statement. 
The collated responses, as mentioned above, are then tested for balance, 
comprehensiveness and clarity, which will be addressed here in turn. The process 
of testing for balance involved counting the number of people who have agreed, 
   97 
disagreed or held a neutral position towards with each statement. A total was then 
calculated for each category of response. If the total numbers for the ‘agree’, 
‘disagree’ and ‘neutral’ category is approximately the same then the sample can 
be described as balanced. An unbalanced sample would make it difficult for 
participants to complete the rank ordering of statements through from, for 
example, most agree to most disagree. Therefore if a sample has an overload of 
responses on one category, statements need to be reworded or reflected to balance 
statements more closely. Comprehensiveness of the sample was checked by 
asking participants who took part in the pilot study to describe any issues that had 
not been covered by existing statements or to highlight issues covered that were 
not relevant to the topic. Lastly, the sample was checked for clarity of expression. 
Items deemed ‘unclear’ on the pilot response form can be reworded to clearly 
express the statement in question. 
The pilot study suggested that the initial Q set was balanced, comprehensive and 
that the wording of statements was clear. However, there were a number of 
duplicate statements in the initial Q sample. Out of duplicated statements, only 
one was retained and all others were discarded. The final Q sample in this study 
consisted of 62 statements (see appendix A2).  
5.8 Participants 
As mentioned earlier, participant recruitment in Q is concerned with maximising 
the possibility for the expression of multiple narratives on a given issue. This is 
not to claim that particular participants can only tell one specific story but rather 
that “discursive diversity” is maximised by including those variously positioned 
“in a multiplex of person-locations or subject-positions” (Stainton Rogers, 1995:, 
p. 182). Thus, participant recruitment in this study sought to reflect diversity.  
The 43 participants who took part were different and similar along a number of 
fault-lines. For example, men and women who varied in terms of age, sexualities, 
social background and occupation took part. Some participants had a specialised 
interest in sexual violence more generally (e.g. police officers, professionals 
supporting victims of violence) and sexual harassment in particular (e.g. company 
managers). Others, however, indicated that they had no special interest or direct 
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experience with sexually harassing acts. The purpose of the inclusion of those 
with varying levels of interest in the topic was maximise the possibility of making 
manifest a range of dominant, more marginalised and less familiar narratives. It 
should be noted that none of the participants explicitly identified themselves as 
victim, survivor or perpetrator of sexual harassment. 
Participants were recruited through both my existing links with various 
organisations including the police and victim support centres as well as my 
social/professional networks. I knew some participants personally whereas others 
were unknown to me prior to this study. All participants were recruited from the 
Midlands area of the UK. 
5.9 Materials & Procedure 
The 43 participants were supplied with instructions on how to complete the Q 
study (See appendix A3). They were asked to sort the Q set along a scale ranging 
from +6 (Most agree) to –6 (Least agree) using a quasi-normal distribution.  Each 
participant was supplied with the 62 numbered statements which were typed on 
approximately 7cm by 2 cm cards.  
To complete the sorting task, participants were given a further set of cards. Each 
card had a rank position typed on it as well as the specified number of items that 
could be allocated to the particular rank position. This was supplied so that 
participants could recreate the quasi normal distribution on an appropriate 
workspace such as a table. Participants were also given a quasi-normally 
distributed grid or Q grid on a piece of A4 Paper (see appendix A4). Participants 
were asked to map out their understanding of what sexual harassment is by using 
the quasi normally distributed shape to rank order the statements 
After they had competed the sorting task they were asked to write down the 
numbers of each statement on the Q grid. For example, if participants had placed 
statement 50 on rank position +3 then they would write this number down on the 
+3 rank position on the A4 Q grid. Lastly, Participants were asked to make open-
ended comments about why they had placed certain items on particular rank 
positions using the Q response booklet (see appendix A2). For those 
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participants who had the materials posted to them, they were provided with a 
stamped addressed envelope in order to post back the completed Q grid and 
response book. 
5.10 Statistical analysis 
The statistical analysis of Q sorts can be carried out using different types of factor 
analysis (Watts and Stenner, 2005). In this study, the 43 Q sorts were analysed 
using principle component analysis (PCA). The choice of analysis here is guided 
by Occam’s razor, that is, by choosing the simplest explanation from a set of 
equivalent alternatives, one is likely to ‘shave’ off redundancies and/or 
ambiguities which impede understanding of a given phenomenon. To clarify this 
decision, it is important to note that factor analysis runs a more complicated 
statistical analysis of variance explained compared to PCA. However, it can be 
argued that in Q methodology running a more complex calculation makes no 
conceptual difference to the patterns that emerge (Kerlinger, 1958; Giles, 2002). 
For factors to be interpretable, they require rotation. The aim of rotation is that 
factors comprise of Q sorts which load or correlate reasonably highly on one 
factor and have negligible loadings on other factors which emerge. This clear 
pattern of loadings would suggest that each factor is clearly distinguishable from 
all others identified. In this study varimax rotation was used to produce 10 
orthogonal factors. Rotated factors selected for interpretation were based on the 
amount of variance explained by each specific factor identified. More specifically, 
Kaiser’s criterion of selecting eigenvalues greater than 1.0 was used in this study. 
Whilst this criterion may appear arbitrary, factors which fall short of this 
minimum are unlikely to serve any data reduction aims as they will explain less 
variance within the data than single Q sorts (Watts and Stenner, 2005). 
In addition to rotation, for a factor to be interpretable it must have an exemplar Q 
sort which typifies the pattern configuration for that factor.  Exemplifying Q sorts 
are generally produced through a weighted averaging or merging of the Q sorts 
which loaded highly on one factor only and have a low loading on all others. 
Highly significant loadings are generally defined as 0.3 or above (Giles, 2002; 
Kline, 1994). However, I wanted to maximize the possibility of selecting 
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patterns which were clearly exemplary whilst simultaneously maximizing the 
number of high loading Q sorts with low loadings on other factors which could be 
merged. To achieve this, I raised the level of loadings deemed to be significant 
using a more stringent criterion of including those Q sorts with loadings of 0.6 on 
a factor and no more than 0.4 on any other factor (Please see appendix A4 for full 
table of Q sort loadings). 
As mentioned earlier, in this study, 10 orthogonal factors were identified. 
However, one factor can be described as confounded due to the absence of any 
high loading Q sorts which are require to reconstruct an exemplifying Q sort for 
interpretation. Of the remaining factors, 3 contained a single Q sort with high 
loadings on a given factor and low loadings on all others. In Q it is typical 
practice to interpret factors with two or more high loading Q sorts as the emphasis 
is on identifying shared patterns. However, Watts and Stenner (2005) argue that 
factors with a single exemplifying Q sort can be interpreted if there is theoretical 
justification for doing so. I would argue that discursive diversity captured by Q 
necessarily draws on shared cultural knowledge and so, in a broad theoretical 
sense, the pattern configuration is shared. Thus, in some senses, this makes this 
choice no different from, say, analysing a discursive pattern which is predominant 
in one interview out of a data set. Given this, these factors were subject to an 
interpretative reading. The 6 other factors had two or more high loading Q sorts 
which were merged to produce a single exemplar for each factor. Each of these 
exemplifying Q sorts was also interpreted. 
5.11 Q Study 2: Policies and Practices: Stories of Victimisation 
The second Q study conducted was concerned with the question of how sexual 
harassment can be resisted or otherwise dealt with. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, 
the act of framing behaviour as a form of sexual harassment and/or using 
formalised routes of amelioration to deal with it often runs the risk of secondary 
victimisation for recipients. In this study, I explore multiple understandings of 
how the issue of sexual harassment should be dealt with, focusing on how 
particular policy narratives open up or close down possibilities for secondary 
victimisation. 
   101 
5.12 Development of the Q set 
In this study, the sample was derived from a wide range of sources relevant to the 
question of how sexual harassment should be dealt with. These sources included 
cultural analysis of workplace policies on sexual harassment, newspaper and 
magazine articles, academic literature, television programmes and interviews.  73 
items were initially produced which were pilot tested by sixteen people for 
comprehensiveness, balance and clarity of statements (see appendix B1). The 
outcome of the pilot study suggested that the Q set was unbalanced. Therefore 
some items were reflected in order to make the statements balance more closely. 
The final Q set consisted of 60 statements (see appendix B2).  
5.13 Participants 
As with the previous Q study described above, participant recruitment was 
underpinned by the need to maximise diversity. The 44 participants who took part 
included men and women who varied in terms of age, sexualities, social 
background and occupation and who had varying levels of special interest in the 
topic. Some of the participants who took part in the first Q study mentioned above 
also participated in this study. However, some participants took part in this study 
only. To recruit participants, I used the same links with organisations and social/ 
professional networks described in the Q study above. All participants were based 
in the Midlands area of the UK. 
Important to note is that none of the participants who took part in this study 
explicitly identified themselves as victim, survivor or perpetrator of sexual 
harassment. 
5.14 Materials & Procedure 
The 44 participants who took part in this study were supplied with a similar set of 
materials that were used in the first study and followed the same procedure. 
However some of the specific features of the materials differ from study one. 
More specifically, participants were asked to sort the Q set along a scale ranging 
from +5 (Most agree) to –5 (Most disagree) using a quasi-normal distribution (see 
appendix B3). Participants were also given the opportunity to comment further on 
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specific statement positionings using a response booklet provided (see appendix 
B2). 
5.15 Statistical analysis 
Principle component analysis and varimax rotation of the 44 completed Q sorts 
produced 9 orthogonal factors. Factors selected for interpretation were those with 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0. As mentioned earlier, for a factor to be interpretable, 
Q sorts with high significant loadings on one factor only are required to produce 
an pattern configuration which typifies the given factor. As with the first Q study 
mentioned above, to maximise the number of high loading Q sorts whilst selecting 
those which clearly exemplify a given factor, I selected Q sorts with loadings of  
0.6 or above on a factor and no more than 0.4 on any other factor. 4 factors had 
two or more high Q sort loadings on each factor only which were subsequently 
merged to produce an exemplifying Q sort for each factor for interpretative 
reading. The remaining factors had a single high loading Q sort with low loadings 
on all other factors. For these factors, the single Q sort was interpreted (please see 
appendix B4 for the full table of Q sort loadings).  
It should be noted that factor 7 was bipolar. A bipolar factor is one which has both 
positive and negative Q sort loadings on it. This means that Q sorts with a 
negative loading have been completed in an opposite way to those Q sorts with 
positive loadings. Therefore two interpretations will be given of this factor. 
Firstly, the interpretation will proceed in the same way as with all other factors. 
This factor will be labelled factor 7a. The second interpretation (factor 7b) will 
involve reversing the position of statements. For example, items placed at +6 will 
now be placed at –6 and so on. 
5.16 Questions of Power 
Central to the exploration of sexual harassment in this thesis are the ways in 
which sexually harassing acts are located in and (re)produce forms of 
heterosexualised/gendered power relations (see previous chapters). Whilst I would 
argue that Q methodology was particularly suited to address the research 
questions outlined in the above sections, it is important to note that it is not a tool 
designed for the analysis of power relations per se.  A statistically dominant 
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factor produced through Q does not necessarily translate as a social institutionally 
powerful narrative. For example, it is possible that a factor which explains less 
variance is more reflective of predominant forms of power and power 
relationships in operation in particular contexts (Brown, 1980).  
To explore the operation of power in the ways in which sexual harassment is 
variously constituted, I drew insights from Foucauldian informed discourse 
analysis to analyse a set of interview data. Before moving on to describe the 
interview study, I will firstly discuss notions of power and discourse as theorised 
within discursive approaches more generally and Foucauldian discourse analysis 
in particular. 
5.17 Discourse Analysis: Power and Agency 
As is extensively discussed elsewhere, the key point of departure of approaches 
which take discourse as its focus of study from mainstream psychology is the 
conceptualisation of language/discourse as actively producing and constituting 
social phenomena. This view of language stands in stark contrast to more 
mainstream notions of it as a transparent medium, passively describing the objects 
it represents. 
For Foucault (1969), discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects 
of which we speak” (p. 49). Discourses are thus conceptualised as a social 
practice which produce and reproduce the objects to which they refer in multiple, 
often contradictory ways. Important to note is that discourses are neither fixed nor 
universal. Rather they become manifest, take shape and are framed by the 
different historical and cultural contexts in which they emerge. Given this, 
discourses are not the product of ‘individual’ activity as such but rather constitute 
and (re)produce an “array of subject positions” (Parker, 1994, p. 245), which 
when taken up, shape and constrain, enable and disable, ways of being in the 
social world (e.g. Parker, 1992).  
Subject positionings as well as the discourses they are situated in, differ in terms 
of access to power that they can offer. Central to analysis of power from 
Foucauldian perspectives are the ways in which norms work to regulate “the 
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web of everyday existence” (Foucault, 1979: 183) – referred to by Foucault 
(1979) as a form of disciplinary power. The workings of disciplinary power 
highlight the ways in which power is not only negative, that is, hierarchical and 
repressive but also positive in the sense that it produces and constitutes objects 
and subject positionings. The analysis of the operation of power from this 
perspective centres on the ways material power can be exercised in and through 
discourses as well as the ways in which relations of power are produced and 
constituted in and by discursive constructions. 
The ways in which discourses are said to have a productive effect has raised 
concerned about how individuals can be conceptualised as active agents, capable 
of resisting and challenging the power relations in which they are located. 
Hollway and Jefferson (2005) argue that the problem of agency – the degree to 
which individuals are conceptualised as active/passive – is one that is grounded in 
western philosophical debates drawing on the individual – social dualism. 
Discursive approaches more generally have stood accused of overly deterministic 
analysis, locating the individual as passive in the web of social discursive action 
(e.g. McNay, 2000). To address this, some approaches have attempted to deal 
with this issue by focussing on the “empirical and [to] turn attention to describing 
the way in which agency and structure become practical issues for people engaged 
in their local moral orders. We analyse agency as discursive resource rather than a 
state or essence” (Wetherell, 2005, p. 170). This discursive approach to agency 
asks questions such as “when do people invoke personal agency and control, 
when do they invoke external determinants?” (Wetherell, 2005, p. 170). I would 
argue that whilst this is, depending on the task at hand, an interesting analytical 
avenue to pursue, it nevertheless sidesteps theoretical considerations of the 
operation of agency in relation to discourse.  
In common with other strands of discourse analytics, Foucauldian approaches 
informed by notions of disciplinary power have been criticised on the basis of 
discourse determinism and of failing to provide an adequate theorisation of 
agency as a precondition for resistance to power (e.g. McNay, 1991; 2000; 
Deveaux, 1994). In response to such criticisms, I would agree with Gavey (2005) 
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who argues that Foucauldian models of power have been read as “unnecessarily 
overdetermining” by some scholars in the field (p. 89). Notions of resistance are 
inextricably interwoven in relations of power in Foucault’s theorisations as 
reflected in his claim that “where there is power, there is resistance” (1980, p. 95). 
The issue, it seems, is how agency can be reconceptualised when there is no 
asocial subject, when one can never be situated outside of power, as from a 
Foucauldian perspective, there is no vantage point outside of discourse to perform 
agentic action or to resist the various circulation of power within and through 
discursive webs. However, as Fraser (1997) points out, the productive effect of 
discourse does not preclude the conceptualisation of subjects as “both culturally 
constituted and capable of critique” (p. 214). In a similar vein, Butler (1990) 
contends that “construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of 
agency” (p. 147). Instead of locating agency squarely in the subject, Butler argues 
that agency and possibilities for resistance are dispersed within spheres of cultural 
intelligibility produced by the limitations of prevailing norms to contain the 
multiplicity of expressions possible. Rather than bypassing the question of 
agency, Butler’s (1990) theorisation reconceptualises it as “enactments of 
variation within regulated, normative and habitual processes of signification” 
(Moss, 1998, p. 99). 
The ways in which Foucauldian-informed discourse analysis lends itself to 
exploring the productive effect of discourses in the context of power relations and 
resistance was deemed particularly suited to examine heterosexualised/gendered 
power relationships in the constitution of sexual harassment in this thesis. This is 
not to claim that other forms of discourse analysis cannot or do not explicate 
power relations (see, for example, Anderson and Doherty, 2008). Rather, 
theoretical insights of Foucault’s work shift analytic focus to the connections 
between constructions identified [and subject positions therein] and social and 
cultural practices using notions of disciplinary power which I have found useful in 
articulating particular power dynamics in heterosexualised constructions of 
harassment (see, for example, Chapters 7 and 9). In this thesis, Foucauldian 
discourse analysis was used to explicate the productive effect of discourses 
circulating in a set of interview data. It is this interview study which is the focus 
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of discussion in the following sections. 
5.18 The Interview Study 
Data for this study was collected through one to one semi-structured interviews. 
The development of the interview schedule was informed by a range of literature 
on the issue (see chapters 2 and 3). Informal discussions with a range of people 
who varied along a number of fault-lines including age, occupation, sexualities, 
gender were also used to highlight issues and ideas that may be become relevant 
to the interview process. An initial set of possible questions were piloted in these 
informal discussions with individuals to get of a sense of whether the wording of 
questions was easily understandable and whether they tapped in to relevant issues. 
The outcome of piloting suggested that the questions met the aforementioned aims 
and provided me with interesting and relevant ideas for additional prompts in the 
interview process (See appendix C1). 
To elicit and engage with broad perspectives on the issue of sexual harassment, 
the term ‘unwanted sexual attention’ was employed as an alternative to ‘sexual 
harassment’. This is because some previous research suggests that the former term 
tends to produce responses which focus on a broader spectrum of manifestations 
of sexual harassment whereas the latter phrase tends to elicit extreme versions of 
such behaviour (e.g. Thomas and Kitzinger, 1997; Herbert, 1997).  
The final version of the schedule consisted of four questions and a series of 
prompts which aimed to tap into issues concerned with (1) definition, (2) causes, 
and (3) policy interventions. None of the questions explicitly focused on or 
required a disclosure of personal experiences of sexual harassment as the broad 
purpose of the interview was to explore the multiplex of versions that can be taken 
up in relation to the issue of sexual harassment. 
5.19 Participants & Data Collection 
Participant recruitment followed the same strategy used in the Q studies 
mentioned above. More specifically, I aimed to recruit a diverse sample of 
participants to facilitate the possibility of eliciting manifold versions of unwanted 
sexual attention. Participants recruited varied in terms of gender, sexualities, 
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age and occupation. Some participants had also taken part in one or both Q 
studies, others took part in the interview only. Some participants were unknown to 
me prior to interview and were recruited through my links with particular 
organisations such as victim/survivor support centres and the police. Other 
participants I knew personally or were recruited through individuals in our 
common social/professional network. All participants who took part were based in 
the Midlands area of the UK. 
Participant recruitment began with a meeting where I outlined the focus of the 
study and explained what participation would involve. All participants were 
informed that the interview would be audio-taped and transcribed and that I would 
remove any identifying information such as names, place of work and so on. 
Participants were also given a copy of the interview schedule and were invited to 
discuss the process of participation along with the interview questions. In this 
initial discussion, I explained their ethical rights and reassured them that the 
interview did not require any personal disclosures of sensitive experiences that 
they did not want to make. After this initial meeting, participants were asked if 
they would like to take part and a date, time and place were set to conduct the 
interview. Participants were given my work email and work phone number to 
cancel if they decided in between this initial meeting and interview date that they 
did not want to take part. They were given written information about the study to 
take away with them and a consent form to be signed and returned to me when we 
met to conduct the interview proper (see appendix C2). 
The interviews were conducted in locations convenient for the participant and so 
were conducted in a range of venues including, for example, police stations and 
other workplaces, participant’s homes, and cafes. All interviews were tape-
recorded using a Dictaphone and microcassettes.  
Initially 27 participants were interviewed. However, 9 of the tapes had to be 
omitted from the final data set in this study. This is because 7 of the tapes were 
warped beyond repair, I could not be transcribed due to bad sound quality and a 
further tape was withdrawn from the process and destroyed at the participant’s 
request. The request for withdrawal of data was because the participant 
   108 
concerned had, as the discussion unfolded, disclosed sensitive information about a 
third party and on reflection was uncomfortable about this being used in the 
project. The final data set comprised of interviews with 13 women and 5 men 
which had lasted approximately between 30 to 60 minutes. 
5.20 The Interview Process 
Before moving on to discuss the transcription of the interview data collected, it 
seems pertinent to discuss the process of doing the interviews. In chapter 4, I 
discussed how issues of Otherness impacted the process of participant recruitment 
and the broader project. In this section, I would like to shift focus to the ways in 
which other particular positionings in which I was located in relation to my 
participants, as well as the wider institutional context where this project is 
situated, impacted and shaped the interviewing process. More specifically, my 
positionings as student and as inexperienced researcher became tied up with 
issues of doing ‘good’ interviews within the discipline of psychology. 
Whilst a number of textbooks describe guidelines and/or helpful tips about the 
process of doing interviews, there is much less said about exchanges in interviews 
that “would be sanitized away, deemed bad research, embarrassing intrusions of 
the personal or even lapses of interviewer control (Burman, 1994: 57). In the 
process of doing the interviews, there were moments where I struggled to 
articulate the question I wanted to ask, of uncertainty of which issue to focus on 
when the participant had raised a number of interesting points when answering 
one question, of laughter and of personal engagements on issues other than the 
focus of research.   
It is this messiness that is often not captured in advice on doing interviews and, as 
an inexperienced researcher, left me feeling embarrassed about my inability to 
conduct a ‘clean’ ‘professional’ interview. I was concerned that the interviews I 
conducted fell short of the description of the interviewer as ultimately in control, 
who skilfully guides the discussion through careful questioning and prompting. 
However, instances of discussion which move away from traditional positionings 
of the interviewer as in control, which are focused on issues other than the subject 
at hand, can make explicit the multiple positionings available to the researcher 
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and participant in the interview context and make explicit norms/assumptions 
guiding the research (Burman, 1994). 
The ways in which such exchanges can make explicit multiple positionings can be 
seen nearing the end of an interview I conducted with Diane. Diane was an ex 
colleague of mine who was both older than me and occupied a higher status job 
position in the organisation that we worked in. In this excerpt, I was finding it 
difficult to compose the next question that I wanted to ask her: 
D: Then yeah, you would have I think, people report more 
stranger assaults don’t they, than people you know. 
L: Yeah um xxx bear with me. 
D: You’re very good, you haven’t got anything written down. 
L: [laugh] 
D: [laugh] Anything written down. 
L: How do you think friends would respond to the person that’s 
on the receiving end of unwanted sexual attention 
Here, I explicitly draw attention to the difficulty I have in composing the next 
question which is constructed implicitly as a disruption to smooth interviewing 
processes. This can be seen in Diane’s reassuring response to it by positioning me 
as “very good” interviewer which is then emphasised by appealing to my skills of 
being able to do it doing without having “anything written down”. This exchange 
can be read as inverting power relationships between researcher and researched in 
the sense that the participant responded to me and my implicit concerns around 
questioning. This can be seen further in an interview with Eve. Like Diane, Eve 
was older than me and we were introduced through mutual links with the police: 
E: I think we’re just particularly lucky, we are um, people that 
deal with that kind of thing that they get it down on paper to 
record it, important isn’t it?   
L: Yeah. 
E: Interesting subject to do a thesis on, whatever it is.  
L: Yeah, yeah, I yeah 
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C: Huge subject, plenty to write about.  
E: Oh God yeah, cos I had very fixed ideas about it when I first 
started it and they’ve all changed and they’ve all, you know, 
it’s amazing.  
E: Is that just from talking to different people, getting other 
people’s perspectives on stuff, has that made it change? 
L: Yeah, yeah and er, the literature on it as well. 
E:  Interesting stuff, anything else? 
L: Yes [laugh] 
E:  [laugh] 
Here my student status is invoked through reference to my “thesis”. Eve, through 
her comments that it is an “interesting”, and later on, a “huge “subject” to research 
invites me to talk about my project. My response is marked by my positioning as 
student where I give a personal account of the process of learning about the issue, 
where I progressed from having “very fixed ideas” to having those ideas “all 
change”. Thus my novice status is made explicit. Through this exchange, Eve can 
be read an inverting the researcher – researched power relationship – it is she that 
asks the questions at this point in the interview and then controls when discussion 
of the topic area will recommence as she says “interesting stuff, anything else?”. 
Of course these instances of inversion of traditional power relationships between 
the researcher and researched should not distract attention away from my ultimate 
power in terms of translating, constructing and deconstructing versions of my 
interactions with participants in a project which is intended for more public 
consumption (e.g. Coyle, 1996). My point here is not to claim that I was 
powerless in the process. I was aware that it was possible that my status as 
inexperienced and as student may well have positioned participants as needing to 
‘help’ me. I was also concerned that my particular positionings may have 
impacted the content and extent of disclosure of particular information during the 
interview. For this reason, I gave participants the opportunity of listening to their 
recording to make sure they were happy with it remaining as part of the data set. 
This option should not be seen as ‘solving’ this possible problem. However, I felt 
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that the opportunity for participants to listen to their tapes without me present 
might provide them with a sense of how the discussion unfolded when viewed 
from an alternative standpoint. As mentioned above, one participant who 
withdrew their data had taken up this option. 
5.21 Transcription 
The transcription of audio-recordings was guided by two overlapping concerns: 
(1) the need to represent aspects of interaction that would facilitate analysis, and 
(2) providing the audience with a readable version of the interview recording 
which contextualised the exchange between myself and the participant. The 
notation used focused on pauses, emphasis, laughter and other paralinguistic 
features which I felt was important to the interaction and would help to 
contextualise the process of analysis (see appendix C3). I also felt that this level 
of transcription would provide readers with some context for making sense of 
particular points of discussion. Early on in the process of beginning the analysis, I 
did return to my initial decisions for the system of transcription of employed to 
ask questions about whether other forms of notation should be included. This 
decision making process was informed by listening to audio recordings again in 
conjunction with reading the transcripts and initial analytic notes.  However, I felt 
that further transcription detail did not add anything significant to the particular 
kind of analytic process I had chosen to undertake.  
To enhance readability of the transcripts I also used conventional forms of 
punctuation. Therefore these transcripts contain forms of “naturalised 
transcription, in which the text conforms to written discourse conventions, and 
denaturalised transcription in which the text retains links to oral discourse forms” 
(Bucholtz, 2000: 1439). 
The above description of choices available in the process of transcription lays 
open the ways in which transcripts are never a complete or true account of the 
interview encounter (Bucholtz, 2000; Ochs, 1979; Swann and Graddol, 1994; 
O’Connell and Kowal, 1995; Kvale, 1996). Any recording medium of a research 
encounter necessarily removes the encounter from its context and as such 
becomes a textual form in its own right rather than a passive medium 
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reflecting the ‘reality’ of an instance of interaction. The activity of transcription 
becomes a process of translation from oral discourse to written form which 
inevitably means that transcriptions can never be identical to the interview 
encounter. Moreover, the transcriber brings to this process particular assumptions, 
interests and values which variously impact what is included and excluded in the 
final transcript (Bucholtz, 2000). It is in this sense that the transcript is already an 
interpretation of the encounter it seeks to record (Swann and Graddol, 1994).  
From the theoretical standpoint I have taken in this thesis, this conceptualization 
of the transcription process is not a problem that needs to be solved; rather it 
reflects the very active part that researchers play in the co-production of research 
with their participants. I would agree with Bucholtz (2000), that this process of 
transcription as a partial, interpretative activity requires not ‘solutions’ as such but 
a politicized reflectivity to explore why we have included the things that we have 
and the impact of rendering invisible the things we exclude. More specifically, 
Bucholtz (2000) contends that “to ask that researchers think about ourselves in 
relation to our transcripts is a step toward making transcription practices visible, 
toward emphasizing that transcription is always partial, in every sense of that 
word, and toward exploring how our practices shape our knowledge” (P. 1463). 
5.22 Ethics 
In chapter 4, I discussed broad ethical issues that variously impact the research 
process. This section turns attention to the ways in which I responded to issues 
and considerations as outlined in the British Psychological Society’s guidelines 
for conducting ethical research. All three studies outlined above followed similar 
procedures for ethical practice and as such the following descriptions refer to the 
treatment of all individuals who took part in this research. 
5.23 Informed Consent 
I used a number of strategies to ensure that my explanation of what participation 
in this research would involve was sufficient for participants to get a sense of the 
processes that they would experience and how their contribution would be used in 
this project. When I talked to individuals initially about their possible 
participation, I outlined what the project was about and what I broadly trying 
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to achieve. This included a discussion about my own investments and interests in 
doing the project. In relation to the Q studies, as well as give participants a written 
consent form (see appendices A5 and B5) I gave a verbal description of the 
process of completing a Q sort and explained how their contribution would be 
analysed. During explanation of the interview study, I also gave participants a 
written consent form (see appendix C2) as well as a copy of the broad questions 
that would be guiding the interview but explained that other questions would be 
asked to follow up particular points that they made in the discussion. At the end of 
this initial meeting participants were provisionally asked if they would like to take 
part and either a mutually convenient time/day/location was agreed on for 
participation or in the case of most of the Q studies I said that I would send a Q 
pack in the post. 
In addition to this verbal discussion, I also gave participants this information in 
written form so that they could consider their decision to participate in the 
absence of any pressure they may have felt to agree to take part. For those 
individuals I met with for their participation in the process, I asked them if they 
were still happy to continue and at that point asked them to sign a consent form. 
Those who took part in the postal study returned consent forms with their 
contribution via mail. 
5.24 Right to Withdraw 
In this initial meeting with participants, I discussed their right to withdraw from 
the research process with them and explained that provisional agreement did not 
tie them to participation. For those taking part in the interview study, I 
emphasised that they did not have to answer any questions that they did not wish 
to and that the interview did not require disclosure of any information that the 
participants did not want to discuss. 
I provided both my work phone number and email for participants to withdraw 
from the process at this stage and cancel any appointments made. I set a deadline 
of one week for withdrawal after participation. For those taking part in the 
interview study, I made each individual aware that they had the option of listening 
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to their particular interview before the withdrawal deadline to make sure they 
were happy with the information that was disclosed during this encounter. 
5.25 Debriefing 
For the Q postal studies, once I received the completed Q sort, participants were 
contacted by phone as agreed in the initial meeting described above to arrange a 
time/day to discuss participatory issues. For other participants, debriefing 
occurred at the end of their contribution. I invited participants to discuss any 
issues that had arisen, how they felt about participation more generally and if they 
had any further questions that they had not as yet asked.  
Although none of the participants had identified as, or been selected on the basis 
of experiencing sexual violence, I was also aware that through the process of 
participation personal issues may become salient for participants (e.g. Harned, 
2005). In the event that participants made a personal disclosure, I planned to 
initially draw on my professional experience and training of working with 
victims/perpetrators and put them in touch with organisations that could offer 
appropriate support. No participants made any such disclosures. 
5.26 Anonymity  
I explained to all participants that I would anonymise their contribution to the 
research project. This involved numbering Q sorts and referring to individual Q 
sort comments made in the response booklet by number only in the final project. 
Audio tapes of interviews were stored in a lockable metal box which only I had 
access to. Identifying information such as participant names, names of others 
mentioned, places of work and so on were removed from the transcripts. 
Transcripts were only shared with others, such as members of the supervisory 
team, once the transcripts had been suitably anonymised. 
5.27 Ethical implications of the broader project 
As discussed in chapter 4, the production of knowledge can variously impact, 
enable or disable, wider power relationships which shape ways of being with 
particular others. Such ways of being may disadvantage particular groups in 
complex ways. Through this project, I have attempted to reflexively consider 
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the impact this work may have in terms of maintaining and (re) producing 
problematic power relationships. This has not, and I would argue, should not be 
an individual exercise as the particular standpoint in which the researcher is 
located may constrain the ways in which implications of the project are 
conceptualised and understood. Throughout this process, I have used a number of 
discussion forums such as supervisory meetings, conferences and informal 
discussion with many varied others to think through the implications of particular 
strands of thought and of ways of representing others that this work might have.  
5.28 Summary 
In this chapter, the methods used to collect and analyse the entire data set for this 
thesis were described. This description was embedded within broader theoretical, 
methodological and ethical concerns which contextualise the processes of 
knowledge production in this thesis. In the four chapters that follow, analyses of 
the aforementioned data will be outlined. This begins with a reading of Q data 
collected in the first study which focused on understandings or definitions of 
sexual harassment. 
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Chapter 6: Call It What You Want? – Understandings of Sexual Harassment 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter centres on the interpretation of data collected in first Q 
methodological study conducted. In this study, multiple narratives which focused 
on the issue of what constitutes sexual harassment were identified. In this chapter, 
I provide a reading of these narratives with a view to unpack the implications of 
how sexual harassment is conceptualised in these particular stories. This chapter 
will begin by describing the rationale for the study in the context of previous 
literature. The discussion will then move on to the interpretation of each narrative 
identified through Q analysis described in chapter 5. Lastly, I will focus on the 
variable ways in which issues of sexism, power and ‘normal’ sex  become 
relevant to the narratives identified with a view to unpacking the implications they 
have in relation to broader debates around the problematisation of unwanted 
sexualised/gendered conduct. 
6.2 Drawing Boundaries 
As discussed in chapter 2, the general ‘reluctance’ or ‘unwillingness’ of victims 
(particularly women) to describe experiences of unwanted sexualised/gendered 
conduct as ‘sexual harassment’ has been a central concern within this body of 
literature. Concerns around non-labelling lie in the ways in which the use of the 
term ‘sexual harassment’ has been treated as playing a crucial part in the 
“redefinition” of women’s experiences of problematic behaviour from ‘normal’ 
‘everyday’ relations to a form of sexualised/gendered violence (MacKinnon, 
1979; Kitzinger and Thomas, 1995; Thomas and Kitzinger, 1997; Madison & 
Minichiello, 2000). More specifically, for some, the term is intended to 
encompass sexism in all its varied manifestations which allows for more 
‘mundane’ everyday experiences as well as the more extreme versions of 
unwanted conduct to be problematised as a manifestation of gendered/sexualised 
power (e.g. Wise and Stanley, 1987; Thomas and Kitzinger, 1997; Magley and 
Shupe, 2005). Predominant representations of the problem of non-labelling focus 
on women’s reluctance to extend use of the term to more insidious, day-to-day 
experiences of sexist/gendered/sexualised behaviour. 
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This concern has given rise to a plethora of research focussed on accounts of non-
labelling in which women’s non-use of the label ‘sexual harassment’ has been 
variously represented as, for example, evidence of internalised gender oppression 
(e.g. Monson, 1997; Cairns, 1997), as a strategy to minimise the seriousness of 
experiences ( e.g. Madison and Minichiello, 2000) and as a failure to recognise or 
understand what sexual harassment is (e.g. Herbert, 1997; Hinze, 2004: see also 
chapter 2). As argued in chapter 2, these constructions of women victim’s non-
labelling are often represented as a significant barrier to challenging sexual 
harassment which works to shift responsibility for this phenomenon from the 
initiator of problematic conduct to the recipient. 
What has received less attention in the literature is the ways in which the issue of 
what counts as sexual harassment is constituted, how the term is used and how 
such use is contextualised. I would argue that this stems from implicit 
assumptions in dominant representations of labelling behaviour in the literature 
that definitions (should) translate clearly into experience and that the 
contextualisation of an experience as sexual harassment is inherently ‘good’ and 
so the question of what constitutes sexual harassment in the current cultural 
context has not taken centre stage as an issue for research. As others have noted, 
these assumptions have worked to minimise or discount the problematisation of 
conduct through the use of other means such as using notions of sexism to make 
sense of an incident. In addition to this, I would argue that the focus on the non-
use of the term ‘sexual harassment’ also raises the following questions: how do 
particular experiences, acts and events become constituted as sexual harassment? 
What counts as sexual harassment in the current cultural context and why? 
To explore issues raised by the above questions, I sought to map narratives of 
sexual harassment which have currency in the current cultural context through the 
use of Q methodology. The pattern analytic of Q methodology lends itself to 
reading the ways in which particular issues are included, excluded or otherwise 
contextualised in narratives of sexual harassment. To avoid (re) producing the 
ways in which women are explicitly and implicitly positioned as accountable for 
identifying manifestations of sexual harassment, I shifted focus from women 
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victims to the diversity of narratives available by including both men and women 
who varied along a number of fault lines in this study (see also chapter 5). 
6.3 Analysis of Narratives 
In this study, 9 factors were identified. In the following section a brief description 
of the participants who loaded on a given factor is provided prior to the reading of 
the factor as a narrative. The reading of narratives is informed by participant 
comments which contextualised the positioning of particular statements in 
completed Q sorts which were merged to produce the exemplifying Q sort for 
each factor. 
6.4 Factor 1: The Sex(- ism) Narrative 
This factor explains 14.368% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 6.178. Four 
participants loaded significantly on this factor (Q sorts, 9, 19, 29 and 32). 
Participants 9, 19 and 29 are women and participant 32 is a man.  At the time of 
this study, participant 9 was a 50 year old lecturer; participant 19 was in her early 
30’s and worked as a manager for a violence crisis centre; Participant 29 was 29 
years old and working as a stock controller and Participant 32 was in his 50s and 
was project worker in a hostel.  
Interpretation 
In this narrative, sexual harassment is represented as explicitly sexualised acts 
which primarily involve unwanted physical touching of any part of a person’s 
body (32: +4). More specifically the touching of sexualised body areas such as 
genitals (27: +6), breasts (61: +5) and bottom (46: +5) are manifestations which 
typify harassing behaviour. Other physical acts such as the touching of a person’s 
hand (49: +1), putting arms around another person (34: 0) or stroking someone’s 
back (31: 0) appear to be more ambiguous in terms of their sexual content. 
Therefore, these acts require further contextualisation as the meaning of such 
behaviour “depends on the relationships of [the] people involved and 
circumstances of the incident but obviously could be harassment” (P29 comments 
for 61: +5, 27: +6, 49: +1, 34: 0, 31: 0).  
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Physical contact is not the sole defining feature of sexual harassment in this 
narrative. The emphasis here is on unwanted sexual acts and as such mere 
exposure to sexual imagery/content is treated as potentially harassing. This could 
include, flashing (30: +3), being exposed to pornography (22: +3) or hearing 
sexual comments and/or jokes. Importantly, subjective feelings of upset, of 
disliking the behaviour encountered, are prioritised over the intention to cause 
offence when determining whether events such as these count as harassment (13: 
+3; 1: -6). As Participant 29 comments: “some people think what they are saying 
is harmless but it is actually offensive. Still harassment [but] without the intent”. 
Given that the emphasis here is on sexualised encounters, it is unsurprising that 
explicit sexual advances in the form of pestering someone for sex constitute 
sexual harassment (9: +5). However, the idea that it is only natural for men to 
make a pass at women is disagreed with (57: -6). Instead of being part of 
normal/natural heterosex, sexual harassment is seen as an abuse of power (17: +4). 
More specifically, it is not the case that sexual harassment is grounded in sexual 
attraction only, stemming from the perpetrator’s sexual preferences (40: +2). It is 
possible that heterosexual individuals may sexually harass same-sex others 
because this behaviour “is a form of manipulation and power” (P32 comments for 
28: -3). An example of such power abuses could be instances of workplace 
harassment in which a boss abuses their senior position by asking an employee to 
sleep with him/her in exchange for a promotion. However, this is not to say that it 
is only power differentials in the work hierarchy which give rise to sexual 
harassment as it can happen anywhere (29: +4).  
Sexual harassment as an abuse of sexualised power can be distinguished from 
other manifestations of power such as sexism (14: +6). For example, undermining 
comments or exclusionary practices on the basis of gender constitutes 
“discrimination rather than harassment” (P29 comments for 39: -5 & 26: -4; 20: -
5; 44: -4; 3, -5). Similarly, undermining and/or exclusionary practices on the basis 
of sexual preference is not sexual harassment but rather “discrimination” (P29 
comments for 62:-4) or possibility “sexism?” (P9 comments for 45: -3: 39: -5; 5: -
4). 
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Factor 1: The Sex(-ism) Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (31) Hugging 
someone can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(23) Calling a 
woman a lesbian 
because she will not 
engage in feminine 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(18) Beeping a car 
horn at someone can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 (54)Touching 
someone’s hand can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(36) Being called 
“love” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(25) The person on 
the receiving end 
should be the one 
who decides whether 
sexual harassment 
has occurred 
(34) A person putting 
his or her arm around 
another person can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(53) Repeatedly 
asking someone out 
for a date can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(49) Touching 
someone’s knee can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(45) Insulting 
someone by calling 
them gay can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(40) Sexual 
harassment rarely has 
anything to do with 
sexual attraction 
(16) Calling a man 
gay because he will 
not engage in manly 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(42) Staring can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(37) Leering can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(12) A boss who 
criticises an 
employee’s work 
after the employee 
has said no to sex is a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(30) Flashing can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(5) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sexual preference can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(55) Comments or 
behaviour that 
suggests that a 
person is immature 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(11) Suggesting that 
a woman sleeps 
around can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(19) Complimenting 
a person’s looks can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(15) Invading 
someone’s personal 
space can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(4) Adults can 
sexually harass 
children 
(60) In this era of 
political correctness 
it is all too easy for 
innocent remarks to 
be misunderstood as 
sexual harassment  
(22) Having 
pornographic images 
in the workplace can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(17) Sexual 
harassment can be 
about the abuse of 
power 
(20) Suggesting that 
housework is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(44) Suggesting that 
child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of  sexual 
harassment 
 
(2) Sexual 
harassment is a series 
of incidents 
(47) Suggesting that 
a man sleeps around 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(59) You can only 
call an incident 
sexual harassment 
when sexual 
comments or 
behaviour are aimed 
at a person 
(21) Asking someone 
personal questions 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(10) Children can 
sexually harass adults 
(38) Obscene emails 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(13)Sexual comments 
that offend a person 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(32) Touching any 
part of a person’s 
body can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(46) Touching 
someone’s bottom 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(1) A person is only 
guilty of sexual 
harassment if they 
intended to be 
offensive 
(39) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sex can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(26) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sex can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(50) Negative 
comments about a 
person’s looks can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(48) Being called 
“darling” can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(52) Suggesting that 
women should wear 
feminine clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(43) Stroking 
someone’s back can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(33) Sexual 
comments about 
men’s clothes can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(6) Obscene phones 
calls can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(35) Flirting can be 
mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
(29) Sexual 
harassment can 
happen anywhere 
(9) Pestering 
someone for sex can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(27) Touching a 
person’s genitals can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(57) Sexual 
harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only 
natural for men to 
make a pass at 
women 
 (3) Treating 
pregnant women like 
invalids can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(62) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sexual 
preference can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 (28) Only gay 
people can sexually 
harass someone of 
the same sex 
(8) Being called 
“dear” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 (58) Touching a 
pregnant woman’s 
stomach can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(7) Wolf-whistling 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(41) Sexual 
comments about 
women’s clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(56) Friendliness can 
be mistaken for 
sexual harassment 
(51) Telling sexual 
jokes can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(24) A boss that asks 
an employee to sleep 
with him or her in 
exchange for a 
promotion is sexual 
harassment 
(61)Touching a 
woman’s breasts can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(14) There is a 
difference between 
sexism and sexual 
harassment 
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6.5 Factor 2: The Vulnerable Victim Narrative 
Factor 2 explains 12.713% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 5.467. Three participants 
loaded significantly on this factor. Two of these participants are women and one is male.  
Interpretation 
In a similar vein to Factor 1, the vulnerable victim narrative represents behaviour focused on 
the physical body as characteristic of sexual harassment. However, it is not sexual component 
of these behaviour which defines them as harassment per se but rather that the touching a 
person’s genitals is “the only bits of the body really classed as private so unless you have 
permission it is the worst thing you can do” (P27 comment for 27: +6).  Similarly, flashing or 
“showing your privates is just as bad if someone didn’t want to see it. It would mean that the 
person doing the flashing was giving sexual advances” (P27 comment for 30: +6). Like 
Participant 27, Participant 34 suggests that touching a woman’s breasts can be a form of 
sexual harassment because this is a “personal area of the body” (P34, 61: +5). Sexual 
harassment then is behaviour which represents a significant transgression of boundaries 
around the private/personal arena (6: +3). The emphasis here is on more extreme, violations 
of the private sphere. It is not the case that everyday instances of invading another’s personal 
space necessarily constitute harassment as this “can be accidental/ unavoidable” (P34 
comments for 15: -2). That does not mean to say that a person is only guilty of sexual 
harassment if they intended to be offensive (1: -3; 13: +3). The emphasis is seems is on 
whether transgressions of the personal arena can be read as an abuse of power (59: -4: 26: 4). 
Here, sexual harassment works through the targeting of those individuals who have less 
access to particular forms of social power relative to the initiator (26:+4). For example, these 
power differentials allow adults to sexually harass children “all the time [because] children 
trust adults, making them so very vulnerable” (P40 comments for 4: +5; 29: +5). In adult 
relationships, this power relation may manifest in the workplace in the form of quid pro quo 
harassment “especially if the person being propositioned is the bread winner in the family (P 
40 comments for 24: +4; 9: +4). As well as focusing on economic and age related power 
relations, this narrative also highlights the ways in which gendered practices can give rise to 
abuses of power in which individuals may be undermined or excluded from activities on the 
basis of gender (26: +4; 39: +3; 29: +5). In this narrative, age, gender and occupying 
subordinate positions in the work hierarchy can work to make people vulnerable to sexual 
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harassment. Given that sexual harassment may manifest as sexualised and/or gendered power 
practices, sexual attraction is not necessarily a prerequisite for the occurrence of this 
phenomenon (57: -3; 40: -4; 28: -4). Nor does sexual harassment have to be repetitive in 
order to constitute an abuse of power (2: -6). 
 Central to this narrative is the notion that sexual harassment is behaviour which in some way 
exploits individuals who are positioned as vulnerable by their relative lack of power in 
relation to the initiator. As such, acts which appear non-coercive cannot be said to constitute 
harassment. For example, behaviours such as complimenting a person’s looks are “not 
inappropriate [and] are generally nice (P34 comments for 19: -5). Similarly, being called 
love, dear or darling might be a conversational “habit” (P34 comments for 36; -6; 8: -5; 48: -
5) and are generally seen as “a term of endearment, used widely, deeming it to be a non-
sexist/sexual remark” (P27 comments for 36: -6). These acts appear to lack the outward 
appearance of being exploitative and/or discriminatory and as such fall outside the boundaries 
of sexual harassment in this narrative. 
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Factor 2: The Vulnerable Victim Narrative 
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(11) Suggesting that 
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comments about a 
person’s looks can be 
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(54) Touching 
someone’s hand can 
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(10) Children can 
sexually harass adults 
(23) Calling a 
woman a lesbian 
because she will not 
engage in feminine 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(57) Sexual 
harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only 
natural for men to 
make a pass at 
women 
(20) Suggesting that 
housework is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 (51) Telling sexual 
jokes can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(43) Stroking 
someone’s back can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(35) Flirting can be 
mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
(62) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sexual 
preference can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(6) Obscene phones 
calls can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(28) Only gay people 
can sexually harass 
someone of the same 
sex 
 (42) Staring can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(14) There is a 
difference between 
sexism and sexual 
harassment 
 
(53) Repeatedly 
asking someone out 
for a date can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(12) A boss who 
criticises an 
employee’s work 
after the employee 
has said no to sex is a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(7) Wolf-whistling 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(38) Obscene emails 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(39) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sex can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(24) A boss that asks 
an employee to sleep 
with him or her in 
exchange for a 
promotion is sexual 
harassment 
(19) Complimenting 
a person’s looks can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(3) Treating pregnant 
women like invalids 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
 (31) Hugging 
someone can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 (15) Invading 
someone’s personal 
space can be a form 
of sexual 
harassment 
 
(33) Sexual 
comments about 
men’s clothes can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(49) Touching 
someone’s knee can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(56) Friendliness can 
be mistaken for 
sexual harassment 
(16) Calling a man 
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not engage in manly 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
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comments that offend 
a person can be a 
form of sexual 
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(61) Touching a 
woman’s breasts can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(2) Sexual 
harassment is a series 
of incidents 
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of sexual harassment 
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comments or 
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of sexual harassment 
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a man sleeps around 
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sexual harassment 
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form of sexual 
harassment 
(5) Any comment or 
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sexual preference can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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sexual harassment 
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harassment can be 
about the abuse of 
power 
(29) Sexual 
harassment can 
happen anywhere 
(30) Flashing can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 (36) Being called 
“love” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(48) Being called 
“darling” can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
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sexual attraction 
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another person can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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person is immature 
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sexual harassment 
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political correctness 
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innocent remarks to 
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sexual harassment  
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harassment 
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6.6 Factor 3: The Equal Opportunities Narrative 
This factor explains 9.083% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 3.906. One man 
(Participant 24) and one woman (Participant 17) loaded significantly on this factor. 
Participant 24 was 26 year old engineer and participant 17 was a 40 year old centre 
administrator. 
Interpretation 
As with the two factors outlined above, the equal opportunities narrative characterises sexual 
harassment as an abuse of power (17: +6). This power relation rarely has anything to do with 
sexual attraction (40: +6) and is not conceptualised as a natural/normal component of 
heterosex (57: -6). Instead sexual harassment as a power relation is “used to get what he/she 
wants” (Participant 24 comment on 17: +6). Power can be derived through unequal economic 
positionings in the workplace. For example, unequal economic power in the workplace can 
be used to coerce employees into unwanted sex (24: +5; 9: +5). Similarly, the use of higher 
ranking job positions can also be used to exact punishment in the form of work performance 
criticism when an employee has refused sex with a boss (12: +5). However, it is not solely 
hierarchically organised work structures which afford certain individuals more power over 
others. Power is also derived in the ways in which gendered/sexualised practices work to 
position women as subordinate to men (44: +4; 26: +4 39: +3; 52: +3; 33: -4), and 
heterosexuals as superior to ‘other’ sexualities (62: +3; 28: -6).  
Gendered harassment practices which undermine or exclude women from activities on the 
basis of sex could take the form of (re)producing constraints around femininity such as 
suggesting that child-care is a woman’s job or suggesting that women conform to particular 
practices such as wearing feminine clothes (44: +4; 52: +3). Similarly, discriminating 
practices around sexualities may take the form of exclusionary practices on the basis of a 
person’s sexual preference. It is not the case that complaints of such abuses of power reflect 
an era of political correctness [where] it is all too easy for innocent remarks to be 
misunderstood as sexual harassment (60: -3). Instead political correctness is what 
“people...use...as an excuse to say what they want and think they can get away with it. It is a 
typical comment to blame their shortcomings on someone else” (Participant 17 comment on 
60: -3). 
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In the spirit of equal opportunities, a fair system is needed to decide whether sexual 
harassment has occurred. It is not the case that an initiator is only guilty if they intended to be 
offensive (1: -5). Nor should it be down to the person on the receiving end to decide whether 
sexual harassment has occurred (25: -3). Given that the focus of this narrative is on equal 
opportunities, evidence of discriminatory practice is needed for an incident to constitute 
sexual harassment. More individual comments about a person’s character such as suggesting 
that a person is immature (55: -5) or personalised interaction such as being called ‘love’, 
beeping a car horn at someone or putting arms around another individual are not necessarily 
or obviously discriminatory and as such do not constitute as harassment in this narrative (36: 
-4; 34: -4: 18: -4) 
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Factor 3: The Equal Opportunities Narrative 
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sex can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(24) A boss that asks 
an employee to sleep 
with him or her in 
exchange for a 
promotion is sexual 
harassment 
(40) Sexual 
harassment rarely 
has anything to do 
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6.7 Factor 4: The Boundaries Narrative 
This factor explains 7.952% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 3.419. Two women 
(participants 13 & 31) loaded significantly on this factor. Participant 13 was a 26 year old 
women working in an office. Participant 31 opted out of providing demographic information. 
Interpretation 
This narrative focuses on making explicit subtle distinctions between harassing and non-
harassing behaviour or events which constitute a different issue to sexual harassment. For 
example, like factor 1, the boundaries narrative represents sexism as distinct from sexual 
harassment because “sexism is due to sex/gender. Sexual harassment is due to 
desires/control/manipulation (P31 comments on 14: -4). The constitution of sexism as 
different to sexual harassment does not mean to say that sexual harassment does not manifest 
differently for men and women. For example, suggesting that a person sleeps around can be a 
form of sexual harassment for women, but it is less likely to be experienced as harassment by 
men (11: +2; 47: -4; 25: +4). 
The emphasis on the sexual aspect of sexual harassment is reflected in the ways in which 
coercive unwanted sexual acts such as quid pro quo harassment on the job and punishment 
for rejecting sexual advances through work performance criticism is seen as characterising 
sexual harassment (24: +6; 12: +5). However, this should not be taken to imply that sexual 
harassment only occurs in the workplace. Rather it is noted that it can happen anywhere (29: 
+6). 
Through a series of distinctions made the explicit sexualised overtones of sexually harassing 
behaviour compared to other non-harassing is emphasised. For example, whilst leering can be 
a form of sexual harassment, staring on the other hand is unlikely to be (37: +4; 42: -6). 
Similarly, whilst repeatedly asking someone out on a date can be read as implicitly 
sexualised, the lack of overt sexual advance renders it as less harassing. In contrast to this, the 
explicitly sexualised act of pestering someone for sex falls within the boundaries of what 
constitutes sexual harassment in this narrative. The explicitly sexualised component can also 
be seen in the prioritisation of direct exposure to the obscene in the form of phones, emails 
and images as sexually harassing behaviour (6:+5; 22: +3; 38: +3)  Importantly, sexual acts 
and/or comments must offend the recipient for it to be classed as harassment (13: +5; 25: +4; 
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21: +3). It is noted that some behaviours such as hearing sexual jokes may not be interpreted 
as problematic (51: -3). 
Distinctions are also drawn around the body and personal space in terms of what acts 
constitute a violation of boundary norms. More specifically, unwanted touching of more 
private body spaces such as breasts and/or genitals are contrasted with non-harassing physical 
contact such as touching someone’s knee, hand or putting an arm around another person (61: 
+4; 27: +3; 49: -4; 54: -5 34: -5). The invasion of someone’s personal space in and of itself 
does not constitute an harassment act, as participant 31 comments “don’t feel this is sexual 
harassment (in relation to 15: -4).  
It is possible that non-harassing, potentially ‘friendly’ acts can be mistaken for sexual 
harassment. As participant 13 notes initiators of such acts “are trying to be friendly and are 
not harassing anyone in anyway” (comments for 56: -5). For example, an individual who 
complimenting a person’s looks “is only trying to be nice and not in anyway harassing the 
receiver” (Participant 13 comments for 19: -6). Thus, for an act to constitute sexual 
harassment it must be explicitly sexualised or an extreme violation of physical boundary 
norms. 
   129 
Factor 4: The Boundaries Narrative 
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6.8 Factor 5: The Unjust Narrative 
This factor explains 7.032% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 3.024. One man 
(Participant 39) and one woman (Participant 21) loaded significantly on this factor. Both 
participants opted out of returning demographic information. 
Interpretation 
As with the first three factors outlined above, this narrative posits abuses of power as central 
to manifestations of sexual harassment (17:+4). Here, economic power positionings can be 
used to exploit subordinate workers through, for example, criticisms of a subordinate 
employee’s work performance because he/she has refused sexual advances and/or quid pro 
quo harassment (12: +5; 24: +5). However, what makes this behaviour problematic is not the 
unwanted sexual component of such acts per se. Rather the problem lies in the unfairness of 
the initiator’s behaviour because “you should get a promotion because you are the best 
person for the job not because you slept with the boss” (Participant 21 comments for 24: +5). 
Similarly, unwanted physical contact of any part of the body such as breasts and/or genitals is 
constructed as problematic in terms of individual rights (32: +3; 61: +6; 27: +6). As 
Participant 21 notes, “if women wanted you to touch her breasts they would say so. Men 
haven’t got the right to touch you” (P21 comments for 61: +6).  Here, exposure to explicit, 
extreme sexual content or imagery also appears to violate such individual rights (59:+3; 6: 
+3; 30: +4; 22: +5). Given that individual rights are prioritised, it should be down to the 
recipient whose rights have been violated to decide whether sexual harassment has occurred 
(25: +4). 
It is not only exposure to sexualised behaviour or material that constitutes a violation of 
individual rights. Comments about an individual’s private sexual life are also considered 
harassing. More specifically, suggesting that a particular woman or man sleeps around is 
unfair because those who chose to have a number of sexual partners “has probably not found 
the right partner” (P21 comments for 11: +3 & 47: +2). Since multiple partners here is 
constructed as one way in which people find “the right partner”, slurs on a person’s sexual 
reputation are not justified. 
In this narrative, for behaviour to constitute sexual harassment it must be seen as unfair and 
unjust in some way. In principle, any comment or behaviour that undermines a person 
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because of his/her sex can be a form of harassment. However, excluding individuals from 
activities on the basis of gender is not necessarily harassing (39: -3). This is because certain 
roles are gender-typed and so it is not unreasonable or unjust to divide tasks/activities up 
according to gender. For example, suggesting that child-care and/or housework are women’s 
jobs is unlikely to be harassing because “it is just that women are better at housework than 
men [so] it is not a form of sexual harassment” (P21 comments for 20: -5; 44:-5).  
Particular behaviours that are considered fair, just or ‘nice’ and thus non-harassing could be 
complimenting a person’s looks, leering, sexual comments about women’s or men’s clothes 
and/or wolf whistling (19: -4; 37: -4; 41: -5; 7: -4). As Participant 21 comments “some 
women like to hear men wolf whistling because it makes them feel attractive” (P27 
comments for 7: -4). Similarly, it is not out the realms of possibility that people may enjoy 
sexual jokes or at least not be offended by them (51: -6). This is not to say that sexual 
harassment constitutes everything unpleasant. Whilst negative comments about a person’s 
looks might be unpleasant and unfair in the sense that “you can’t judge people by the way 
they look”, subjective dislike of someone on this basis is not the right kind of unreasonable 
behaviour to constitute harassment (P21 comment for 50: -3). In this narrative, sexual 
harassment appears to be premised on the notion that injustice must stem from 
sexualised/gendered behaviour. 
Given that a specific form of injustice defines the behaviours considered to be problematic, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that particular everyday behaviours such as beeping a car horn at 
someone is not considered to be sexually harassing (18: -6) 
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Factor 5: The Unjust Narrative 
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feminine clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
(10) Children can 
sexually harass 
adults 
(46) Touching 
someone’s bottom 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(60) In this era of 
political correctness 
it is all too easy for 
innocent remarks to 
be misunderstood as 
sexual harassment  
 
(6) Obscene phones 
calls can be a form 
of sexual 
harassment 
(17) Sexual 
harassment can be 
about the abuse of 
power 
(24) A boss that 
asks an employee to 
sleep with him or 
her in exchange for 
a promotion is 
sexual harassment 
 
(61) Touching a 
woman’s breasts 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Least Agree            Most Agree 
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6.9 Factor 6: The Dispersed Power Narrative 
Factor 6 explains 6.703% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 2.882. One man 
(participant 11) and one woman (participant 7) loaded significantly on this factor. Participant 
11 was 23 years old and self employed. Participant 7 was 21 years old who at the time of this 
study was unemployed. 
Interpretation 
In this narrative, sexual harassment is a repeated, prolonged experience in which the victim is 
specifically targeted by the perpetrator and pestered for sex (59: +3; 9: +4). Sexual advances 
are made using profane or abusive methods such as obscene phone calls, physical touching of 
the recipient’s body such as their genitals or bottom and flashing (2: +5; 9: +4; 6: +3; 32: +5; 
27: +3; 46: +3). The question of whether this behaviour stems from the initiator’s sexual 
attraction for the recipient is not central to understanding sexual harassment (40: +1: 28: -5). 
Instead, this behaviour can be seen as an abuse of power (17: +5). In this narrative, power is 
handed back to the victim to some extent by prioritising their judgement of whether sexual 
harassment has occurred (25: +4). 
Here power is not seen as derived solely from specific positionings which afford greater 
power and/or organisational hierarchies (29: +6). Instead, power is seen as more dispersed 
which allows, for example, adults to sexually harass children but also for children to sexually 
harass adults (4: +6; 10: +4). The dispersal of power coupled with the conceptualisation of 
sexual harassment as a means to do power over another allows for same-sex harassment to 
occur regardless of the sexualities of those involved (28: -5). Nor do gendered forms of 
power operate in a fixed fashion with women positioned largely as the victims of sexual 
harassment and men as the perpetrators (57: -5). What is emphasised is that men can also be 
subject to harassment through, for example, slurs on their sexual reputation (47: +4; 45: +2).  
Derogatory comments alone, whether they be sexualised, gendered or heterosexist, are not 
always sufficient to render an experience as sexual harassment (16: -6; 23; -6: 33: -5: 50: -4). 
For example making sexual comments about men’s clothes does not constitute harassment as 
“sexual harassment would need to be more serious than merely comments about dress sense 
(P11 comments for 33: -5). What appears to be crucial to defining something as sexual 
harassment is the repetitive pattern characterising implicit or explicit requests for sex. 
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Behaviours which lack obscenity such as touching a pregnant woman’s stomach or staring do 
not resonate obviously with behaviours used to pester someone for sex (58: -4; 42: -4; 9: +4). 
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Factor 6: The Dispersed Power Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sexual preference can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(18) Beeping a car 
horn at someone can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(26) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sex can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(35) Flirting can be 
mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
(41) Sexual 
comments about 
women’s clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(55) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
suggests that a 
person is immature 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(49) Touching 
someone’s knee can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(39) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sex can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(1) A person is only 
guilty of sexual 
harassment if they 
intended to be 
offensive 
 
(15) Invading 
someone’s personal 
space can be a form 
of sexual 
harassment 
 
(38) Obscene emails 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(8) Being called 
“dear” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(60) In this era of 
political correctness 
it is all too easy for 
innocent remarks to 
be misunderstood as 
sexual harassment  
 
(13) Sexual 
comments that offend 
a person can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(61) Touching a 
woman’s breasts can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(46) Touching 
someone’s bottom 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(42) Staring can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(52) Suggesting that 
women should wear 
feminine clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(43) Stroking 
someone’s back can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(22) Having 
pornographic images 
in the workplace can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(12) A boss who 
criticises an 
employee’s work 
after the employee 
has said no to sex is a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(53) Repeatedly 
asking someone out 
for a date can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(45) Insulting 
someone by calling 
them gay can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(59) You can only 
call an incident 
sexual harassment 
when sexual 
comments or 
behaviour are aimed 
at a person 
 
(10) Children can 
sexually harass adults 
(28) Only gay people 
can sexually harass 
someone of the same 
sex 
 
(50) Negative 
comments about a 
person’s looks can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(31) Hugging 
someone can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(51) Telling sexual 
jokes can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(48) Being called 
“darling” can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(19) Complimenting 
a person’s looks can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(40) Sexual 
harassment rarely has 
anything to do with 
sexual attraction 
(14) There is a 
difference between 
sexism and sexual 
harassment 
 
(27) Touching a 
person’s genitals can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(47) Suggesting that 
a man sleeps around 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(17) Sexual 
harassment can be 
about the abuse of 
power 
(16) Calling a man 
gay because he  
will not engage in 
manly activities can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(57) Sexual 
harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only 
natural for men to 
make a pass at 
women 
(58) Touching a 
pregnant woman’s 
stomach can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(34) A person putting 
his or her arm around 
another person can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(56) Friendliness can 
be mistaken for 
sexual harassment 
(44) Suggesting that 
child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(37) Leering can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(11) Suggesting that 
a woman sleeps 
around can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(24) A boss that asks 
an employee to sleep 
with him or her in 
exchange for a 
promotion is sexual 
harassment 
 
(30) Flashing can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(9) Pestering 
someone for sex can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(32) Touching any 
part of a person’s 
body can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(29)Sexual 
harassment can 
happen anywhere 
(23) Calling a 
woman a lesbian 
because she will not 
engage in feminine 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(33) Sexual 
comments about 
men’s clothes can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(62) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sexual 
preference can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(54) Touching 
someone’s hand can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(7) Wolf-whistling 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(36) Being called 
“love” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(20) Suggesting that 
housework is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(21) Asking someone 
personal questions 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(3) Treating pregnant 
women like invalids 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(6) Obscene phones 
calls can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(25) The person on 
the receiving end 
should be the one 
who decides whether 
sexual harassment 
has occurred 
 
(2) Sexual 
harassment is a series 
of incidents 
(4) Adults can 
sexually harass 
children 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Least Agree            Most Agree 
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6.10 Factor 7: The Relationship Narrative 
This factor explains 5.551% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 2.387. One 60 year old 
woman (participant 3) who worked as a housing manager in a hostel loaded significantly on 
this factor. 
Interpretation 
In common with the factor 6 discussed above, in this narrative, sexual harassment is 
conceptualised as a repetitive and prolonged event focused on pestering someone for sex 
through a series of unwanted intrusions such as obscene phone calls or emails and flashing 
(2: +5; 38: +3; 6: +5; 30: +6). The emphasis here is on the intrusiveness of this behaviour in 
the victim’s personal life. As such asking the victim personal questions or making comments 
about their sexual life, sexuality and sexual reputation constitute sexual harassment (21: +3; 
47: +4; 11: +4; +3). 
The extent to which behaviour is conceptualised as intrusive and inappropriate is largely 
determined by aspects of the relationship between the initiator and recipient. For example, 
touching a pregnant woman’s stomach can be considered harassing “if done by the wrong 
person” (P3 comment for 58: +4). Similarly, norms around sexual relationships and conduct 
make it possible to conceptualise particular adult-child interactions problematic and thus 
potentially sexually harassing (4: +4). However, norms around appropriate interaction in 
relationships make it difficult to conceptualise everyday behaviours such as referring 
someone as ‘love’, ‘dear’ or ‘darling’ or giving someone a compliment about how they look 
as harassing. These normative standards for conduct do, however, make it difficult to pass off 
claims of problematic conduct as a result of widespread political correctness or as a result of 
mistaking friendliness for sexual harassment (60: -5; 56: -4). 
While there isn’t a difference between sexism and sexual harassment, the emphasis is on 
inappropriate intrusions or violations of aspects of someone’s personal sexualised life (14: -
6). Therefore, the term ‘sexual harassment’ does not extend to discriminating acts such as 
suggesting that child-care and housework is a woman’s job or treating pregnant women as if 
they were invalids (3: -6; 20: -6; 44: -4). Neither does it encompass potentially insulting 
comments about a person’s character or dress sense (55: -3; 33: -3; 52: -3). This is not to say 
that such behaviour is unproblematic but rather such comments “should be treated with the 
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contempt it deserves – but [does] not [constitute] sexual harassment” (P3 comments for 20: -
6). 
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Factor 7: The Relationship Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(24) A boss who asks 
an employee to sleep 
with him or her in 
exchange for a 
promotion can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(13) Sexual 
comments that offend 
a person can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(15) Invading 
someone’s personal 
space can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
 
(27) Touching a 
person’s genitals can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(10) Children can 
sexually harass adults 
 
 
(53) Repeatedly 
asking someone out 
for a date can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(50) Negative 
comments about a 
person’s looks can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(51) Telling sexual 
jokes can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(61) Touching a 
woman’s breasts can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(59) You can only 
call an incident 
sexual harassment 
when sexual 
comments or 
behavior are aimed at 
a person 
(31) Hugging 
someone can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
(25) The person on 
the receiving end 
should be the one 
who decides whether 
sexual harassment 
has occurred or not 
(34) A person putting 
his or her arm around 
another person can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(35) Flirting can be 
mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
 
(46) Touching a 
woman’s bottom can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(29) Sexual 
harassment can 
happen anywhere 
 
(48) Being called 
“darling” can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(52) Suggesting that 
woman should wear 
feminine clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(43) Stroking 
someone’s back can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
(5) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sexual preference can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(22) Having 
pornographic images 
in the work place can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(7) Wolf-whistling 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(23) Calling a 
woman a lesbian 
because she will not 
engage in feminine 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(21) Asking someone 
personal questions 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(11) Suggesting that 
a woman sleeps 
around can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(14) There is a 
difference between 
sexism and sexual 
harassment 
 
 
(56) Friendliness can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(33) Sexual 
comments about 
men’s clothes can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(28) Only gay people 
can sexually harass 
someone of the same 
sex 
 
(49) Touching 
someone’s knee can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(37) Leering can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(16) Calling a man 
gay because he will 
not engage in manly 
activities is a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(40) Sexual 
harassment rarely has 
anything to do with 
sexual attraction 
 
(38) Obscene emails 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(47) Suggesting that 
a man sleeps around 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(1) A person is only 
guilty of sexual 
harassment if they 
intended to be 
offensive 
 
(20) Suggesting that 
housework is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(60) In this era of 
political correctness 
it is all too easy for 
innocent remarks to 
be misunderstood as 
sexual harassment 
 
(36) Being called 
“love” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(44) Suggesting that 
child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(41) Sexual 
comments about 
women’s clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(62) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sexual 
preference can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(12) A boss who 
criticizes an 
employee’s work 
after the employee 
has said no to sex is a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(54) Touching 
someone’s hand can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(57) Sexual 
harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only 
natural for men to 
make a pass at 
women 
 
(45) Insulting 
someone by calling 
them gay can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(58) Touching a 
pregnant woman’s 
stomach can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(2) Sexual 
harassment is a series 
of incidents 
 
(30) Flashing can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(3) Treating pregnant 
women like invalids 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(19) Complimenting 
a person’s looks can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(8) Being called 
“dear” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(55) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
suggests a person is 
immature can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(18) Beeping a car 
horn at someone can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(39) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sex can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(26) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sex can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(42) Staring can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(32) Touching any 
part of a person’s 
body can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(17) Sexual 
harassment can be 
about the abuse of 
power 
 
(4) Adults can 
sexually harass 
children 
(6) Obscene phone 
calls can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(9) Pestering 
someone for sex can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Least Agree            Most Agree 
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6.11 Factor 8: The Coercion Narrative 
This factor explains 4.063% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.747. One participant 
loaded significantly on this factor. Participant 8 was an 18 year old male student. 
Interpretation 
Whilst it is contended in this narrative that in heterosexual encounters it is only natural for 
men to make a pass at women (57: +5), it is recognised that sexual advances can be coercive. 
For example, bosses may use their greater economic power to exchange promotions for sex 
(24: +4), or punish employees for rejecting their advances by criticising the recipient’s work 
performance (12: +5). This coercive activity may also translate into making obscene phone 
calls as well as perpetrating unwanted physical acts on the victim such as touching their 
breasts and/or genitals (6: +3; 61: +4; 27: +3) There is a sense of the initiator being 
deliberately mean or coercive and it seems that women generally are the focus of this kind of 
coercion (1: +4; 41: + 6; 61: +4; 33: -5).   
 The emphasis on women as victims should not be taken as implying that it is only adult 
women who are the victims of sexual harassment nor that this behaviour is confined to the 
workplace (29: +5). Indeed, this sense of coercion is reflected in the ways in which adults 
may use their position to sexually harass children. It is important to emphasise that the focus 
on female and/or child victims does not suggest that it is only men who perpetrate sexual 
harassment as it is possible for anyone to sexually harass others regardless of their sexualities 
(28: -4). 
As well as turning attention to women victims, this narrative focuses on the ways in which 
sexually harassing behaviour can be used to exclude individuals from activities because of 
their sexual preference (62: +5). It seems that in this narrative exclusionary practices based 
on sexualities fit in with the coercive character of sexual harassment. Important to note is that 
this narrative prioritises issues around sexual advances, practices and sexualities (62: +5; 45: 
+2; 24: +4; 12: +5). Heterosexism more generally is not conceptualised as harassing per se as 
there is a difference between sexism and sexual harassment (14: +6). As such heterosexist 
practices or comments specifically about gender, such as suggesting that house work and/or 
child-care is a woman’s job, or excluding people from activities because of their sex are not 
considered to be sexual harassment (20: -6; 44: -6; 39: -5; 52: -4). Undermining comments 
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more generally on the basis of gender and sexuality are not considered to be harassing in the 
sense that they do not coerce individuals into performing sexualised acts or explicitly act as 
an exclusionary mechanism (5: -3; 26: -2). The positioning of items suggests that for an act to 
be labelled as ‘sexual harassment’ the victim must be put in a situation where they experience 
the effects of exclusionary and unpleasant behaviour based around sexualities or sexual 
advances. 
Given that in this era of political correctness it is all too easy for innocent remarks to be 
misunderstood as sexual harassment, it is important to note that a range of everyday 
behaviours are unlikely to be harassing, coercive or exclusionary (60: +3). This may include 
touching someone’s hand, hugging someone, complimenting a person’s looks, being called 
darling or telling sexual jokes (54: -4; 31: -3; 19: -3; 48: -3; 51: -3). It is generally these kinds 
of actions that are likely to fall outside of the definition of sexual harassment in this narrative. 
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Factor 8: The Coercion Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(56)  
Friendliness can be 
mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) Wolf-whistling 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(32) Touching any 
part of a person’s 
body can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(53) Repeatedly 
asking someone out 
for a date can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(34) A person putting 
his or her arm around 
another person can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
(43) Stroking 
someone’s back can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(18) Beeping ca car 
horn at someone can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
(2) Sexual 
harassment is a series 
of incidents 
 
(55) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
suggests that a 
person is immature 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(5) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sexual preference can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(23) Calling a 
woman a lesbian 
because she will not 
engage in feminine 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(15) Invading 
someone’s personal 
space can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(58) Touching a 
pregnant woman’s 
stomach can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(17) Sexual 
harassment can be 
about the abuse of 
power 
 
(45) Insulting 
someone by calling 
them gay can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(25) The person on 
the receiving end 
should be the one 
who decides whether 
sexual harassment 
has occurred or not 
(16) Calling a man 
gay because he will 
not engage in manly 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(19) Complimenting 
a person looks can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(26) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sex can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(37) Leering can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(38) Obscene emails 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(10) Children can 
sexually harass adults 
(40) Sexual 
harassment rarely has 
anything to do with 
sexual attraction 
 
(4) Adults can 
sexually harass 
children 
 
(24) A boss that asks 
an employee to sleep 
with him or her in 
exchange for a 
promotion is sexual 
harassment 
(39) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sex can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(28) Only gay people 
can sexually harass 
someone of the same 
sex 
 
(48) Being called 
“darling” can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(35) Flirting can be a 
mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
 
(21) Asking someone 
personal questions 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(42) Staring can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(49) Touching 
someone’s knee can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(30) Flashing can (be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(6) Obscene phone 
calls can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(29) Sexual 
harassment can 
happen anywhere 
 
(62) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sexual 
preference can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(44) Suggesting that 
child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(33) Sexual 
comments about 
men’s clothes can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(52) Suggesting that 
women should wear 
feminine clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(31) Hugging 
someone can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(13) Sexual 
comments that offend 
a person can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(11) Suggesting that 
a woman sleeps 
around can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(46) Touching 
someone’s bottom 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(59) You can only 
call an incident 
sexual harassment if 
comments or 
behaviour are aimed 
at a person 
 
(9) Pestering 
someone for sex can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(27) Touching a 
person's genitals can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(1) A person is only 
guilty of sexual 
harassment if they 
intended to be 
offensive 
 
(57) Sexual 
harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only 
natural for men to 
make a pass at 
women 
(41) Sexual 
comments about 
women’s clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(20) Suggesting that 
housework is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(54) Touching 
someone’s hand can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(22) Having 
pornographic images 
in the workplace can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(51) Telling sexual 
jokes can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(47) Suggesting that 
a man sleeps around 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(3) Treating pregnant 
women like invalids 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(36) Being called 
“love” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(50) Negative 
comments about a 
person’s looks can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(8) Being called 
“dear” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(60) In this era of 
political correctness 
it is all too easy for 
innocent remarks to 
be misunderstood as 
sexual harassment 
(61) Touching a 
woman’s breasts can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(12) A boss who 
criticizes an 
employee’s work 
after the employee 
has said no to sex is a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(14) There is a 
difference between 
sexism and sexual 
harassment 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Least Agree            Most Agree 
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6.12 Factor 9: The Context Narrative 
Whilst this factor appears as the tenth factor identified in the statistical analysis, in this 
section it will be referred to as factor 9. This is because the factor which technically precedes 
it could not be interpreted due to the lack of significantly loading Q sorts (see also chapter 5). 
This factor explains 3.816% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.641. Participant 35 
loaded significantly on this factor. This participant was a man who worked in IT and was in 
his late 30s. 
Interpretation 
Two main issues appear to be central to this narrative. Firstly, as its name suggests, actions 
require sufficient contextualisation to determine whether they are harassing or not. Secondly, 
there is a sense from the placing of statements coupled with participant comments that the 
issue of sexual harassment should not be taken too seriously. These issues will be explicated 
in the following interpretation.  
As with factor 8, some claims of sexual harassment can be considered ridiculous as it’s only 
natural for men to make a pass at women (57: +4). The process of making a sexual advance 
may involve leering or staring but “only in hope” of reciprocal attraction which makes these 
actions non-harassing (P35 comment for 42: -5; 37: -5). Whilst it is acknowledged that 
pestering someone for sex can be a form of harassment, participant 35 comments that he 
“won’t feel harassed if they pester me!!” (9: +6). This comment can be read as suggesting 
that the issue here is not necessarily with the behaviour per se but whether it is welcomed or 
not. The light-hearted, humorous tone of this reply to this statement is also evident in 
participant comments related to the statement that behaviours which position the recipient as 
immature can be a form of sexual harassment (55: +6). Here it is noted that “they [the 
initiator and recipient] should shake hands and grow up!!” This comment positions both the 
initiator and recipient as childish. This, coupled with light-hearted reply that pestering for sex 
would be, in some circumstances welcomed, undermines the seriousness of sexual 
harassment claims as well as trivialising acts as immature rather than harassment.  
The trivialisation of sexually harassing acts can further be seen in the positioning of other 
statements. For example, suggesting that a woman sleeps around can be a form of sexual 
harassment “unless it’s with me!! (P35 comment for 11: +4). Similarly, suggesting that a man 
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sleeps around can also constitute harassment. However, it is also noted that men “love it” 
(P35 comment for 47: +4).  
What is emphasised in this narrative is that while some acts are to a greater or lesser extent 
straightforwardly harassment or non-harassing, most others require contextualisation. For 
example, touching someone’s bottom appears to represent a reasonably clear-cut act of 
harassment, with participant 35 simply responding “yeah” to this statement (46: +4). 
Similarly, certain acts are constituted as obviously acceptable behaviour. For instance, 
complimenting a person’s looks are non-harassing as it would “be nice if someone did” (P35 
comments for 19: -6). Nor is the act of telling sexual jokes particularly harassing, as 
participant 35 sarcastically comments, “I think it’s called a sense of humour” (comments for 
51: -4). However, some acts such as making obscene phone calls “depend” on the 
circumstances and are as such less clear-cut (P35 comment for 6: +3).  Moreover, in the 
course of day –to- day living, some behaviour such as receiving emails can be experienced as 
“just harassment full stop” which can be read as making it difficult to distinguish between 
harassment and sexual harassment (P35 comments for 38: +3). The same could be true of 
behaviours which invade someone’s personal space, as this could be “just harassment” rather 
than sexual harassment (P35 comments for 15: +2). 
In a similar vein, comments such as calling someone ‘darling’ can only be read as harassing 
in certain situations. As participant 35 states, being called ‘darling’ can be sexually harassing 
“only if it comes after ‘make the tea’” (48: -4). Important to note is that other similar terms of 
reference such as being called ‘dear’ are contextualised differently as age-related expressions. 
This can be seen in participant 35’s comment that “being called ‘dear’ means you’re passed 
it” (8: -3). 
Continuing this line of argument, this narrative stresses the ways in which practical 
considerations might become relevant when contextualising an incident. For example, 
treating pregnant women like invalids may be acceptable rather than harassing as “they ain’t 
exactly in peak fitness” (P35 comment for 3: -3). Similarly, some exclusionary practices may 
well have a practical and reasonable basis in some contexts. This can be seen in the 
positioning of the act of excluding people from activities on the basis of sexual preference as 
non-harassing, with participant 35 commenting sarcastically “yeah - why not let every 
paedophile be Santa at Xmas” (comment for 62: -6). The same logic applies to exclusion 
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based on sex. In response to this, participant 35 again sarcastically replies: “yeah...I keep 
getting stopped from changing in the women’s dressing rooms” (39: -4). 
The need to contextualise the initiator’s behaviour is necessary as some acts are not 
intentionally offensive (1: +5). For example, having pornographic images in the workplace 
may not be a deliberate act of sexual harassment, with participant 35 commenting that such 
images “are not [sexual harassment] to me...if you can’t have your own space –f’em”. Given 
that making sense of potentially sexually harassing events is complicated by particular 
contextualising issues, the person on the receiving end should not be the one who decides 
whether they have been harassed as “people tend to get things wrong” (P35 comments for 25: 
-2). Misunderstandings of what behaviour might mean can lead to both flirting and 
friendliness being mistaken as sexual harassment so here it is important to only find someone 
guilty of problematic conduct if they intended to offend a particular individual (35: +5; 56: 
+5; 1: +5; 59: +3). 
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Factor 9: The Context Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(13) Sexual 
comments that offend 
a person can be a 
form of sexual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(12) A boss that 
criticizes an 
employee’s work 
after the employee 
has said no to sex is a 
form of sexual 
 (5) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sexual preference can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(7) Wolf-whistling 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(25) The person on 
the receiving end 
should be the one to 
decide whether 
sexual harassment 
has occurred  
(24) A boss that asks 
an employee to sleep 
with him or her in 
exchange for a 
promotion is sexual 
harassment 
(26) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
undermines a person 
because of his or her 
sex can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(18) Beeping a car 
horn at someone can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(32) Touching any 
part of a person’s 
body can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(53) Repeatedly 
asking someone out 
for a date can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(60) In this era of 
political correctness 
it is all too easy for 
innocent remarks to 
be misunderstood as 
sexual harassment 
 
(23) Calling a 
woman a lesbian 
because she will not 
engage in feminine 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(20) Suggesting that 
housework is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(21) Asking someone 
personal questions 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(17) Sexual 
harassment can be 
about the abuse of 
power 
(38) Obscene emails 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(51) Telling sexual 
jokes can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(50) Negative 
comments about a 
person’s looks can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(30) Flashing can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(16) Calling a man 
gay because he will 
not engage in manly 
activities can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(45) Insulting 
someone by calling 
them gay can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(4) Adults can 
sexually harass 
children 
 
(15) Invading 
someone’s personal 
space can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(6) Obscene phone 
calls can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(46) Touching 
someone’s bottom 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(37) Leering can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(40) Sexual 
harassment rarely has 
anything to do with 
sexual attraction 
(3) Treating pregnant 
women like invalids 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
(27) Touching a 
person’s genitals can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(49) Touching 
someone’s knee can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(29) Sexual 
harassment can 
happen anywhere 
 
10) Children can 
sexually harass adults 
 
(14) There is a 
difference between 
sexism and sexual 
harassment 
(2) Sexual 
harassment is a series 
of incidents 
 
(47) Suggesting that 
a man sleeps around 
can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
(56) Friendliness can 
be mistaken for 
sexual harassment 
(62) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sexual 
preference can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment   
 
(42) Staring can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(39) Excluding a 
person from an 
activity because of 
his or her sex can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
58) Touching a 
pregnant woman’s 
stomach can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(61) Touching a 
woman’s breasts can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(31) Hugging 
someone can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(54) Touching 
someone’s hand can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
28) Only gay people 
can sexually harass 
someone of the same 
sex 
 
(52) Suggesting that 
women should wear 
feminine clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(44) Suggesting that 
child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
(11) Suggesting that 
a woman sleeps 
around can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(35) Flirting can be 
mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
(55) Any comment or 
behaviour that 
suggests a person is 
immature 
(19) Complimenting 
a person’s looks can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(22) Having 
pornographic images 
in the workplace can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(48) Being called 
“darling” can be a 
form of sexual 
harassment 
 
(8) Being called 
“dear” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
(36) Being called 
“love” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
(41) Sexual 
comments about 
women’s clothes can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(43) Stroking 
someone’s back can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
34) A person putting 
his or her arm around 
another person can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
(33) Sexual 
comments about 
men’s clothes can be 
a form of sexual 
harassment 
(59) You can only 
call an incident 
sexual harassment 
when sexual 
comments or 
behaviour are aimed 
at a person 
(57) Sexual 
harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only 
natural for men to 
make a pass at 
women 
(1) A person is only 
guilty of sexual 
harassment if they 
intended to be 
offensive 
(9) Pestering 
someone for sex can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment  
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Least Agree            Most Agree 
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6.13 Stories of Sexual Harassment: Similarities & Differences  
As mentioned earlier, one problem identified in previous literature is the 
predominant tendency for victims, as well as people more generally, to treat 
‘mundane’ ‘everyday’ experiences of unwanted gendered/sexualised conduct in 
general and sexism(s) in particular as a distinct phenomenon to sexual harassment. 
The non-labelling of more routine instances of problematic gendered/sexualised 
behaviour has raised concerns that it is being (re) produced as ‘normal’ behaviour 
rather than as manifestation of gendered power. The nine narratives identified 
point to the ways in which the question of whether sexism is a form of sexual 
harassment is neither straightforward nor polarised. This can be seen not only in 
the identification of multiple narratives but also, in some cases, within specific 
narratives. To explicate this point, I will focus on how narratives contextualise 
three issues that have been central to the body of work of non-labelling: (1) 
sexisms, (2) power, and (3) the normalisation of gendered/sexual violence as ‘just 
sex’. 
6.14 Sexisms 
The statement – (14) there is a difference between sexism and sexual harassment 
– was strongly prioritised in three of the narratives (factors 1, 4 and 8) as central 
to the specific story being told. The Sex(-ism) narrative (Factor 1) resonates 
strongly with accounts in previous literature where the term ‘sexual harassment’ is 
used to refer to explicitly sexualised, extreme acts, with sexisms situated outside 
of the boundaries of sexually harassing conduct (14: +6) (e.g. Epstein, 1997; 
Monson, 1997). However, important to note, is that while various manifestations 
of sexisms did not constitute sexual harassment here, they were problematised 
using other conceptualisations of gendered practice such ‘sexism’ and 
‘discrimination’. The location of sexism(s) as a problem despite being seen as 
distinct from sexual harassment resonates with Lee’s (2001) claim that the non-
use of the label ‘sexual harassment’ is not synonymous with acceptance of 
unwanted conduct. Rather, Lee argues that people (particularly women) use a 
range of terms to draw attention to the ways in which gendered behaviour is 
inappropriate. In a similar vein to the Sex(-ism) narrative, the Boundaries 
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narrative (Factor 4), prioritises the difference between sexism and sexual 
harassment to make the argument that the latter is about explicitly sexualised 
conduct – the issue of sexism(s) is outwith the focus of the narrative (14: +4). 
Here, there appears to be links to Epstein’s (1997) assertion that in the case of 
particular experiences of sexism “it can be difficult to define harassment as 
‘sexual’ when, in common sense terms, it is not” (P. 156).  
However, when turning to the Coercion narrative (Factor 8), the situation 
becomes increasingly complex. Whilst like the previous two narratives, the 
difference between sexism and sexual harassment is positioned as important to 
this narrative (14: +6), it is used to draw attention to the difference between the 
two issues in a particular way. More specifically, in this narrative, distinctions are 
made between sexisms that count as sexual harassment, with heterosexist 
practices of exclusion by sexuality falling within the boundary of sexual 
harassment but gendered sexisms falling outside the limits of this particular 
understanding.  
Making distinctions between sexisms was not specific to the Coercion narrative. 
The remaining narratives, whilst not prioritising the difference between sexism 
and sexual harassment, nevertheless made particular sexism(s) relevant in various 
ways to understanding sexual harassment. For example, the difference between 
the two issues was tentatively agreed with and assigned a rank position of +2 in 
the Equal Opportunities narrative (Factor 3), the Dispersed Power narrative 
(Factor 6) and the Context narrative (Factor 9). However, this issue took on 
different meanings in the context of these narratives.  
Despite the indication that the difference between sexism and sexual harassment 
was of moderate importance to the Equal Opportunities narrative, it nevertheless 
prioritised a range of sexist practices as central to understanding sexual 
harassment. This narrative resonates with recent versions of sex discrimination 
law discussed in Chapter 3 – the Equal Treatment Amendment Directive (2003) - 
which unlike earlier sex discrimination laws focuses on unequal practices based 
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on sexualities as well as on gender. In this narrative, whilst some sexisms may be 
different to some forms of sexually harassing behaviour, this does not preclude 
them from understandings of discriminating sexualised/gendered practice.  In 
contrast, in the Dispersed Power narrative, forms of sexism based on gender are 
outwith the focus of this narrative and particular forms of sexism centring on 
sexualities are positioned as falling outside the definition of sexual harassment. 
Instead what is prioritised is the ways in which repeated prolonged sexual acts 
constitute sexual harassment which is akin to definitions which focus on 
harassment as a repetitive act (e.g. Guirdham, 2002). Unlike the Equal 
Opportunities and Dispersed Power narrative, the Context narrative positions 
exclusionary forms of sexism as potentially non-harassing because of possible 
‘appropriate’ gendered/sexualised reasons for disparate treatment. 
The Relationship narrative (Factor 7) and the Vulnerable Victim narrative (Factor 
2) both, to varying degrees, disagree that there is a difference  between sexism and 
sexual harassment. The Relationship narrative is the only narrative which strongly 
prioritises the similarity of sexism and sexual harassment (14: -5). If this 
statement was read in isolation, a reasonable assumption to make about this 
positioning is that the term ‘sexual harassment’ would refer to a range of sexist 
practices. However, when read in relation to the positionings of other issues and 
considerations in this narrative it quickly becomes apparent that this is not the 
case. Conduct which could be read as sexism is either not central to the narrative 
or is disagreed with. Instead, what is focused on is the way in which sexual 
harassment represents a violation of norms around personal boundaries and 
relationships. However, like the Sex(isms) narrative, this does not mean to say 
that particular sexisms are treated as acceptable but rather are problematised using 
other means. The Vulnerable Victim, however, only tentatively positions sexism 
and sexual harassment as similar (14: -2) and positions a range of sexisms, to 
varying degrees, as sexual harassment. As noted above, what is emphasised here 
is the ways in which power relations based on sex, sexuality and age make 
particular groups vulnerable to problematic conduct. 
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The Unjust narrative (Factor 5) is the only one in which statement 14 – there is a 
difference between sexism and sexual harassment - is positioned as more clearly 
outwith the focus of the narrative (+1). However, as mentioned above the 
(re)production of gendered roles as well as exclusionary gendered/sexualised 
practices are not considered to be sexually harassing as it argued that in particular 
circumstances a specific gender group is more competent at performing gender-
typed tasks. Here, unequal treatment between men and women is appropriate 
because they do not share the same skills and competencies. It appears that this 
narrative draws on the same liberal version of equality which underpins the 1975 
Sexual Discrimination act which contends that equals should be treated alike and 
unequals should be treated differently. However, for unequal treatment to be 
justified, the differences must be relevant to the issues at hand. As argued in 
chapter 3, this version of equality is problematic because it ignores the ways in 
which similar treatment of men and women can nevertheless impact one gender 
group in specific, problematic ways and thus (re)produce gendered power 
relations (e.g. Crouch, 2001). 
6.15 Power & Sex 
As with the issue of sexism(s), considerations about the operation of power were 
complexly constructed in and across the narratives identified. Six of the narratives 
strongly prioritised sexual harassment as an abuse of power (statement 17). 
However, the positioning of sexual harassment as an act of power became 
constituted in narratives in diverse ways, particularly in relation to the construct of 
‘normal’ sex . For example, within the Sex(-isms) narrative, whilst it is tentatively 
acknowledged that sexual harassment, in some circumstances may be related to 
the initiator’s sexual attraction for the recipient (40: -2), it avoids claims that 
unwanted sexual advances are a ‘natural’ part of ‘normal’ sex (57: - 2). Instead, 
what is prioritised here is the ways in which sexual harassment is a tool to do 
power over others (17: +4). A similar argument is interwoven  through the 
Vulnerable Victim narrative (17: +4; 57; -3; 40: -4) and  the Unjust narrative (17: 
+4; 57: -2: 40: -2). However what is emphasised in the Vulnerable Victims 
narrative is that sexual harassment is a means of doing power over those in 
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vulnerable gendered/sexualised/age-related positionings. Again, a different point 
is made in the Unjust narrative, with its focus on power as a violation of 
individual rights. Unlike the Vulnerable Victim narrative which draws attention to 
sexualised/gendered aspects of sexual harassment, the Unjust narrative draws on 
notions of liberal humanism to position sexual harassment as a barrier to fair 
practices for the individual concerned. 
In a similar vein to the narratives mentioned above, the Equal Opportunities 
narrative strongly characterises sexual harassment as an abuse of power. 
However, what is stressed here is that sexual harassment has nothing to do with 
‘natural’ sexual advances nor sexual attraction. Rather it is a form of power which 
when deployed discriminates against people on the basis of gender and sexuality. 
This version of sexual harassment is not unlike claims that sexual harassment is 
not about sex per se but a means of doing and maintaining power (e.g. Lee, 2001). 
The Dispersed Power narrative also strongly prioritises the ways in which sexual 
harassment can be conceptualised as an abuse of power and discounts the notion 
that repeated explicit sexualised acts are an expression of men’s ‘natural’ 
behaviour towards women. This narrative, however, does not conceptualise power 
as something that some social groups possess or have greater access to compared 
others. Instead, power is seen as dispersed, allowing a diversity of individual’s 
access to power through sexually harassing acts. 
For the Relationship narrative the conceptualisation of sexual harassment as an 
abuse of power is of moderate importance to this narrative (17: +3). There is 
tentative agreement with both the notions that sexual harassment rarely has 
anything to do with sexual attraction (40: +2) and sexual harassment might be the 
expression of ‘natural’ sexual behaviour from men to women. These points are 
reconciled in this narrative by recourse to the idea that sexual harassment 
represents a violation of personal relationship norms which can be done in the 
presence or absence of sexual attraction and/or in the course of making ‘normal’ 
sexual advances. 
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In contrast to the above narratives, the characterisation of sexual harassment is an 
abuse of power is neither central to the Boundaries narrative or the Coercion 
Narrative. In the Boundaries narrative, issues focused on whether sexual 
harassment is part of ‘normal’ heterosex or a manifestation of sexual attraction is 
outwith the focus of the narrative. Rather this narrative characterises the issue of 
sexual harassment as a manifestation of problematic sexualised behaviour and 
focuses on making distinctions between sexualised harassing behaviour from non-
sexualised and hence non-harassing conduct. The Coercion narrative on the other 
hand does make the point that while it’s only ‘natural’ for men to make a pass at 
women, the phenomenon of sexual harassment is, to some degree, unrelated to 
‘normal’ sexual attraction (40: +2) and more concerned with deliberate coercion. 
Like the Coercion narrative, the Context narrative prioritises the naturalness of 
men’s sexual advances to women and positions sexual attraction as relatively 
central to the phenomenon of sexual harassment. Unlike the other narratives, 
while it is tentatively acknowledged that sexual harassment can be conceptualised 
as an abuse of power, it tends to trivialise the phenomenon as a childish 
disagreement. 
6.16 Summary: Moving Towards the Multiple 
The multiplicity of narratives identified, the ways in which they are composed of 
a diversity of considerations including those centred on sexist/power practices, 
suggest that it is not the case that the prioritisation of sexualised manifestations of 
sexual harassment necessarily preclude particular sexisms in understandings of 
sexual harassment. Nor is it always the case that behaviours falling outside the 
boundaries of sexual harassment in particular narratives are positioned as 
‘normal’, rendered acceptable and/or trivialised. Rather, it seems that these issues 
are contextualised differently depending on specific boundaries created within the 
story that is being told.  
Important to note is that I make no claims that the narratives identified here 
exhaustively describe all narratives available. Nor do I claim that the inclusion of 
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particular issues in understandings of sexual harassment make them somehow 
unproblematic. Rather, I would argue that the narratives identified here point to 
the need to move away from polarised conceptualisations of issues in sexual 
harassment as well as the need to look not only at what is being problematised but 
how this problematisation takes place. This would allow for a more contextualised 
reading of the implications of labelling and non-labelling behaviour. 
Consideration of boundaries around the construct of sexual harassment is 
continued in the next chapter which uses Foucauldian discourse analysis to 
explore interview data. In chapter 7, the focus is shifted to how the public-private 
dichotomy is discursively deployed to (re)produce specific boundaries around 
acceptable and unacceptable sexual conduct. 
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Chapter 7: Politicising the Personal? Unwanted Sexual Attention as a Private 
Relation 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, Foucauldian discourse analysis is used to explore constructions of 
the public/private dichotomy in interview data. This analysis focuses on the ways 
in which constructions of the public/private dichotomy are deployed to produce 
unwanted sexual attention as a problem arising from the private realm of personal, 
intimate relationships. This chapter explores two main constructions of the 
workplace: (1) the constitution of the workplace as the public sphere, a space 
demarcated from personal relationships, feelings and behaviour; and (2) the 
workplace as an increasingly personalised sphere. I will argue that the 
construction of the workplace as a public sphere allows unwanted sexual attention 
to be constructed as a violation of formalised work etiquette. The positioning of 
unwanted sexual attention as a violation allows recipients to be positioned as the 
victim and initiators to be positioned as the perpetrator of an offence. However, 
versions of the workplace which prioritise increased emphasis on the 
personalisation of employee relations are used to construct the issue of 
victimisation between colleagues as less clear-cut. The construction of unwanted 
sexual attention as a personal relation works to position it as a permissible 
problem in private relationships. Lastly, I will explore how unwanted sexual 
attention occurring in private spaces and relationships rather than public ones are 
constituted as risky because dealing with it demands the negotiation of 
interpersonal relationships and emotions. 
7.2 Constructing (In) Formal Working Relations 
Within the literature, the public/private distinction has been variously represented 
as “different realms of experience and value, spatially and temporally, separated 
and epitomised by different sorts of people and roles” (Slater, 1998: 144). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this distinction between public and private has been 
deployed to maintain gendered power relations in the workplace. Wage labour has 
traditionally been constructed as a masculinised preserve which is reflected in the 
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ways in which idealised working relations have been variously characterised as 
rational, formal and efficient (Corroto, 2005).  
According to Mott and Condor (1997) the ideal of the effective worker and 
worker relations has undergone a shift since the late 1940s. Prior to the Second 
World War, the ideal of bureaucratic life focused on impersonal, formalised 
working relations in which employees were “cooperative strangers” (Moore, 
1962: 87). However, this ideal has been superseded by conceptualisations in 
which workers are “treated less as physical bodies or anonymous role occupants 
from whom labour can be exacted, and more as individuals with feelings and 
social needs to be met within the workplace” (Mott and Condor, 1997: 53). 
Within this latter conceptualisation of the worker, liberal humanist discourses of 
valuing the individual become interwoven with conceptions of productive labour. 
As Rose (1990) points out, informality, friendship and pleasure become a 
prerequisite for productivity. The personalisation of the workplace has, in various 
ways, become interwoven with notions of femininity. The shift towards more 
personalised working styles such as delegated decision making, participative 
leadership styles and so on have been gendered as feminine (Ball, 2004). These 
feminised working strategies have been argued to personalise otherwise formal 
working roles (e.g. Hochschild, 1983; Ball, 2004). 
The personalisation of the workplace produces particular tensions in relation to 
sexual violence in organisational settings. Minson (1993) points out that the 
conceptualisation of the workplace as a formal arena in which private 
relationships and emotions do not belong provides some protection against 
unwanted sexual attention on the job. This is because sex, sexuality and intimate 
relationships have been variously represented as belonging to the private sphere 
(Brewis and Linstead, 2000). Minson (1993) further argues that it may be difficult 
to argue that sexualised behaviour is inappropriate at work due to the shift from 
formal bureaucratic employment norms to the workplace as an increasingly 
personalised space in which informality is encouraged. 
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To explore the ways in which unwanted sexual attention becomes constituted as a 
personal relation both inside and outside the workplace, I will focus on four 
constructions identified. These were: (1) hierarchical power; (2) unwanted sexual 
attention as a personal relation; (3) the subjective as a complication; and (4) 
public/private and risk. Each construction will be addressed in turn in the 
following sections. 
7.3 Hierarchical Power 
The positioning of sexual violence in the workplace as an abuse of formalised 
power is one way in which unwanted sexual attention on the job has been 
constructed as problematic. The hierarchical organisation of job positions within 
employment have been predominantly represented as giving rise to sexual 
harassment in the workplace (e.g. Mackinnon, 1979; Payne, 1993; Bower, 1993; 
Dougherty, 2006). More specifically, a number of scholars have argued that 
power differentials between higher ranking and subordinate workers provide 
opportunities for superiors to exploit subordinates sexually (e.g. Mackinnon, 
1979; Payne, 1993; Bower, 1993).  The construction of unwanted sexual attention 
as an exploitation of power differentials in employment rank can be seen in the 
following excerpt from Steve’s account: 
S: I think sometimes you can to a certain extent receive power, 
power in your job. 
L: Yeah. 
S: And you think that just because somebody’s lower down the 
ladder than you, you can get away with pretty much anything, 
or you can get away with a lot more than if someone’s more 
equal in your job or certainly in the work environment  
Here, unwanted sexual attention is constructed as an abuse of hierarchical power. 
The initiator’s power to harass is derived from their higher position within the 
work hierarchy which allows them to exploit subordinates because their job-
related power allows them to “get away with pretty much anything”. In Steve’s 
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account, unwanted sexual attention between equally situated colleagues is 
constructed as unlikely to occur because of the absence of hierarchical power 
relations. The ways in which sexual attention becomes exploitative in the context 
of hierarchical relations is discussed by Nola below: 
N: [The]Power thing is a big debate there, whether it’s from a 
senior person at work, the boss or you know management that 
adds a whole other dimension to it. And it sort of, when, when 
do you say no excuse me you’re being out of order, when do 
you worry oh I’m going to lose my job or get passed over for 
promotion’ or whatever. 
L: Yeah. 
N: That’s, that’s more much more power thing isn’t it, that rarely 
starts with just innocent flirting, very much a power thing from 
a management’s point of view  
Again, unwanted sexual attention is constituted as an abuse of hierarchical power 
in the workplace. Subordinate work positions are associated with powerlessness 
and dependence on the goodwill of senior members for maintaining or increasing 
income and/or work status. Hierarchical positionings are constructed as 
complicating the issue of sexual refusal because of the subordinate workers 
economic vulnerability. This can be seen in the questions described in the above 
excerpt which refer to issues one might ask themselves when negotiating 
unwanted sexual attention from a senior employee – “when do you say no excuse 
me you’re being out of order when do you worry ‘oh I’m going to lose my job’”. 
The senior person is constituted here as abusing or exploiting power through the 
description of it as a “power thing” which positions the initiator as deviating from 
normative, acceptable sexual behaviour. There is a clear sense here that senior 
employees recognise the potential for power exploitation in hierarchically 
organised workplaces. The notion that senior members are aware that sexual 
attention between higher- and lower-ranking employees is an abuse of power 
constitutes the behaviour as a clear-cut offence with subordinates being positioned 
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as victim and senior employees as perpetrators. The construction of worker 
awareness of power exploitation between higher and lower ranking staff can be 
seen further in Alan’s account:  
A: I think they would usually be aware of what’s right and what’s 
wrong. For example in issues of um sexual harassment in the 
workplace  
L:  Yeah 
A: the, the boss knows that if he pinches his secretary’s backside  
L: Yeah 
A: the, that isn’t really the done thing, particularly now, you 
know maybe ten twenty years ago it was 
L: Yeah 
A: but now it it’s politically incorrect that statement’s come about 
as a result of greater social awareness of sexual 
discrimination in the workplace. As, as one example, 
therefore, he knows it’s wrong and unless he can argue that he 
can’t distinguish right from wrong, then I think he’s 
completely aware that that when he when he does it um then it 
is the wrong thing to do 
By drawing on the legalistic work discourse, the boss is positioned as both 
someone who knows about gendered power exploitation in the workplace and 
someone who is responsible for enforcing “sexual discrimination” laws in the 
workplace. These positionings work to emphasise the initiator as a perpetrator of 
an offence because “he’s completely aware ... it is the wrong thing to do”.  
Interestingly, unlike the excerpts discussed above, Alan makes explicit reference 
to the gendering of hierarchical positionings in the workplace. As Mackinnon 
(1979) notes, within hierarchically organised workplaces “women are generally 
men’s subordinates on the job, with men in the position to do the hiring, firing, 
supervising and promoting of women”. This can be seen here with the positioning 
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of the male employee as boss and the woman employee as his direct subordinate. 
However, this description of the male boss and female secretary also draws 
attention to the ways in which subordinate positions in the workplace have often 
been traditionally located as ‘women’s work’ which has been characterised as 
involving so-called ‘lower’-order roles such as typists, file clerks, receptionists for 
example (e.g. Mackinnon, 1979; see also Chapter 2).  
Secretarial work is predominantly represented as “woman’s work” (Mott and 
Condor, 1997). The job specifications of secretarial work, in common with other 
kinds of ‘women’s work’, tend to blur public and private roles in the sense that the 
employment position not only requires the woman to act as an effective worker 
but also requires the display of feminine characteristics such as being caring, 
socially sensitive, amicable and loyal (Mott and Condor, 1997). The secretary has 
traditionally been treated as an ‘office wife’ where they will not only undertake 
secretarial duties but also perform care-related tasks for their boss (Mott and 
Condor, 1997). Indeed, Hearn (1989) argues that the boss-secretary relationship 
reflects traditional representations of the patriarchical master in which women are 
positioned as in service to men (Hearn, 1989). The positioning of the boss as a 
patriarch is reflected in the description of the recipient as “his secretary” which 
provides a sense of ownership. 
Through the description of the secretary in this account, she is positioned as not 
only subject to differentials in organisational power but also power imbalances in 
the gender hierarchy which are both emphasised through the use of the phase 
“sexual discrimination”. The location of the secretary within these power relations 
renders her an unequivocal victim. Thus, as with the positionings of the initiator 
and recipient in all excerpts discussed in this section, hierarchical power relations 
work to position unambiguously the recipient’s status as victim and the initiator as 
perpetrator. 
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7.4 Unwanted Sexual Attention as a Personal Relation 
Unwanted sexual attention on the job was not only constructed as exploitation of 
hierarchical power relations but also as an infraction of norms around the personal 
sphere. This can be seen in Nola’s description of what counts as unwanted sexual 
attention in the workplace: 
N: ... Just references to you, an attempts to touch or grab or just 
get too close, um squeezing through a corridor when there’s 
obviously enough room an they really don’t have to press 
themselves up against you like that or whatever 
Unwanted sexual attention on the job is constructed as forced physical intimacy 
were the initiator “attempts to touch or grab or just get too close”. The initiator’s 
behaviour is constituted as intentionally encroaching on an individual’s personal 
space which is implied through the idea that there is enough physical space to 
avoid “pressing themselves up against you”. Similarly, Samantha defines 
unwanted sexual attention as contravening norms around an individual’s personal 
life: 
L: ... What does the phrase unwanted sexual attention mean to 
you? 
S: Um, just somebody invading your personal space. 
L: Um 
S: You know like it could, could be either saying stuff to you, 
about, about your sexuality or it could be someone physically 
touching you in a way that you find (.) you know, um, 
insulting, 
 .... 
L: You say sexuality, what did you mean by that? 
S: Um, it could mean anything from, you know, whether what you 
prefer men or women or it could be you’re not in a regular 
relationship, and you have few partners, you know, it could be 
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anything like that. You could be called a slag for sleeping 
around a lot or a virgin if you don't 
Sex, sexuality and the body are constructed as a ‘personal space’ which serves to 
locate these aspects of an individual’s life within the personal sphere. The 
examples Samantha gives of unwanted sexual attention are of behaviours that 
deviate from the norms of heterosexuality and from normative feminine sexuality. 
In this account, women’s sexuality is framed by what Cowie and Lees (1987) call 
the ‘drag-or-slag dichotomy’ in which ‘slags’ are othered by the ways active 
feminine sexuality is constituted within the Madonna/Whore dichotomy. On the 
other hand, drags are problematised through their unwillingness to engage in 
hetero-sex. Thus, women tread a fine line when negotiating issues around sexual 
reputation (e.g. Kitzinger, 1995). Implied in this account is that these forms of 
unwanted sexual attention are problematic precisely because they violate aspects 
of an individual’s personal life. Violation of norms around an individual’s 
personal life is elaborated on in the following extract where Samantha discusses 
an incident of unwanted sexual attention in the workplace: 
S: ... There used to be this bloke at work who was openly gay 
L: Um 
S: and he used to get called a queen and everything and 
sometimes it was, you know, you could see them taking it as a 
joke, other times I think it really insulted him. 
L: Yeah 
S: And, you know, it's not nice for somebody at work to be able to 
do that to you ... there have got to be certain boundaries that if 
you cross over them then it's going to far  
Here, the recipient becomes the focus of unwanted sexual attention because he is 
constituted as deviating from normative heterosexuality. This can be seen through 
the use of derogatory description of him as “queen”. The construction of this 
comment as a possible joke draws attention to informalised employee relations in 
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this workplace. As Pryor (1995) points out, humour in the workplace plays a 
crucial function is personalising working relationships and promoting fun and 
friendship. However, Watts (2007) argues that “because humour in all its 
representations contains some measure of ambiguity, it allows insult, disrespect, 
ridicule and slur to enter into dialogue” (p, 260). 
The ways in which humour can function as a disguised insult or punishment has 
been identified as one common manifestation of sexually harassing behaviours 
(e.g. Stockdale, 2005; Mott and Condor, 1997). The ambiguity in humour allows 
initiators of offensive jokes to disclaim intention of harm or wrongdoing because 
jokes are generally represented as ‘good’ in the sense they play a role in having 
fun (Watts, 2007; Mott and Condor, 1997). This ambiguity serves to create a 
sense of uncertainly around whether the recipient can legitimately be positioned 
as victim and the initiator a perpetrator because it becomes unclear as to whether 
an offence has occurred. 
In this account, unwanted behaviour is constituted as problematic through the use 
of liberal humanist versions of personalised working relations. More specifically, 
the behaviour is described as ‘not nice’ which draws on liberal humanist versions 
of the ‘friendly’ office in which the feelings and social needs of individuals are 
valued (e.g. Mott and Condor, 1997).  The behaviour is also constituted as 
unacceptable by the depiction of it crossing a boundary between formalised 
working relations and the private sphere. This can be seen in the explicit 
problematisation of “somebody at work” commenting on a work colleague’s 
personal life. Samantha, when referring to this particular incident of unwanted 
sexual attention later on in the interview, draws the distinction between the 
personal and the public sphere more explicitly: 
S: What they are, what they do, in their own spare time, which 
you know has nothing to do with them 
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In Samantha’s account, what individuals do in their “spare time”, in their private 
life, is constructed as something distinct from formalised relations in the public 
space of the workplace. It is through the construction of a boundary between the 
public and private spheres of individual life that unwanted sexual attention in the 
workplace becomes problematic. 
In some participant accounts, employee relationships were constituted as both 
formal and more personalised. The personalisation of formal working relations 
produces particular tensions around making sense of unwanted sexual attention as 
a clear violation of normative formal relationships. Indeed, expressions of 
unwanted sexual attention appear to be made possible in the workplace by the 
endorsement of personalised relationships between colleagues. This can be seen in 
Diane’s account where she discusses her relationship with her previous boss: 
D: ... Some people really invade your personal space. I had a 
boss that used to do that but because I got on with him and I 
liked him 
L: Yeah 
D: but I knew he was doing it, but it didn’t make me feel 
uncomfortable, you know, he’d ask you to do something and 
he’d touch your hand because that he thought that would make 
you say yes, and I’d say I know what your doing, I know your 
touching me and I’m not going to do it.  
L: [laugh] 
D: Touch my hand, it doesn’t help  
Diane highlights multiple aspects of her relationship with her colleague in this 
context – he is her “boss” which draws attention to the status-related power 
differentials between them. As mentioned earlier, hierarchical power relationships 
within the workplace have been used to constitute cases of unwanted sexual 
attention as problematic as well as a clear-cut offence within the workplace.  
Here, the boss’ behaviour is constituted as inappropriate in that it is constructed as 
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violating norms around personal space. However, the boss is also located in a 
permissible intimacy discourse in which his behaviour is positioned as to some 
extent allowable because it occurs within a personalised relationship in which she 
“got on” and “liked” him. The construction of their personal relationship serves to 
mitigate the boss’s positioning as perpetrator of unwanted sexual attention and 
works to normalise the behaviour as part of their informal relationship.  
Unwanted sexual attention in this excerpt is constructed as an interpersonal tactic 
used by the boss to persuade his employee(s) to perform tasks. This particular 
depiction of unwanted sexual attention serves to desexualise unwanted sexual 
attention which further undermines the positioning of the boss as a perpetrator of 
a sexualised offence. Diane is not constructed as a victim because she did not feel 
“uncomfortable” by her boss’ actions. Instead, she is positioned as actively 
resisting his behaviour. Thus, the personalisation of relationships between 
initiators and recipients works to position unwanted sexual attention as a normal if 
not unwanted part of informal interaction.  
The ways in which personalised behaviours make unwanted sexual attention 
possible and permissible in the workplace can be further seen in the following 
excerpt from Mike’s interview:  
M: I suppose physical would be, you know, the unwanted hand, 
um the and anything where it goes beyond the realms of what's 
acceptable, um touching shouldn't, shouldn't happen but does 
especially in industry though init. 
L: Oh right. 
M: [Cough.] Oh yeah, you got you know, I mean you'd all, I 
dunno so much now, certainly not in the environment I work 
in, but you know previously, when I was in industry you would 
get the boss who would put hands round the shoulder, gave 
them a little tap on the bottom as they walked past, something 
like that and ah yeah, obviously, not everyone finds that 
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appealing xxx if you find that appealing. 
L: [Laugh] 
M: But yeah, I've seen it happen in an office environment but it 
didn't get to the stage where it became really bad, it was it, it 
was sort of dealt with and sorted, but nothing official which 
you know nowadays is a bit worrying? 
L: xxx 
M: Um a quiet word in the chap’s ear, really don't do it you're 
making this woman feel uncomfortable, don't do it anymore 
and he his was the standard stock answer. Oh I didn't realise 
that, we're just friends, so yes there's that as well 
Here, the initiator is variously positioned in formalised spaces (e.g. “the boss”) 
and informalised spaces (e.g. “chap”, “friend”) which serves to highlight 
personalised relationships between colleagues in the workplace. This sense of 
informality is further conveyed in the description of unwanted physical acts where 
the boss is constructed as moving beyond formalised work behaviours to more 
intimate physical behaviour such as putting “hands round the shoulder”. Similarly, 
describing touching someone’s bottom as “a little tap” serves to construct this 
behaviour as playful which again locates this behaviour in the realms of the 
informal. 
Mike highlights informality as a problem in terms of challenging unwanted sexual 
attention in the workplace. Physically intimate behaviour is constructed as 
something that is allowed in friendship. Thus, the question of what kind of 
interaction is ‘allowed’ between individuals who are friends as well as work 
colleagues becomes an increasingly complex one to answer. Here, informality 
provides the initiator with a “standard stock answer” to claims that he has behaved 
inappropriately. By drawing on the ‘permissible intimacy’ discourse, the initiator 
can be positioned as ‘friend’. This serves to construct intimate behaviour as 
acceptable. This use of notions of intimacy and informality in the context of the 
workplace resonate with Minson’s (1993) claim that the conceptualisation of the 
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workplace as a personalised space in which informality is encouraged may make 
it difficult to argue that sexualised behaviour is inappropriate at work. The 
construction of particular forms of informality as providing a means with which to 
‘do’ unwanted sexual behaviour can be seen further in Gillian’s account: 
L: Can you think of any examples, sort of specific kinds of 
behaviours that you might count as unwanted sexual 
attention?  
G: Yes, Yes, I’ve got a humdinger.  
L: Oh great [laugh]excellent. 
G: Well [Name] apparently was working at [Name of 
organisation] which is what she does, someplace or other, and 
this new manager came in, and I think at their Christmas do or 
something, they you know have a staff raffle type thing, and 
apparently he put all the names on, in his, on a piece of paper 
in his pockets 
L: Umm 
G: and then he ask some pretty female employee 
L: oh right 
G: to come and draw a name out of his pocket his trouser pocket. 
L: oh right 
G: And he’d said, you know,’ oh what’s in my pocket?’, and, and 
God, isn’t that, ah God, that’s just so gross and sordid and 
disgusting. Anyway obviously he didn’t dare ask [Name] 
who’s really harrumph and you know sticks up for herself. 
L: Yeah 
G: and er, he said to some girl what’s in my pocket? And [Name] 
said a court case [laugh] 
Gillian contextualises this example of unwanted sexual attention as occurring at a 
“Christmas do” at work. This context blends notions of formal and informal 
relations since workplace Christmas parties provide an informal situation in which 
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individuals with formal working roles and relations can participate. As with the 
description of the initiator in the excerpt from Mike’s interview above, the 
perpetrator’s formal working role is made explicit; he is the “new manager”. The 
initiator’s greater hierarchical power over the recipient is implied by the absence 
of an official working title in the description of her.  
In Gillian’s account, however, it appears that unwanted sexual attention is made 
possible through use of the informal context rather than hierarchical power 
relations per se. More specifically, the initiator uses humour or sexual innuendo to 
direct sexualised behaviour at the recipient. As mentioned earlier, the ambiguity 
of humour can provide opportunities for initiators of unwanted sexual attention to 
disclaim any offensiveness caused through recourse to the representation of jokes 
as harmless fun (e.g. Watts, 2007; Stockdale, 2005). This can be seen here where 
the initiator uses humour to ‘do’ unwanted sexual attention.  
The sexualisation of this particular example of workplace ‘banter’ is reinforced by 
the description of the recipient as “pretty” which implies the initiator may find her 
sexually attractive. Lea’s (2007) description of the discourse of desire is relevant 
to the sexualisation of the initiator’s behaviour. According to Lea (2007), the 
discourse of desire posits the physical attractiveness of the recipient as producing 
sexual interest in others, as making them desire him or her. In this extract, the 
discourse of desire operates to position the initiator’s use of humour as about sex 
rather than about other possible functions of humour in the workplace such as fun, 
friendship and/or camaraderie (e.g. Pryor, 1995; Mott and Condor, 1997). 
Whilst humour provides an opportunity for the initiator to ‘do’ unwanted sexual 
attention, it also is presented as a means to challenge this behaviour. Here, a third 
party intervenes in the interaction between the recipient and initiator through the 
use of wit. The retort of “a court case” brings in to sharp relief the formal working 
roles of those involved and functions to relocate the manager’s behaviour from the 
realms of the informal to a formalised employment context in which inappropriate 
sexualised/gendered behaviour is legislated against. Similarly Alan, in his 
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discussion of workplace sexual discrimination, alludes to possible legal 
consequences of informal relationships and events in the employment context: 
A: ... I think um, it, it’s important that, um, that sort of all parties 
are aware that certain situations could if not managed 
correctly, could if allowed to go out of control, could if not um 
managed with an air of moderation, for example, office parties 
just in this one aspect of 
L: um 
A: of ah sexual discrimination in the workplace could lead to 
scenarios like that being much more likely because the time, 
the circumstance, and attitudes and alcohol would, would sort 
of, maybe contribute to that. There is during three hundred 
and sixty four days in the year the boss would never think of 
making an approach on his young secretary. 
L: um 
A: Sort of  the end of ah six seven hours drinking at a Christmas 
party, dancing around and having lots of fun, all of a sudden I 
think their inhibitions could, could drop ... maybe they do 
something that they would never normally conceive of if they 
were in normal circumstances  
In Alan’s account, informal work-related events such as “office parties” can give 
rise to unprofessional behaviour. Unprofessionalism here is constituted through 
the use of the unruly personal relationships discourse in which informal behaviour 
is not subject to workplace regulation. Indeed, within this discourse, the personal 
realm and behaviours appeared to be relatively uncontrolled. This is emphasised 
through the use of a three part list where worker’s behaviour might not be 
managed correctly”, could “go out of control” and might not be managed with “an 
air of moderation”. The potential for behaviour resulting in legal consequences is 
implied through use of legalistic, formal terminology such as “all parties”, “sexual 
discrimination” and “managed correctly”.  
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The initiator of potentially unruly behaviour is the “boss” and the recipient “his 
young secretary”. As mentioned earlier, the boss-secretary relationship has been 
represented as imbued with gendered hierarchical power imbalances. We saw 
early on in Alan’s interview that unwanted sexual attention directed by a boss 
towards a secretary constituted a clear -cut case in which the recipient is 
positioned as victim and the initiator as perpetrator. However, the gendered power 
differences between the recipient and initiator in this excerpt are constructed as 
complicated rather than clear-cut because of personalised, informal interactions 
between the two individuals. More specifically, through use of the unruly personal 
relationships discourse, unwanted sexual attention is located as a problem in the 
personal sphere when workers are not required to adhere to formal roles and 
regulations. This can be seen in the description of a boss “never” considering 
“making an approach on his young secretary” during “three hundred and sixty-
four days in the year”. However, the informal social event of the “Christmas 
party” deregulates formal workplace behaviours. For example, workers are 
described as “drinking” which may allow their “inhibitions to drop” which creates 
the impression that employees are less concerned with controlling and managing 
their behaviour. The positioning of the boss’s behaviour as at least partially 
influenced by “drinking” locates his behaviour within a biological discourse in 
which alcohol may contribute to an individual dropping their inhibitions. It 
appears that “drinking” may mitigate the boss’s accountability for unwanted 
sexual attention because alcohol is constituted as partially responsible for making 
him behave in a manner that is out of character. Interestingly, unwanted sexual 
attention is described as stemming from “having lots of fun” which constitutes 
particular forms of personalised relations and behaviour as potentially dangerous.  
The location of unwanted sexual attention in the realms of informal fun also 
serves to reduce the seriousness of it. The initiator is constructed as not 
intentionally using job-status to impose sexual attention on the secretary. Instead, 
the boss’s actions are constituted as a deviation from his normal behaviour – “he 
would never normally conceive of it”. His problematic behaviour is ascribed to 
circumstances in which he is expected to engage with colleagues informally, 
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where he is ‘allowed’ to have less control. Thus, it is informal situations rather 
than the boss himself which are constructed as the problem and because of this he 
is positioned as less blameable for his actions. Alan makes this point more 
explicitly in the excerpt below: 
A: … How often that aspect of unwanted  sexual attention 
happens, for example if it’s a one off, if there’s um sort of 
extenuating circumstances, not justifying um a, a sexual, ah, 
ah, um, any kind of sexual assault, but ah, if there was for 
example in this in this scenario of, ah workplace, scenario that 
maybe at a Christmas party or maybe it’s equally 
unacceptable, it might be more explainable down to attitudes, 
atmosphere 
Whilst unwanted sexual attention is described as not justified, the use of a 
disclaimer here works to rationalise and excuse unwanted sexual attention. 
Unwanted sexual attention is constructed as understandable because of the 
informal context. It is informality rather than the initiator that is positioned as 
making unwanted sexual attention possible. The positioning of the boss’s 
behaviour as a “one-off” further highlights it as an aberration produced by 
personalised relations. This functions to position the initiator as less blameable for 
his actions. 
7.5 The Subjective as a Complication 
The notion that apportioning blame becomes difficult in personalised working 
relationships is further highlighted by constructions of subjective feelings and 
behaviour at work as complicating formal duties and relationships. For example, 
in the extract below, Pat alludes to the need for objectivity and rationality when 
considering an accusation of unwanted sexual attention in the workplace. 
However, an individual’s ability for objective detachment is constructed as 
complicated by subjective feelings about colleagues they have a personal 
relationship with:   
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P: If you’re dealing with a friend, especially if they’re the one 
supposedly harassing that’s an impossible situation. I’ve been 
in a situation where someone’s been accused, work colleague 
of sexual abuse, an that was a horrible, horrible time because 
he was a work colleague and, you know, worked with him a 
couple of years.  
L: Yeah. 
P: And suddenly someone’s saying he was capable of something, 
I wouldn’t dream he’s capable of ... ah it was horrible. But to 
think that you, that someone you would trust um could do that, 
and someone that you’ve been out for a drink with an just, it’s 
scary, but people are capable of these things  
Friendship in this context is constructed as complicating objective interpretation 
of this case of unwanted sexual attention. Pat describes herself as in a “horrible”, 
“impossible” situation because the positioning of the accused as perpetrator of 
“sexual abuse” is at odds with the positioning of the accused as a trusted friend. 
This can be seen in Pat’s comment that she “wouldn’t dream he’s capable of 
[sexual abuse]”. Here, dealing with a case of unwanted sexual attention is not just 
a matter of assessing evidence but also emotional work in the sense that it 
involves reassessing subjective judgements about her friendship with the accused.  
Implied in this account is that formal accusations may work to end informal 
relations. This can be seen in Pat’s description of “people” being “capable of these 
things”. The use of the generic word “people” serves to create relational and 
emotional distance between Pat and the accused. Particular forms of emotionality 
were also constituted in Eve’s account as producing particular interpersonal 
difficulties in formalised relations. This can be seen in the extract below: 
E: … I mean it happens, I mean if you’ve got, you know, the way 
some women are really huggy.  
L: Yeah. 
E: Now, if that, if you’ve got, if you work say in an office with 
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somebody, and it’s a small office and one person hugs 
everybody, all the time, you meet people like that don’t you 
L: yeah 
E: and if there’s somebody in the office who hates it and they just 
think don’t, don’t touch me, I don’t want you to hug me, I 
don’t like it, is that then sexual harassment? 
Here, the sense of personalisation of working relationships is accomplished 
through the description of “a small office” which creates the impression of 
physical closeness and familiarity amongst colleagues. This personalisation of 
formal roles is expressed through hugging which is constructed as a feminine 
characteristic as can be seen in the claim that “some women” rather than men “are 
really huggy”. Here, the “huggy” woman worker is constructed though the use of 
liberal humanist notions of personalised work environments in which workers are 
not only understood in terms of labour but rather as individuals whose feelings 
should be valued. There is a sense here that the woman worker is simply 
expressing who she is which is reflected in the comment that “some women are 
really huggy”. 
Hugging is associated with intimacy, support and caring, all of which are 
dominantly represented as a feminine preserve. The performance of this behaviour 
in the workplace can be read as a form of emotional labour in which such caring 
acts are used to “create an atmosphere of contentment” (Hochschild, 1983). 
Through this description of emotional labour, the “small office” becomes 
constituted as femininised.  
The association of hugging with caring and supportive behaviours constitutes it as 
‘nice’ as well as desexualising the act. The non-offensiveness of the act can be 
seen further in the positioning of workers – only one person “hates it” – which 
implies that the majority of workers are accepting of it. This construction of 
majority acceptance constitutes unwanted behaviour as a personal preference 
which locates dislike of the behaviour firmly with the realms of the subjective – 
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there is no objective or rationalised reason given here for why the recipient “hates 
it” – their dislike of it is constituted as just the way they feel about it. The 
construction of unwanted behaviour as personal preference, a subjective feeling of 
dislike, works to throw doubt on the recipient’s position as victim for as Eve asks 
“is that then sexual harassment?”. 
The depiction of unwanted behaviour as a generally acceptable behaviour in Eve’s 
account further undermines the positioning of the recipient as victim as well as the 
positioning of the initiator as a perpetrator of sexual harassment. Interestingly, 
what Eve’s example highlights is the risks of doing emotional labour, informal 
relations and subjective engagement in the workplace. This particular example 
draws attention to the ways in which personalised working relations opens up 
possibilities for subjective interpretations and personal preferences within the 
workplace which may complicate formal working relations. The ways in which 
subjective interpretations and feelings in the workplace produce particular 
interpersonal difficulties with colleagues can be seen further in Steve’s account 
below. More specifically, Steve describes how subjective engagement with 
colleagues can give rise to misinterpretation: 
L: Are there any kinds of unwanted sexual attention that er, that 
are more serious than others? 
S:  Um yes, yeah, I would say so, yes, obviously er touching 
somebody as they go past or something like that. Sometimes 
it’s accidental it can happen though. 
L:  Yeah. 
S: And sometimes, it’s just sort of playful, is obviously, or can be 
misconstrued, some people think differently. I suppose 
everybody will flirt to a certain extent, but it’s really, it 
depends how the individual that’s being flirted at sees the 
thing. 
L: Yeah 
S: xxx 
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L: Do you think misconstruing the situation is a common thing 
or? 
S: Um, I think it happens sometimes, everybody’s having a laugh 
and you know it’s ok, and suppose suddenly, probably going 
back too far. I mean can, how do you know how far you can 
cope with it? Suppose really from a bloke’s point of view um, 
you’re there you do the job but you try an have a laugh at the 
same time 
L: yeah 
Working life is constructed as involving both doing ‘the job’ in the formal sense 
of performing roles, duties and responsibilities as well as more personalised 
informal interaction with colleagues such as having “a laugh”. The use of the 
disclaimer – “you’re there to do a job but you try to have a laugh at the same 
time” – draws attention to the ways in which informal relations are intertwined 
with formal roles in employment. 
This more personalised interaction is constructed as having fun which is reflected 
by words such as “playful”, “flirt” and “have a laugh”. Interestingly, having a 
“laugh” at work is constituted as important from “a bloke’s point of view”. 
Arguably, this could be read as a means through which men do emotional labour 
in the workplace. As mentioned above, the increased emphasis on feelings, 
emotional support and valuing the individual in the workplace has produced the 
need for emotional labour to be performed by workers and this has traditionally 
been seen as a feminine preserve (e.g. Ball, 2004). However, the prioritisation of 
particular forms of emotional work on the job has been interwoven with 
masculinised organisations and/or masculinised identity in various ways. For 
example, McDowell (2001), argues that men often do emotions in the workplace 
through informal strategies such as humour. This can be seen in this account, 
where Steve describes men workers engaging in personalised interactions through 
humour and “having a laugh”. 
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However, there is a sense that this form of emotional labour and personal 
engagement are potentially fraught with risk because it involves engaging with the 
subjective. More specifically, subjective interpretation of the behaviour and 
events of others from moment to moment is constructed as unknowable. This is 
because during interaction sometimes “everyone’s having a laugh” and “it’s ok” 
and then “suddenly” particular behaviours might be interpreted as going “too far”. 
In Steve’s account, the initiator of interaction is constructed as in a risky position 
because possibilities for misconstrual are constituted as unpredictable. 
In Steve’s account, unwanted sexual attention is constructed as “playful” and 
“flirting” which locates such behaviour in the realms of ‘normal’ interpersonal 
relations as well as rendering it harmless. It is framed as a misunderstanding 
which further constitutes it as part of normal, harmless interaction. Within this 
construction of unwanted sexual attention, the initiator is positioned as a normal 
‘bloke’ rather than a perpetrator of a sexual offence. This is accomplished by the 
description of unwanted sexual attention as “accidental” or a misconstrual. Here, 
intention to do harm is absent which serves to position the initiator as less 
blameable than someone who intends to offend. There is also the sense that the 
initiator is less responsible for offence caused because, as mentioned above, other 
people’s reactions to an individual’s behaviour are difficult to foresee. In this 
account, the recipient could be read as being over-sensitive because the behaviour 
is constituted as fun, friendly and about “having a laugh”. 
The construction of unwanted sexual attention as a misunderstanding during 
otherwise friendly interaction works to undermine the possibility of the recipient 
as being a victim and the initiator as a perpetrator of wrongdoing. Instead, by 
constituting unwanted sexual attention as an accident, as an ever-present risk 
associated with friendly interaction, it becomes normalised.  
The construction of personalised relationships as risky can be seen further in 
Steve’s account when he describes informal interactions with his colleagues 
during work nights out. This can be seen in the following excerpt: 
 175 
 
L: When you say wrong signals what do you mean? 
S: Um, yeah, accidental, totally accidental. Sometimes you can 
just you can say something and some, somebody totally 
misconstrues it...in what I do it can happen. Just were out 
with, we’re out with work, an having a laugh you say 
something to somebody, and one person can take it quite 
innocently, and the other person, you know, hands you their 
phone number 
Here, engaging in friendly, informal relationships with colleagues is constituted as 
risky because friendly behaviour can be misunderstood by some individuals as an 
offer of further intimacy. The possibility of misinterpretation is constituted as a 
potential problem in interaction because “one person can take it quite innocently 
and the other person you know hands you their phone number”. Therefore, 
because interpretation of behaviour is constructed as varying between individuals, 
misunderstandings are constituted as difficult to foresee. Given that 
misunderstandings are hard to predict, individuals located in this interaction are 
positioned as less blameable because consequences of behaviour are “accidental”. 
Thus, constituting unwanted sexual attention as a misunderstanding, unwanted 
sexualised behaviour becomes understandable. This functions to normalise 
unwanted sexual attention in this context.  
7.6 Public/Private & Risk 
The public/private distinction has been drawn on in both academic and popular 
accounts of sexual violence to construct victimisation as a risk of participating in 
public life. For example, ‘stranger danger’ has been located as a problem within 
the public sphere. In contrast, environments and relationships which have been 
constructed as private such as the home, family, partners and friends have been 
dominantly represented as ‘safe’ (e.g. Harden, 2000). The representations of 
public as dangerous and private as safe have been challenged by the recognition 
of other forms of sexual violence occurring in intimate and personal relationships.  
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In some participant accounts, notions of the public/private dichotomy were 
interwoven with what I will call the ‘(in)escapable discourse’ in which notions of 
risk are constructed in relation to the ease with which a recipient can disentangle 
themselves from problematic situations. Notions of unwanted sexual attention as a 
danger or threat to the recipient in public places was mitigated by constructions of 
it as easily escaped from. This can be seen in Philip’s account where he discusses 
how recipients can negotiate situations involving unwanted sexual attention. In 
the following extract, Philip describes the ways in which recipients can handle 
unwanted sexual attention in particular public spaces: 
P: If it was in a pub or a club I mean again the, ah, the recipient 
has always got, ah, the voting rights with their feet 
L : um 
P: you know, if they don't want it, then they can you know move, 
walk away, leave the club, leave pub, go elsewhere. If an 
individual follows and makes it, you know, ah continues with it 
then again, the recipient could always report it to, you know, 
someone in a pub or a club, a bouncer , a manager or 
whatever and ask them to ask the other individual to leave or if 
it was a bloke he could punch him on the nose [laugh] 
Here, there is a sense that dealing with unwanted sexual attention in particular 
public spaces such as “a pub or a club” is relatively straightforward because it is 
reasonably easy for the recipient to escape from the situation – “if they don’t want 
it, then they can you know move away, walk away, leave”. Notions of potential 
danger or threat associated with further manifestations of unwanted sexual 
attention is mitigated by reference to reporting and protection mechanisms that are 
in place in pubs and clubs. Indeed, the idea of expressions of unwanted sexual 
attention in public places as dangerous or risky for the recipient is further 
undermined by the implicit suggestion that in some instances sexual attention 
might be wanted in this context. This can be seen in the use of the word “if” in the 
sentence “if they don’t want it”. The construction of pubs and clubs as a space 
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where sexual attention might occur, that expressions of it might be welcomed and 
that unwanted manifestations of it are easily dealt with works to normalise as well 
as trivialise recipient experiences. 
A gendered distinction is made around the strategies recipients can use to 
communicate non-consent.  Whilst not mentioned explicitly at the beginning of 
the excerpt, Philip begins by discussing women recipients. The distinction made 
between women and men recipients is made clear towards the end where he 
overtly describes a strategy for dealing with unwanted sexual attention used by 
“blokes”. Women recipients are positioned as having indirect strategies at their 
disposal to communicate non-consent. This construction of the strategies used by 
women to challenge unwanted conduct resonates with issues discussed in Chapter 
2 around communicating non-consent. We saw that in response to arguments that 
recipients, women in particular, may be reluctant and/or unable to refuse 
unwanted sexual attention directly, indirect strategies for communication of non-
consent such as leaving the room have been argued to be a sufficient indication 
that behaviour was unwelcome in legal contexts (e.g. Monti, 2000). As argued in 
previous chapters, the requirement (within both legal and popular discourses) that 
women recipients use either direct or indirect strategies to communicate non-
consent works to re-inscribe gendered positionings within predominant 
constructions of sexual refusal in which women become accountable for 
managing men’s sexual behaviour (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2).  
In Philip’s account, gendered notions around confrontation and aggression are 
drawn on to position women as non-confrontational, non-aggressive and in need 
of help to challenge manifestations of unwanted sexual attention (see also Chapter 
1 and Chapter 2). This portrayal of women works to locate them as vulnerable and 
in need to protection. This sense of feminised vulnerability is further highlighted 
by the description of those designated to protect recipients’ in particular public 
places. For example, the “bouncer” is a highly masculinised position which 
becomes imbued with heterosexualised, masculinist notions of physicality, 
aggression and guarding of territory (Wolkowitz, 2006). Reference to the 
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“bouncer” in this excerpt brings into sharp relief the dependency of the feminised 
other for protection on those located as masculinised. In contrast, male recipients 
need no such protection. The description of the male recipient as being able to 
deal with unwanted sexual attention through violence (re)produces versions of 
hegemonic masculinity as aggressive and as a perpetrator of violence rather than a 
victim of it. Indeed, Philip’s laughter after the description of men’s violence can 
be read as an indication of the difficulty he has in taking unwanted sexual 
attention between men seriously which again serves to undermine the male 
recipient as a victim of unwanted sexual attention. 
In a similar vein to Phillip, the (in)escapable discourse was drawn on in Kate’s 
interview to make sense of the difficulties associated with negotiating unwanted 
sexual attention in public places. However, in Kate’s account this discourse was 
also drawn on to make distinctions between issues raised when dealing with 
unwanted conduct in both public and private spheres. This can be seen in the 
excerpt below which follows on from an earlier discussion in the interview where 
Kate had described “pubs and clubs” as public “environments” where unwanted 
sexual attention might be encountered. 
K: Unwanted sexual advances from a stranger, er, in an 
environment where a person might feel vulnerable, they’re the 
worst one’s that I can think of because you’ve, it can become a 
physical um fear from the advance. But I would say that’s the 
easiest to get over, because people can either report it or they 
can move away from the situation, and leave that behind and 
the episode is over and done with. 
L: Where is that? 
K: That’s in a, say an environment where you out and about, 
where you’re encountering a stranger who making advance to 
you. 
L: Ah right, yeah. 
K: Where you can walk away, you’re not gonna encounter them 
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again. But I would say from a personal point of view, it’s 
probably worse in a situation where it’s developed from 
someone that you know, has developed either a crush ... um 
and you can’t walk away from it, you have to deal with, an 
that’s where it becomes difficult because everything hangs on 
how you deal with them. They’ve put their cards on the table, 
so if your job’s on the line or quite often, if people reject 
someone who’s a friend, it can complicate social circles … 
social politics very nasty thing. So I would say that was the 
worst circumstance, when you can’t walk away from the 
person and leave that behind as part of your life 
Kate begins this discussion of the public/private distinction by framing particular 
public spaces as potentially risky. It is in these public environments that 
individuals “might feel vulnerable” because they are exposed to the unknown. 
More specifically, the unknown ‘stranger’ is constituted as a risk because of the 
possibility of a sexual advance escalating into a “physical” attack. Whilst the 
threat of sexual victimisation in particular public spheres is constituted as the 
“worst one”, it is also described as the “easiest one to get over”. This is because 
the recipient is positioned as able to escape from the intricacies involved in 
dealing with it to some degree because they can hand over this responsibility to 
the police by reporting it. It is also an escapable situation because the recipient 
can “move away from the situation and leave that behind”. 
In contrast, unwanted sexual attention in personal relationships – “from someone 
you know”, from a “friend” is problematic because it is inescapable; “you can’t 
walk away from it you have to deal with it”. Dealing with unwanted sexual 
attention in personalised relationships is constituted as a risky process requiring 
emotional labour. More specifically, the recipient must negotiate their rejection of 
unwanted sexual attention in relation to the initiator’s feelings. Here, the initiator 
is constructed as emotionally vulnerable because they’ve “put their cards on the 
table” and in doing so risk being hurt by rejection. The rejected initiator is also 
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positioned as a risk to the recipient in that they may return the hurt in some way as 
is implied by the example of the recipient’s job being “on the line”. The risk 
associated with rejecting someone is not only constructed as a localised problem 
between recipient and initiator but as something that could impact other 
relationships within a social network. Thus, the recipient not only has to negotiate 
the initiator’s feelings of rejection but also “social politics” which are positioned 
as risky because potentially this can be a “very nasty thing”. The ways in which 
risk is constructed within the (in)escapable discourse can be seen further in the 
following extract: 
K: In the short term, when you encounter it, when you’re out and 
about, say in pubs or clubs, it can be worse because it’s more 
immediately threatening ... but the most complicated is when 
you get it from people who have originally started as friends  
L: yeah 
K: and you find that things change between them, an then you’ve 
got to deal with explaining to them how you feel about it 
without hurting their feelings because you genuinely feel sorry 
for them, you like them 
L: yeah 
K: um but without encouraging them and that’s the one that 
personally, I find hardest to deal with. Not that I’m suggesting 
that it happens to me all the time but every now and again it 
does and that’s the one I really struggle with. You can’t laugh 
and joke about it, brush it off cos it keeps reoccurring and 
reoccurring the next time you have a decent bottle of red wine 
I usually find 
Again, public places of “pubs or clubs” are constructed as spaces in which 
individuals are vulnerable to sexual threat. However, this particular risk is 
constituted as escapable through the description of it as “short term”. In contrast, 
unwanted sexual attention in close, personal relationships is inescapable because 
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opportunities for “reoccurrence” present themselves. Here, situations in which 
unwanted sexual attention may reoccur are those which involve drinking alcohol. 
It is implied that, generally, in the absence of alcohol consumption, the initiator 
refrains from making sexualised advances. However, the link made between 
manifestations of unwanted conduct and alcohol consumption serves to locate the 
initiators behaviour within a biological discourse in which alcohol may contribute 
to an individual losing their inhibitions and acting on their feelings rather than 
monitoring the impact of their behaviour on others. The implication of the 
operation of this biological discourse in this excerpt is that drinking may 
contribute to the expression of unwanted sexual attention which may work to 
mitigate the initiator’s accountability for unwanted conduct. 
Unwanted sexual attention in friendships is also described here as “the most 
complicated” because it involves negotiating a number of interpersonal risks. The 
recipient is located in a care discourse in which they must attempt to manage the 
communication of rejection “without hurting [the initiator’s] feelings”. There is a 
sense that this communication is risky for the recipient of the sexual attention in 
that they are required to be ‘nice’ but not so ‘nice’ that they inadvertently 
encourage further unwanted sexual attention. The positionings of both victim and 
perpetrator of unwanted sexual attention become less clear-cut in this 
construction. The positioning of the initiator as a perpetrator becomes undermined 
and complicated by the constitution of them as unrequited lover and vulnerable to 
emotional hurt from the recipient. Similarly there is not a clear sense of the 
recipient as a victim of unwanted sexual attention because of their positioning as 
someone who can hurt the initiator. Instead, unwanted sexual attention becomes 
constituted as a difficult but nonetheless ‘normal’ aspect of managing unrequited 
love. 
In addition to rejection, other possible social and emotional costs were highlighted 
as a risk of the process of making sexual interests known to others. In the excerpt 
below, Kate describes risks associated with making a sexual advance in the 
context of social networks: 
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K: If it’s in that contained, um, environment, not just work 
thinking about it, everybody assumes it takes place at work, 
the hockey club, if it wasn’t dealt with the way it is within 
there, then you might find there are people who feel 
uncomfortable. It’s not a game, it’s a game and after the day, 
and then nights out and trips away, it’s a whole piece of 
someone’s social life that they would be excluded from if they 
dealt with it poorly ... it’s  almost as if you want them to say 
well, yes, if you could love me that would be nice, but just 
don’t make it difficult or awkward for me  
Again, the initiator is constructed as vulnerable. However, the initiator is 
vulnerable not only in the sense that he/she is open to emotional upset but also to 
social exclusion and loss. This sense of loss is emphasised by use of the three part 
list “after the day, and then nights and trips away” and the use of an extreme case 
formulation – “it’s a whole piece of someone’s social life”. Taken together, these 
descriptions work to emphasize the impact of social exclusion and in doing so 
highlight the risk of making sexual advances. A romantic discourse is drawn on to 
construct the initiator as someone who wants love to be returned. The location of 
the initiator in a romantic discourse serves to construct social exclusion as unfair 
and unpleasant which positions the initiator as a victim. 
The location of unwanted sexual attention in a romantic discourse serves to 
desexualise the sexual advance by constituting it as about love which has 
connotations of affection and relational commitment rather than sex. This 
construction of it works to undermine the positioning of the recipient as a victim 
of it because the behaviour is constituted as desexualised through notions of 
romance and love. Indeed, being loved is generally represented as 
desirable/pleasant which further undermines the recipient’s position as victim. 
Instead, the recipient is positioned as having power to “make things difficult or 
awkward” for the initiator. The recipient’s power to make things difficult for the 
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initiator implies that they play a key role in social exclusion which serves to 
position the recipient as a perpetrator of relational misdemeanour. 
7.7 Summary 
In the constructions identified, sexual harassment is variously constituted as a 
permissible problem in personal relationships. It is permissible in the sense that 
sexualised behaviours are represented as ‘allowable’ in personal relationships. 
However, it was simultaneously problematised in and outside the workplace 
context. In personalised versions of the workplace, unwanted sexual attention is 
constructed as creating tensions between the management of personal 
relationships and management of professional conduct within this formalised 
context. Outside the workplace, unwanted sexual attention in personal 
relationships is problematised through the ways in which it requires the recipient 
to negotiate the initiators feelings of rejection. This positions the recipient in 
various ways as accountable for the initiators emotional well-being. This issue of 
recipient accountability is constructed as complicating the process of dealing with 
unwanted sexual attention in personal relationships. 
In the next chapter, the question of how sexual harassment can be dealt with is 
explored further through an analysis of narratives on this particular issue. 
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Chapter 8: Policies & Practices: Stories of Victimisation 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will interpret narratives focused on sexual harassment policy 
which were identified in the second Q methodological study conducted. This 
study is contextualised by concerns about the ways in which both policy and 
public practices more generally subject those who report sexual harassment to 
further victimisation. This chapter will begin by discussing the ways in which a 
range of legal and policy processes maintain the conditions under which 
secondary victimisation is made possible. The discussion will then move on to the 
interpretation of each narrative identified through Q analysis described in chapter 
5. Lastly, I will focus on the variable ways in which issues of sympathetic victim 
treatment and false allegations become relevant to the narratives identified. In 
doing so, I seek to unpack the implications they have in relation to secondary 
victimisation. 
8.2 Secondary Victimisation 
As discussed in chapter two, sexual violence in general, and sexual harassment in 
particular, have often been minimised or trivialised in social/political discourses. 
For example, sexual harassment has been depicted as ‘just sex’, a result of 
misunderstandings, or secondary to organisational values, interests and aims in the 
context of the workplace harassment (Morgen, 2001; Van Dijk, 1997). In the 
workplace, victims who complain are variously represented as troublemakers, 
difficult to work with and not team players (Morgen, 2001). In common with 
other forms of gendered/sexual violence, victims (particularly women) of sexual 
harassment are often blamed for their experiences by positioning them as 
responsible for it in some way (Vanderveen, 2006; Cowan, 2000; see also chapter 
two). 
Despite the positioning of sexual/gendered violence as illegal, the ways in which 
victim-blaming discourses and/or trivialisation of such acts become interwoven 
with police, court and organisational responses to cases has been well-
documented. For example, particular police practices became subject to scrutiny 
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during the 1990s. Of particular concern was the use of the no - criming procedure 
used in relation to reports of sexual/gendered violence. More specifically, reports 
that the police services deemed “hopeless and had no intention of investigating 
further” were recorded as ‘no crime’, that is, no crime had been committed 
(Gregory and Lees, 1999, P 60; Johnson, Ollus and Nevala, 2007). This served to 
create the impression that a high proportion of complaints were false (Gregory 
and Lees, 1999). In addition to this, during the 1990s police treatment of 
sexual/gendered violence victims received criticism on the basis of victim-
insensitive interrogation strategies used during investigations.  
As a response to such criticisms, police policy was radically altered to offer a 
more victim-orientated approach. This approach included specialist training for 
officers handling such cases and the introduction of the chaperone system in 
which specially trained police officers would act as chaperones to ensure fair 
treatment of the victim during the process. However, despite these changes, 
Anderson and Doherty (2008) notes that it is still the case that a high number of 
victims still receive unsympathetic and/or negative responses from the police. 
As with police responses, court processes appear to be generally unsympathetic to 
victims of sexualised/gendered violence. According to Raitt and Zeedyk (2000), 
many victims, particularly women, are subject to secondary victimisation by the 
judicial process. Central to this judicial victimisation is the way the examination 
of the victim witness is carried out which tends to focus on problematising the 
victim by, for example, using evidence of promiscuity to undermine claims of 
sexual violence. As noted by scholars in the field, the ‘promiscuity’ defence is 
highly gendered which works through positioning women victims as active sexual 
beings which runs counter to normative notions of feminine sexualities in which 
the woman is located as passive object (e.g. Anderson and Doherty, 2008; Gavey, 
2005; Gregory and Lees, 1999). 
Although ‘shield laws’ have been introduced to prevent the complainants’ past 
sexual history being used as ‘evidence’ in cases, it appears that these laws “have 
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been less than effective because they are rarely applied in practice” (Anderson and 
Doherty, 2008: 19). In relation to workplace sexual harassment, current 
definitions focus on whether behaviour was wanted, welcomed or not. This 
phrasing invites questions about the recipients past sexual history, not only with 
the accused but also potentially with other co-workers (e.g. Ford, Notestine and 
Hill, 2000). 
Unsurprisingly, negative representations and treatment of victims of 
sexual/gendered violence within judicial, organisational and public discourses of 
sexual/gendered violence have been represented as a significant barrier to 
reporting cases to authorities (Anderson and Doherty, 2008; Morgen, 2001, 
Gregory and Lees, 1999, Van Dijk, 1997). Barriers to reporting sexual harassment 
have focused largely on examining negative work-related consequences such as 
being labelled as ‘trouble maker’. However, the introduction of the 1997 
Protection from Harassment Act brings with it a different set of considerations 
concerning treatment of sexual harassment victims by police services and court 
processes which has to date received little attention in the literature. Given 
predominant concerns within the literature around the trivialisation of the issue of 
sexual harassment more generally, it would seem pertinent to examine social 
understandings of these current policies and legal initiatives. 
To explore the ways in which various issues concerning recipients and initiators 
become relevant to understandings of policy initiatives and practices in and 
outside the workplace, I conducted a Q methodological study which aimed to tap 
into and map narratives concerning sexual harassment policy, which have 
currency in this cultural context (see also Chapter 5).  
8.3 Analysis of Narratives 
In this study, 10 factors were identified. In the following section a brief 
description of the participants who loaded on a given factor is provided prior to 
the reading of the factor as a narrative. The reading of narratives is informed by 
participant comments which contextualised the positioning of particular 
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statements in completed Q sorts which were merged to produce the exemplifying 
Q sort for each factor. 
8.4 Factor 1: The Impact Narrative 
Factor 1 explains 44.823% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 20.170. Two 
men (Participants 36 and 27) and three women (Participants 43, 45 and 4) loaded 
significantly on this factor. Participant 36 described himself as a 19 year old job 
seeker and participant 27 was a 57 year old lecturer. Participants 43 and 45 were 
undergraduate students in their early 20s and participant 4 was a 26 year old office 
worker. Participant 4 also had taken part in the first Q study (see chapter 6) and 
had loaded significantly on Factor 4 – the Boundaries narrative. 
Interpretation 
In the Impact narrative, the claim that sexual harassment is a minor issue and that 
complaints of it should be taken with a pinch of salt is considered “a load of 
rubbish [as] it can affect the person’s well being and other aspects of their life” 
(P36 comments for 18: -4; 54: -5) and so “for some people it might be a very 
major issue (P45 comments for 54: -5). Given this, investigating complaints of 
sexual harassment cannot be considered a misuse of police time nor can it be 
claimed that laws about sexual harassment are unnecessary (30: -3). Indeed, it is 
the impact that sexual harassment can have on victims which makes protection 
against it crucial, particularly in the workplace (26: -3). 
It is concern about the impact that sexual harassment can have on people’s lives 
which is of primary importance in this narrative. The impact of sexual harassment 
is not something that victims should learn to deal with by themselves as “they 
may need counselling as if the harassment is bad they may need to talk about it” 
(P4 comments for 25: -3). Therefore it is important that recipients of sexual 
harassment receive practical help to deal with this experience (16: +3).  
Concern with the emotional impact of sexual harassment on the victim is further 
reflected in the prioritisation of practices which create a supportive and protective 
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climate to facilitate victim disclosure, complaint making and amelioration. For 
example, police treatment of the victim requires sensitivity and questioning 
should occur in a non-threatening environment because “the recipient may be 
embarrassed by what has happened to them” (P4 comments for 45: +4; 52: +4). In 
addition to this, recipients of sexual harassment should be allowed to request that 
a same sex police officer deals with their case as “they will be more comfortable 
talking about intimate details” (P 4 comments for 47: +3).Victim –blaming 
strategies such as those which focus on the victim’s past sexual behaviour have no 
place in sexual harassment investigations as this “shouldn’t be an issue, it doesn’t 
mean you can be sexually harassed” (P43 comments for 38: -5).  
However, the need to foster a sensitive approach to the treatment of victims is not 
specific to agency processes. Rather people in general should be sympathetic to 
individuals who claim they have been sexually harassed (28: +3). Indeed, in this 
narrative, it appears that there is a need for collective action to be taken against 
sexual harassment. The onus is not just on the recipient to tell the initiator to stop 
or complain, the victim’s partner, friends or other witnesses have a duty to 
intervene or report sexual harassment (20: +3; 43: +2; 50: +2; 56: +2). 
It is acknowledged that complaint making can be risky with the victim becoming 
the subject of repercussions. It is emphasised that the recipient should not be 
victimised for complaining about sexual harassment as “no-one should be 
victimised in any circumstances” (P45 comments for 19: +5). For this reason, it is 
of utmost importance for the victim to not only be protected from retaliation from 
the accused but also from negative comments in general about their actions (19: 
+5; 15: +4). This is because “negative comments could be very hurtful and the 
recipient may feel as though they should withdraw the complaint even if what 
they say happened to them did” (P4 comments for 15: +4). As a preventative 
strategy against retaliation, it is necessary for victims to remain anonymous (31: -
4).  
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However, in this narrative, it is also important to be mindful that not all 
complaints of sexual harassment are true. A complaint of sexual harassment is a 
“serious and damaging allegation to make about someone so if it is false you 
should be liable for some punishment” (P43 comments for 33: +3). Since false 
claims can have a “serious and damaging” impact on those accused, the identity of 
alleged initiators should be kept secret (P43 comments for 33:+3: 40: +2). The 
acknowledgement of false complaints does not render the recipient’s word as 
insufficient cause for a sexual harassment complaint to be pursued (55: -4). The 
importance of this issue, the impact that sexual harassment can have on victims 
means that all complaints should “always be pursued” (P4 comments for 55: -4) 
and “investigated at least” (P27 comments for 55: -4). 
The wider impact of particular strategies for dealing with sexual harassment is 
also considered in this narrative. For example, concerns with prison overcrowding 
become relevant to considerations on how to deal with those found guilty of 
sexual harassment. More specifically, prison sentences are not a good way to deal 
with it as “there are too many people in prison already” (P27 comments for 14: -
3). Therefore, injunctions are prioritised as here seems to be on creating ‘safe’ 
distance between the initiator and recipient and as such if harassment occurs in the 
workplace, the initiator should be sacked (29: +2). 
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Factor 1: The Impact Narrative 
     36 
A person’s motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
     
39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities 
to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
21 
 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
55 
The recipient’s word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers’ time 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.5 Factor 2: The ‘Proper’ Process Narrative 
This factor explains 7.266 of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 3.270. Four women in 
their early 20s and one 26 year old man loaded significantly on this factor. Three of the 
women were students (participant 39, 8 and 12) and one woman was a job seeker (participant 
9). The male participant worked in sales (participant 7). 
Interpretation 
Like the Impact narrative, the ‘Proper’ Process narrative positions claims that sexual 
harassment is a minor issue and that complaints should be taken with a pinch of salt as 
“ridiculous” (P8 comments for 54: -5 & 18: -3). To sensibly tackle the problem of sexual 
harassment, this narrative implies that we must move away from such claims and instead 
raise public awareness of the processes involved in making a complaint and provide training 
on how to deal with such experiences (12: +3; 13: -4). 
The victim is fore-grounded in this narrative as someone who deserves people’s sympathy 
and needs support when dealing with sexual harassment (28: +3; 25: -4)). What is 
emphasised in victim treatment is not only sympathetic agency treatment (52: +3) but also 
making sure that victims get the ‘right’ or ‘proper’ support in the form of specialist help (9: 
+4). Doing the ‘right’ thing is not confined to providing emotional support for the victim but 
also making sure that complaints are pursued and investigated properly. To do this it is 
necessary to make sure recipients receive practical support (16: +4). For example, the 
provision of victim protection against retaliation by the accused is not solely because 
“someone has done something wrong to the victim (P12 comments for 19: +5) but also 
negative repercussions might “stop the recipient from complaining” (P8 comments for 19: 
+5: 31: -5). Therefore, practical considerations around addressing the problem of sexual 
harassment become interwoven with concerns about the emotional impact of such behaviour 
on the victim. 
This is not to say that victim complaints are taken at face-value. To make sure that 
investigations are fair and follow due process it is necessary that a person’s reasons for 
complaining about sexual harassment are checked as there “may be ulterior motives” for 
lodging this kind of grievance (P7 comments for 36: +3). Once guilt has been determined, 
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legal deterrence is required which may involve court processes, prison sentences and/or 
sacking employees found guilty of sexual harassment (5: -3; 23: -2; 14: +4; 29: +3). A 
punitive stance is taken up in relation to perpetrators who continue to break sexual 
harassment laws. For example, a perpetrator who breaches an injunction should be arrested 
because “a person who is guilty of a crime and commits the crime again should be punished 
according to the law” (P7 comments for 3: +5). In this case, the perpetrator is “obsessed and 
can’t stop [and so] needs to be locked away” (P8 comments for 3: +5). Therefore, deterrence 
in the form of punishment and physical removal of perpetrators who fail to respond to such 
deterrents is what is needed to stop sexual harassment. 
The main problem with efforts to challenge sexual harassment lies in poor police practices. 
Currently, while sexual harassment is a police matter, people are not adequately protected by 
this service (32: +2; 39: -3). If it were “the case” that people were adequately protected by the 
police “it would not occur” (P8 comments for 39: -3) because the police have the power to 
stop such behaviour (6: -3). As mentioned above, it is not the case that sexual harassment is a 
minor issue and that dealing with such complaints is a misuse of police time (54: -5: 30: -3). 
Instead, it seems that the police have got their priorities wrong, for example “waiting by the 
road for hours to get speeders is a waste” (P7 comments for 30: -3). Therefore a restructuring 
of police priorities is what is needed to stop incidents of sexual harassment. 
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Factor 2: The ‘Proper’ Processes Narrative 
    
 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
 
 
   
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities to 
those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.6 Factor 3: The Accountability Narrative 
This factor explains 4.688 of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 2.109. Two women 
loaded significantly on this factor. Participant 21 was 19 years old and Participant 10 was in 
her 40s. 
Interpretation 
In this narrative, sexual harassment is not considered to be a minor issue because “it could 
lead to more serious matters” (P10 comments for 54: -4) which implies that it may act as a 
precursor to more extreme problematic behaviour. Therefore the criminalisation of sexual 
harassment is entirely appropriate regardless of the circumstances or contexts in which it 
occurs (1: -3; 23: -3; 59: +3; 49: -4). Given the potential seriousness of sexual harassment, 
complaints should not be trivialised or ignored because “whatever the reason [for the 
complaint] they should always be checked out, where there’s smoke there’s fire” (P21 
comments for 18: -5: 35: +3).  
The basis for the complaint, the “fire” as it were, needs to be investigated by the proper 
authorities such as the police as they have the power to do something about it (35: +3; 32: +4 
6: -4). More specifically, it is recognised that grievances are not always genuine so there is a 
need to check a person’s motives for complaining about sexual harassment – “questions 
should be asked as it can often be untrue” (P21 comments for 36: +4). “Lies can have a 
serious effect on people. A lie like that can ruin someone’s life” (P21 comments for 33: +4) 
so there is a need to punish people who deliberately make a false complaint (33: +4). The 
possibility of false complaints should not, however, cloud the investigative procedure. The 
complainant should be treated as “innocent until proven guilty” (P21 comments for 52: +2) 
and so should be questioned by police in a non-threatening environment and their rights to 
anonymity upheld (31: -3). Steps need to be put in place to ensure that the victim’s version of 
events is untainted by, for example, retaliatory actions from the alleged perpetrator as “the 
accused should not be allowed to interfere or apply pressure to the victim (P21 comments for 
19: +3). 
There is a sense here that both the victim and the perpetrator need to take responsibility for 
this experience. In the first instance the recipient should ask the initiator of sexual harassment 
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to stop because “they have to try” (P21 comments for 20: +2). However, although the 
recipient may need specialist help “to come to terms with what has happened to them” (P10 
comments for 9: +3), practical support should also be given and geared towards letting “them 
know how they can help themselves” (P10 comments for 16: +3). As mentioned above, those 
who make false complaints need to be held accountable for their actions through punishment 
(33: +4).  Similarly, it is the perpetrator who needs to be held accountable for their own 
actions. For example, in the context of workplace sexual harassment, it is not the case that 
employers should be held legally responsible for harassment whether they knew about it or 
not (17: -5). This is because “sexual harassment is down to the individual and no-one else can 
be held responsible” (P21 comments for 17: -5).  
In this narrative, it is implied that the perpetrator has psychological problems which can be 
dealt with through counselling (34: +4). Given that the perpetrator has such problems they 
are, to some extent, deserving of people’s sympathy (57: +2). This is not to say that if the 
perpetrator breaks the law, by for example, breaching an injunction order, they should not be 
arrested (32: +5). Rather to solve the problem of sexual harassment, these psychological 
issues need to be addressed which is not accomplished through more punitive measures such 
as sacking someone from their job (29: -3). 
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Factor 3: The Accountability Narrative 
     28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
     
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities 
to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.7 Factor 4: The Collective Action & Deterrent Narrative 
Factor 4 explains 3.737 of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.682. Two participants 
loaded significantly on this factor. Participant 16 was a man in his 30s who described himself 
as a job seeker. Participant 20 was a 60 year old woman who worked as a housing manager. 
Participant 20 had also taken part in the Q study described in chapter 6 and had loaded 
significantly on factor 7 – the Relationship narrative. 
Interpretation 
As with the Accountability narrative outlined above, this narrative draws attention to the 
ways in which sexual harassment is an important issue that can occur in a range of 
circumstances and contexts (54: -4). In this narrative, collapsing boundaries between the 
public and private spheres is prioritised, with sexual harassment being recognised as 
something that should be an illegal offence that can occur in the private sphere of the home, 
public places in general and the workplace in particular (23: -3; 51: +4: 56: +3; 58; -5). In the 
context of the home, sexual harassment is not conceptualised as a matter that should be dealt 
with privately (49: -5). Rather, as with incidents which happen in more public areas, sexual 
harassment should be reported. 
The emphasis here is on collective action to challenge sexual harassment by, for example, 
encouraging witnesses to report it and intervene if they suspect a person is being sexually 
harassed (48: +3; 50: +2; 43: +2). Government interventions such as providing instructions 
on how to make a sexual harassment complaint may also be necessary to make sure everyone 
is aware about procedures for lodging grievances (60: +2; 12: +3). 
The process of making a complaint should be made easy for the victim in the sense that they 
should be treated sympathetically by people in general and the police in particular. Indeed, 
specialist organisations are needed to provide victims with support (9: +3).  
It is emphasised that recipients should not be victimised for making a complaint and the 
police should make the process as easy as possible through questioning victims in a sensitive 
manner and making sure that questioning occurs in a non-threatening environment (28: +4; 
45: +5; 53: +5; 52: +3). However, the gender of the police dealing with the case is not central 
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to fostering sensitive, supportive victim-orientated procedures so recipients should not be 
allowed to request that a same-sex officer deals with their case (47: -4). What is more 
important is that police officers receive specific training for dealing with sexual harassment 
(44: -4). 
Although sexual harassment cases should be dealt with by the police, there is a sense of 
pessimism about whether the police have the power to stop such behaviour (32: +2; 6: +2). It 
appears that “we need stronger deterrents for sexual offenders” (P20 comments for 3: +4) 
such as arresting perpetrators who breach sexual harassment injunctions and/or denying 
promotion opportunities to those found guilty of sexual harassment (3: +4). These deterrents 
are prioritised over providing counselling for perpetrators (34: -4) or interventions such as 
verbal warnings (21: -2). Indeed, the perpetrator is not seen as deserving of sympathy nor 
having any right to anonymity (34: -4; 40: -4). Thus, it seems that “stronger deterrents” 
coupled with a collective commitment to stop sexual harassment is what is needed to 
challenge this behaviour. 
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Factor 4: The Collective Action & Deterrent Narrative 
     26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
     
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities 
to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.8 Factor 5: The D-I-Y Narrative 
This factor explains 3.579% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.610. One male student 
loaded significantly on this factor (Participant 39) 
Interpretation 
Unlike the previous narratives discussed so far, the D-I-Y narrative stressed that recipients 
should learn to deal with sexual harassment themselves by telling the initiator to stop (25: +4; 
20: +5). An informal confrontation is “the first step before a complaint as they [the initiator] 
may not know” that they are sexually harassing the recipient (P39 comments for 20: +5). This 
initial step is represented as relatively straightforward and as such there is no need to train 
people to deal with sexual harassment (13: +3) and it certainly does not require the 
government to provide training or instructions on how to handle these experiences or make a 
complaint (10: +3; 40: -4). The recipient is capable of doing this alone and there is no need 
for friends to intervene (50: -3). 
This initial step is considered to be a reasonably effective method of stopping sexual 
harassment and as such there is not any real need for all complaints to be referred to the 
authorities because “it can be dealt with before this on most occasions” (P39 comments for 
35: -5). However, important to note is that the authorities should only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on more than one occasion (4: +4). Generally speaking, dealing with 
sexual harassment is not a job for the police but rather a workplace issue. There is a need for 
protection in the workplace and dealing with sexual harassment cases is certainly not a 
misuse of employer’s time (26: -3; 58: -2). However, employers cannot be expected to pursue 
complaints based on the recipient’s word alone and it is often far too difficult to prove that 
sexual harassment has occurred (55: +3; 22: +3). Evidence which could be brought to bear on 
investigations is the recipient’s past sexual behaviour as this might help determine whether 
sexual harassment has occurred or not (38: +4). However, like the Accountability narrative, it 
is important for individuals to held responsible for their actions so if a person is found to have 
deliberately made a false complaint then they should be punished (33: +5). 
Similarly, if a person is found guilty of sexual harassment then it would entirely fair to deny 
them promotion opportunities, give them verbal warnings and/or apply injunctions (8: -3; 24: 
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+2; 2: +2). Sexually harassing behaviour is not necessarily indicative of some psychological 
problem so counselling would not be a particularly good way of stopping sexual harassment. 
Indeed, it is the perpetrator who is ultimately responsible for their problematic actions and as 
such they are not deserving of people’s sympathy, nor can responsibility be shifted to 
employers (57: -4; 17: -5). While employers cannot be held responsible for workplace sexual 
harassment,  they do have a duty of care to the recipient once a complaint has been lodged in 
terms of protecting them from retaliation from the accused (19: +3). 
In short, sexual harassment is reasonably easy to deal with “on most occasions” by the 
recipient informally asking the initiator to stop (P39 comments, 35: -5; 20: +5). Since it is 
generally quite easy to deal with recipients should certainly not be compensated for their 
experiences (37: -4). The difficulty lies, it seems, once a grievance becomes formalised so it 
is best that people should learn to deal with sexual harassment themselves (25: +4). 
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Factor 5: The D-I-Y Narrative 
 
     51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
     
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities 
to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.9 Factor 6: The No Place Like Home Narrative 
Factor 6 explains 3.363% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.610. One woman 
(participant 6) loaded significantly on this factor.  
Interpretation 
This narrative appears to prioritise sexual harassment as a phenomenon that occurs in public 
places such as the workplace (41: +4) rather than as something that is likely to occur in the 
private sphere of the home. As such there is no need for specific protection against sexual 
harassment that happens in the home, and whether or not it should be dealt with privately in 
this context is not at issue (46: +3; 49: -1). Indeed, it is the recipient’s partner rather than their 
friends who is seen as having a role to play in stopping sexual harassment by actively 
intervening and protecting the recipient (43: +5; 50: -3). 
It is not the case that this is a private matter to be resolved at an interpersonal level, rather it 
is the job of the police and the courts to deal with cases of sexual harassment as these services 
have the power to stop it (32: +4; 5: -4; 6: -3; 11: -3). Whilst it is the primary responsibility of 
these services to actively resolve cases, everyone has a duty to report it if they should witness 
such behaviour and as such everyone should be made aware of how they can make a 
complaint (48: +3; 12: +3). The process of making a complaint means that the identity of the 
person making the complaint will be revealed. However, this should not be a frightening 
prospect as people should be protected from negative comments about their actions (31: +5; 
15: +2). 
The process of dealing with a person once they have been found guilty of sexual harassment 
appears to be more straightforward in the workplace compared to other public places. In the 
workplace penalties such as being sacked or being denied promotion opportunities can be 
imposed. However, outside the workplace, although a person should be arrested if they 
breach an injunction order, injunctions in general are not considered to be a good way of 
dealing with sexual harassment (3: +4; 2: -4). Similarly, imposing fines is not a good way of 
dealing with it as “the people concerned will take this too softly and get away with it more” 
(P6 comments for 7: -5). However, more stringent methods such as prison sentences are also 
deemed not a good way of handling perpetrators (14: -3). It should be noted that this position 
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on prison sentences does not appear to be tied up with the question of rehabilitation as 
considerations about whether the initiator should receive counselling is outwith the focus of 
this narrative (34: -1). Instead, it seems that the issue here is getting the ‘right’ level of 
punishment which appears to be difficult to do outside the workplace context. 
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Factor 6: The No Place Like Home Narrative 
     47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
     
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities to 
those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.10 Factor 7: Overview 
This factor explains 2.823% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.270. One man 
(participant 13) loaded significantly on this factor. As noted in chapter 6 this factor is bipolar 
which suggests that two ‘opposed’ exemplifying Q sort configurations have been expressed 
within this factor. More specifically, the statement positionings in these two exemplifying Q 
sorts represent the mirror image of each other. Therefore, to explicate these two positions of 
sexual harassment policy, both Q sort configurations will be read as narratives.  
8.11 Factor 7A: The Burden of Proof Narrative 
Interpretation 
For the Burden of Proof narrative, the issue of sexual harassment is noteworthy in as much 
that it is important to point out that there is little that services can do to stop it (54: -5; 11: +4; 
6: +4). The police and the courts are powerless to stop sexual harassment largely because it is 
far too difficult to prove that sexual harassment has occurred (11: +4; 6: +4; 22: +3). This 
makes laws about it unnecessary, and in the context of workplace sexual harassment, the 
process of dealing with sexual harassment cases a misuse of employers’ time (23: +5; 58: 
+3). Since the police do not have the power to stop it, sexual harassment in public places 
should neither be reported to nor dealt with by this particular service (56:-4; 59: -3). 
Since complaints of sexual harassment can be untrue, alleged victims should not be treated 
with kid gloves (33: +5). When complaints are handed to the police, there is no need for 
officers to question recipients in a sensitive manner, to take steps to ensure that recipients are 
questioned in a non-threatening environment or to protect them from further victimisation 
(45: -5; 52: -4; 53: -3). If it is found to be the case that a person has deliberately made a false 
complaint about sexual harassment they should be punished (33: +5). This reluctance to treat 
recipients with kid gloves is reflected in a general unwillingness to support training initiatives 
on how to deal with sexual harassment (13: +2). Nor should it be the case that the 
government provides instructions on how to make a sexual harassment complaint (60: -3). It 
seems that, in this narrative, lodging complaints about sexual harassment is generally 
considered problematic – it is difficult to prove, people may lie – it appears that it all seems a 
bit unnecessary when it can be dealt with privately in some contexts with the recipient asking 
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the initiator to stop (20: +2). Recipients are capable of asking the initiator to stop by 
themselves so there is no need for friends to intervene (50: -3). 
In circumstances where a complaint of sexual harassment is being processed, there is no need 
to protect the identity of the accused (40: -4). This does not mean to say that the courts should 
be unconcerned with the rights of the accused but that does not translate in to letting the 
initiator get away with wrong doing (27: -3; 3: +2). For example, if the initiator breaches a 
sexual harassment injunction then they should be arrested (3: +2). The emphasis here is on 
keeping the perpetrator away from the recipient through, for example, injunctions and verbal 
warnings (2: +3; 21: +4). Penalties for sexual harassment such as denying someone 
promotion opportunities seem unfairly punitive (8: +3). The key to dealing with sexual 
harassment is resolving the cause of the problem. Therefore, making sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling is considered a good way to stop sexual harassment (34: +3). 
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Factor 7A: The Burden of Proof Narrative 
     39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
     
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities 
to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.12 Factor 7B: The Complaint Orientated Narrative 
Interpretation 
Whilst in the scheme of things, sexual harassment cannot be considered a major issue; it is 
something that requires legal and governmental regulation (54: +5). Therefore laws about 
sexual harassment are necessary and it is the government’s responsibility to make sure the 
public are equipped to make a sexual harassment complaint by providing instructions on this 
process (23: -5; 60: +3). 
There is a sense of optimism about the power of legal regulation to end sexual harassment. 
Police services and the courts are seen as having the power to stop it (11: -4; 6: -4). Proving 
that sexual harassment has occurred seems reasonably straightforward so again there is a 
sense of confidence that complaints can be resolved and sexual harassment stopped (22: -4). 
Given this, dealing with sexual harassment cases cannot be considered a misuse of 
employers’ time. 
However, like the No Place like Home narrative, in this narrative, the question of what 
penalties to impose on perpetrators appears to be more straightforward in the workplace 
compared to other public places (56: +4). In the workplace, penalties such as verbal 
warnings, the threat of being sacked or losing out on promotion opportunities are generally 
seen as good and fair ways of stopping sexual harassment (24: +2; 29: +2; 8: -3). However, 
outside the workplace, penalties such as injunctions, fines or verbal warnings from the police 
do not have the same impact as they do not involve losing (economic or career-related) status 
or rewards. As with the No Place Like Home narrative, the issue seems to be related to 
getting the ‘right’ level of punishment which appears to be difficult to do outside the 
workplace context.  
Given that penalties are considered more effective than other methods such as counselling to 
stop perpetrators, the impression is given that the initiator is not someone with problems 
which give rise to their problematic behaviour (34: -3). Indeed, there is a sense that the 
initiator should not be treated with kid gloves. For example, the idea that the courts should be 
unconcerned with the rights of the accused is prioritised in this narrative (27: +3). 
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Interestingly, however, this narrative prioritises anonymity for the accused (40: +4). My 
impression of this statement positioning coupled with others in this configuration is that this 
may be linked to practical considerations around further repercussions and victimisation. For 
example, this narrative prioritises protecting recipients from further victimisation and 
negative repercussions (53: +3; 5: -2). This concern does not appear to stem from sympathy 
for the victim as this issue is outwith the focus of this narrative (28: 0). Similarly, the 
question of whether the accused deserves sympathy is not a central concern here (57: -1). 
Instead, this narrative focuses on the need to protect the parties involved from further wrong 
doing which might involve keeping the identity of the person accused a secret (40: +4). The 
need to prevent further victimisation is also reflected in suggested police practices with the 
victim. For example, such practices should include sensitive lines of questioning in an 
environment that is non-threatening to the victim (45: +5; 52: +3). 
What is emphasised in this narrative is the need to encourage people to report and make 
complaints about sexual harassment (60: +3; 56: +4). As mentioned above, this is reflected in 
the support for victim-sensitive reporting processes and the prioritisation of the idea that 
recipients should not be victimised for complaining about sexual harassment. Given that the 
emphasis is on encouraging reporting behaviour, people who make false complaints should 
not be punished as this may inhibit reporting more generally (33: -5). 
 211 
 
Factor 7B: The Complaint Orientated Narrative 
     39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
     
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities 
to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.13 Factor 8: The Rehabilitation Narrative 
This narrative explains 2.697% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.213. One woman 
loaded significantly on this factor. Participant 2 was a voluntary worker for a violence crisis 
centre in her 40s. 
Interpretation 
In this narrative, sexual harassment is “frequently” a minor issue (P2 comments for 54: +3) 
and as such many complaints of this behaviour should be taken with a pinch of salt as 
“legislation can make mountains out of molehills” (P2 comments for 18: +2). Therefore, 
authorities should only get involved if sexual harassment occurred on more than one occasion 
(4: +4). That said, cases of sexual harassment should not really be a police matter as it is not 
really their role to “protect us from crassness” (P2 comments for; 39: -3: 32: -4). Indeed the 
involvement of the police is generally considered too extreme. For example, verbal warnings 
from the police or fines are considered a “nut and sledgehammer” approach to dealing with 
sexual harassment (P2 comments for 21: -3: 7: -5). Unsurprising, the suggestion that prison 
sentences are a good way to deal with sexual harassment is considered utter “rubbish” and a 
reflection of “an obsession in this punitive country and almost always run counter to 
rehabilitation” (P2 comments for 14: -5). Therefore counselling rather than punitive 
punishment is prioritised as a good way of dealing with sexual harassment (34: +5). 
Having made the point that police involvement is generally inappropriate, current legal and 
service practices in operation for complaining and victim treatment are considered in this 
narrative. More specifically, people should not be victimised for making complaints and it is 
appropriate for services to adopt victim-sensitive practices such as allowing the recipient to 
request that a same-sex officer deals with their case (53: +3; 45: +3; 47: +5). Given that this 
narrative is generally against the implementation of punitive procedures, those who make 
false complaints should not be punished for their actions (33: -4). However, given the 
difficulties in proving whether or not sexual harassment has occurred, it is necessary that the 
police take into account the recipient’s past sexual behaviour when investigating a complaint 
(22: +2; 38: +3). 
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As mentioned above, incidents of “crassness” more generally in public life are not a matter 
for the police (P2 comments for 39: -3; 59: -3), nor should it be the government’s 
responsibility to train people on how to deal with sexual harassment. Instead this is seen more 
as an educational issue where it “should be part of social skills teaching in secondary 
schools” (P2 comments for 10: -4 & 60: -3). However, sexual harassment is more of an issue 
in the workplace. Generally employers do not adequately protect people from such behaviour 
when “they should” (P2 comments for 42: -3). Again what is emphasised is the need to move 
away from punitive punishment as penalties such as denying promotion opportunities to those 
found guilty of sexual harassment is considered unfair as “past mistakes should always be 
forgiven if reform has occurred” (P2 comments for 8: +3). Instead, in this context, verbal 
warnings from employers would be the “ideal” way of dealing with it (P2 comments for 24: 
+4). 
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Factor 8: The Rehabilitation Narrative 
     3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
     
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities 
to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.14 Factor 9: The Punitive Narrative 
This factor explains 2.658% of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 1.196. One woman 
(participant 31) loaded significantly on this factor. 
Interpretation 
In this narrative, sexual harassment is seen as an important issue that requires a strong line to 
be taken with perpetrators (54: -5). This issue should not be dealt with solely by the police 
through for example verbal warnings (32: -4: 21: -3). Instead, perpetrators should be 
punished by the authorities using strong deterrents such as prison sentences, fines or sacked if 
it occurs in the workplace (14: +4: 7: +3; 29: +3: 24: -3). Punishment is what is required, not 
rehabilitation (34: -4). To clamp down on sexual harassment, it is important that it is 
recognised as a criminal offence, that instances of sexual harassment be clearly 
communicated as unacceptable by the recipient,  and  that incidents are reported when it 
occurs on more than one occasion in public life (1: -3; 20: +4; 56: +3; 4: +3: 26: -4). All such 
reports and complaints should be referred to the authorities who have the power to investigate 
complaints and implement punishment (35: +3).  
This is not to say that authorities such as the courts should be unconcerned about the rights of 
accused and those found guilty of sexual harassment (27: -3). Indeed, once they have paid for 
their crime, it would be unfair to continue to punish them through, for example, denying them 
promotion opportunities (8: +4). Nor is it the case that complainants are taken at face-value as 
innocent victims. It is recognised that people may lie and lodge false complaints (33: +5). To 
assess the truthfulness of complaints, victims should not be treated with kid gloves but rather 
fully interrogated (5: -5). People who deliberately make false complaints should lose their 
rights to anonymity and be punished appropriately (33: -5: 31: +5). It seems that strong 
deterrents can not only put an end to incidents of sexual harassment but also lies and false 
complaints. Therefore taking a more punitive stance is justified. 
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Factor 9: The Punitive Narrative 
     39 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by the police 
     
43 
One should intervene if 
they suspect their partner 
is being sexually 
harassment 
5 
The courts should not be 
responsible for providing 
protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
47 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
allowed to request that a 
same sex police officer 
deals with their case 
55 
The recipient's word is 
insufficient cause for a 
sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued 
15 
People who have made a 
sexual harassment 
complaint should be 
protected from negative 
comments about their 
actions 
6 
The police are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
50 
One should intervene if 
they suspect that their 
friend is being sexually 
harassed 
16 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should receive 
practical support 
3 
A person who breaches a 
sexual harassment 
injunction should be 
arrested 
11 
The courts are powerless 
to stop sexual harassment 
 
2 
Injunctions are a good 
way of stopping sexual 
harassment 
52 
The police should take 
steps to make sure that 
recipients of sexual 
harassment are questioned 
in a non-threatening 
environment 
25 
People should learn to 
deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
19 
Those who complain 
about sexual harassment 
should be protected 
against retaliation by the 
accused 
24 
Verbal warnings from an 
employer is a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
41 
There is a need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
22 
It is far too difficult to 
prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
18 
Sexual harassment 
complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
28 
People should be 
sympathetic to individuals 
who claim that they have 
been sexually harassed 
9 
There should be specialist 
organisations that provide 
support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
4 
The authorities should 
only get involved if sexual 
harassment occurred on 
more than one occasion 
21 
Verbal warnings from the 
police are a good way of 
stopping sexual 
harassment 
44 
There is no need to 
provide the police with 
specific training for 
dealing with sexual 
harassment cases 
30 
Investigating sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
10 
It should not be the 
government’s 
responsibility to provide 
training on how to deal 
with sexual harassment 
36 
A person's motives for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment should be 
checked 
12 
Everyone should be made 
aware of how they can 
make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
7 
Fines are a good way to 
stop sexual harassment 
26 
There is no need for 
protection against sexual 
harassment in the 
workplace 
46 
There is no need for 
specific protection against 
sexual harassment that 
happens in the home 
59 
Sexual harassment in 
public places should be 
dealt with by the police 
37 
Recipients of sexual 
harassment should be 
given compensation 
23 
Laws about sexual 
harassment are 
unnecessary 
38 
The police should take in 
to account the recipient’s 
past sexual behaviour 
48 
People that witness sexual 
harassment should report 
it 
29 
An employee who is 
found guilty of sexual 
harassment should be 
sacked 
8 
It is unfair to deny 
promotion opportunities to 
those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
45 
The police should 
question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a 
sensitive manner 
34 
A good way to stop sexual 
harassment is to make 
sure that the guilty party 
receives counselling 
27 
The courts should be 
unconcerned with the 
rights of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
53 
Recipients should not be 
victimised for 
complaining about sexual 
harassment 
40 
The identity of the person 
accused of sexual 
harassment should be kept 
secret 
17 
Employers should be held 
legally responsible for 
workplace sexual 
harassment whether they 
knew about or not 
51 
Occurrences of sexual 
harassment in the home 
should be reported 
60 
The government should 
provide instructions on 
how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
35 
All complaints of sexual 
harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
14 
Prison sentences are a 
good way to deal with 
sexual harassment 
31 
The identity of the person 
making a complaint about 
sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
54 
Sexual harassment is a 
minor issue 
32 
Sexual harassment cases 
should be dealt with by 
the police 
1 
I feel that making sexual 
harassment a criminal 
offence is taking things 
too far 
57 
People should be 
sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual 
harassment 
58 
Dealing with sexual 
harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers' time 
13 
I feel that providing 
everyone with training on 
how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
42 
People are adequately 
protected from sexual 
harassment by employers 
49 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in the home is 
better dealt with privately 
56 
Sexual harassment that 
happens in public places 
should be reported 
20 
The recipient should ask 
the initiator of sexual 
harassment to stop 
33 
A person who deliberately 
makes a false complaint 
about sexual harassment 
should be punished 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
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8.15 Constructing Victims: Similarities and Differences 
Returning to the issue of secondary victimisation through unsympathetic, negative 
responses to victims in the aftermath of sexual harassment, the ten narratives 
identified here suggest that the treatment of victims is neither straightforward nor 
polarised as either negative or positive. Instead the question of how to deal with or 
treat victims, perpetrators and the issue of sexual harassment more generally is 
composed of manifold considerations. In this section, I will discuss the ways in 
which victim and perpetrator treatment is contextualised within and across 
narratives by focusing largely on two main issues (1) sympathetic treatment, (2) 
relevance of recipient’s past sexual behaviour, and (3), false allegations.  
8.16 Sympathetic Treatment 
Three of the narratives identified, the Impact narrative (Factor 1), the Proper 
Process narrative (factor 2) and the Collective Action and Deterrent narrative 
(factor 4), explicitly prioritised sympathetic treatment of victims by people more 
generally. In the Impact narrative, victim-sensitive treatment is expressed as a 
priority in general treatment of the victim by the public and in police practices due 
to the emotional impact sexual harassment can have on victims (28: +3; 53: +5; 
52: +4; 45: +3; 47: +3). Indeed, the need for a sympathetic stance is prioritised 
over similar treatment for the accused which is not a central concern in this 
narrative (57: +1). 
The prioritisation of this particular form of sympathetic stance resonates with 
criticisms of police services mentioned earlier that victim-sensitive practices are 
in order to take into account the significance of the experience for victims, 
particularly women (e.g. Gregory and Lees, 1999; Goodey, 2005; Anderson and 
Doherty, 2008). The recognition of emotional impact of sexual violence in public 
and legal discourses has been treated by some researchers as crucial in marking 
forms of sexualised/gendered violence as a significant issue (Gregory and Lees 
1999). Indeed, the admission of emotional impact evidence in courts has been 
seen as an important move in moving away from conceptualisations of sexual 
violence solely in terms of a physical act in which courts focus on objective 
evidence of some kind of physical transgression (Raitt and Zeedyk, 2000). 
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However, the emphasis on psychological/emotional impact on victims can be 
considered a double-edged sword. As Raitt and Zeedyk (2000) point out, in cases 
of rape, emotional impact is viewed through the lens of disorder which allows for 
victim-blaming discourses to be drawn on to construct the recipient as mentally 
unstable and/or that their emotional vulnerability makes then particularly open to 
misinterpretation of events or giving out the ‘wrong’ signals. Since the importance 
of the incident becomes judged through notions of emotional harm, victims who 
do not evidence emotional, psychological upset or damage can be positioned as 
not ‘true’ victims and/or allows the incident to be minimised as trivial.  
The increasing importance of emotional harm in police and court decisions in the 
UK can be seen in the introduction of victim statements in 1996 in which victims 
are invited to make a statement as to impact of their experience of violence on 
their life. This has been used in cases of violence more generally and sexual 
harassment in particular (Morgen and Sanders, 1999). The victim statement can 
have an impact on bail conditions, changing or dropping charges and sentencing 
(Morgen and Sanders, 1999). Whilst this has been treated as an important move to 
allow the victim to ‘speak’ to the court as it were, it may also put pressure on 
victims to pathologise themselves in ways they would otherwise choose not to in 
order to ensure that their case is taken seriously. 
In a similar vein, the Proper Process narrative foregrounds the victim by drawing 
attention to the need for sympathetic treatment of the victim by people in general 
and emphasises emotional impact of sexual harassment on victims by calling for 
special organisational help and support (28: +3 52: +3; 9: +4; 16: +4). However, 
whilst notions of emotional impact are positioned as central to this narrative, so 
too are more pragmatic considerations around the benefits of victim-orientated 
approaches such as reducing the possibility that a complaint is withdrawn. The 
importance of pragmatic issues positions the police as more accountable and more 
responsible for complaint withdrawal which has been predominantly constructed 
as an individual choice over which police services have little control (Walker, 
2005).  
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Like the Impact narrative, within the Proper process narrative, sympathy for the 
accused is not a central focus (57: +1). Indeed, the emphasis on concerns for the 
victim, appears to preclude understanding and/or sympathy for the perpetrator 
here. This narrative is not unlike neoliberal versions of law and order in which 
offences are positioned as the fault of the individual and thus require punishment 
(Reiner, 2007). This more neoliberal stance on perpetrators is also reflected in the 
Collective action and Deterrent narrative in which sympathy for the victim is 
prioritised over sympathy for the accused (28: +4; 57: -2). More specifically, 
strong deterrents are positioned as need to curb expression of individual 
problematic behaviour. This version of punishment is expressed in a more 
extreme form in the Punitive narrative (Factor 9) in which versions of ‘Zero 
Tolerance’ are drawn to construct sexual harassment as something that needs 
clamping down on through tough punishment (e.g. Hope and Sparks, 2000). 
However, unlike the first three narratives discussed here the Punitive narrative 
does not prioritise sympathetic treatment of victims and perhaps less 
unsurprisingly perpetrators (28: +1; 57: -2). In the Punitive narrative, the 
emphasis is more on cracking down on problematic behaviours, including false 
allegations, however this latter issue will be discussed more fully later in this 
chapter. 
In the other narratives identified, sympathetic treatment of victims and/or 
perpetrators is not strongly prioritised. In two of the narratives, the accountability 
narrative (Factor 3) and the Burden of Proof narrative (Factor 7a) sympathy for 
the victim is outwith the focus of the narrative (28: 0 for both factors). Instead, in 
both narratives an adversarial approach is take up in relation to the victim in 
which burden of proof plays a central role (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007).  For 
example, in the Accountability narrative, this is reflected here in participant 21’s 
claim that the victim rather than the accused is “innocent until proven guilty” (P21 
comments for 52: +2). Similarly, in the Burden of Proof narrative, interrogation of 
the victim is favoured over victim-orientated police practices. In both narratives, it 
seems that the victim as well as the accused is essentially on trial in investigations 
(Gregory and Lees, 1999). This approach to burden of proof has not been 
uncommon in sexual violence cases. As discussed in chapter 2, within legal cases, 
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the burden of proof rested largely with the victim to prove that consent was 
withheld. This particular representation of evidence functions to place the burden 
of responsibility for communicating why a particular behaviour is considered 
unwanted or inappropriate solely on the victim (e.g. Kurth, Spiller and Brown 
Travis, 2001; Monti, 2000) . The danger here is that the victim can be construed 
as accountable for offender behaviour where it can be argued that the victim did 
not communicate that particular behaviours were unwelcome (Lazard, Buys, 
Callaghan, Keating and Motzkau, 2007).  
Unlike the Burden of Proof narrative, within the Accountability narrative it is 
acknowledged that sexual harassment can have significant emotional impact on 
victims and thus, specialist victim support is necessary. However, as discussed 
above, recognition of the emotional and psychological impact of harassment is not 
necessarily unproblematic. 
In the Complaint-Orientated narrative (Factor 7b) sympathy for victims and 
perpetrators are not central to this narrative (28: 0; 57: -1). A similar position is 
taken on this issue in the Rehabilitation narrative (Factor 8; 28: +1; 57: +1). 
However, in both these narratives, emphasis is placed on preventing secondary 
victimisation of the recipient through endorsement of victim-sensitive police 
practices. Unlike the Impact narrative, concern with such practices does not 
appear to stem from the prioritisation of the emotional impact of experiences of 
sexual harassment. Instead, secondary victimisation is positioned, in and of itself, 
as an issue which needs to be addressed. 
Like the Complaint-Orientated narrative, sympathetic treatment of victims is not 
central to the D-I-Y narrative (Factor 5: 28: 0). However, in contrast to all other 
narratives identified, the D-I-Y narrative emphasises that recipients of sexual 
harassment are capable of dealing with problematic behaviour independent of 
third party assistance. The inclusion of victim-orientated police and agency 
practices are not of particular concern here, partially because sexual harassment is 
conceptualised as a workplace issue and partly because only repetitive instances 
of sexual harassment need to be referred to the authorities. The emphasis on 
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individual responsibility for handling perpetrators of sexual harassment resonates 
with neo-liberal as well as more conservative informed arguments that have been 
advanced around women’s victimisation. For example, Roiphe (1994) contends 
that the emphasis on women as victims represents recipients as weak, passive and 
incapable of resisting ‘everyday ‘mundane’ forms of sexual harassment. As noted 
in chapter 1, these particular arguments locate resistance within individuals rather 
than wider social practices and as such ignore wider power relations operating 
within so called ‘mundane’ ‘everyday’ interactions (Samuels, 2003). 
In the No Place like Home narrative (Factor 6) there is tentative disagreement 
with the issue of the need for sympathetic treatment for both victims and 
perpetrators of sexual harassment (28: -2; 57: -2). However, this does not translate 
into lack of general positive support for victims. What appears to be more central 
in this narrative is drawing boundaries around which environments protection is 
needed which include public places, rather than the home. Indeed, a person’s 
partner has a role to play in stopping sexually harassing behaviour. This appears 
to position sexual harassment as less of a possibility in intimate relationships 
which creates the impression that sexual violence only occurs in specific kinds of 
relationships 
8.17 Cry Wolf? False Allegations and Past Sexual Behaviour 
As mentioned above, one reason cited for low reporting rates of sexual 
harassment as well as sexual violence more generally is victim concerns that their 
complaint will not be believed and treated as a false allegation (Gavey and Gow, 
2001). A number of gendered/sexualised assumptions have become interwoven 
with the issue of false reporting. For example, representations of false allegations 
include the notion that women cry rape to conceal ‘deviant’ (active) feminine 
sexual behaviour (Gavey and Gow, 2001, Gavey, 2005), and/or the alleged 
promiscuity of victims is used to undermine claims of unwanted sexual attention 
and non-consent.  Despite police services admittance that false allegations are 
uncommon, the number often becomes inflated within public discourses 
(Anderson and Doherty, 2008; Gavey and Gow, 2001; Gregory and Lees, 1999).  
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The problem of false allegations was raised as a significant issue in seven of the 
narratives identified. Statement 33 - a person who deliberately makes a false 
complaint about sexual harassment should be punished – was positioned as 
strongly disagreed with in the Complaint Orientated narrative (33: -5) and the 
Rehabilitation narrative (33: -4). However, this statement was occupied as 
strongly agree position in the Impact narrative (33: +3), the Accountability 
narrative (33:+4), The D-I-Y narrative (33: +5), the Burden of Proof narrative (33: 
+5) and the Punitive narrative (33: +5). However, the ways in which this issue 
was taken up, how central false allegations is to investigative procedures and how 
this become interwoven with concerns around the victims sexual reputation 
differed across narratives. For example emphasis on identifying false from true 
reports was only flagged up as a significant issue in the Accountability narrative 
which, as mentioned above, was concerned with burden of proof. Here the need to 
check motives was positioned as integral to investigations processes (36: +4). 
Interesting, within the Burden of Proof narrative, checking victim motives for 
making complaints as not conceptualised as central to the process (36: -1), largely 
it seems because the truthfulness of reports are difficult to establish. Indeed, in the 
Impact narrative, the D-I-Y narrative, and the Punitive narrative, the need to 
actively check motives were not central to policy considerations.  
Despite the positioning of checking victim motives being of less importance to the 
punitive narrative (36: +1), the D-I-Y narrative (36: +2) and the Impact narrative 
(36: 0), the issue of false reporting was taken up in specific ways within these 
narratives. Within the Punitive narrative, punishment of those who make false 
complaints involved losing victim rights to anonymity (31: +5)  which appears to 
draw on notions of ‘name and shame’ deterrents to curb such behaviour (Bell, 
2002). The only other narrative, which positions waiving anonymity rights for 
victims as important is the No Place like Home narrative (31: +5). However, in 
contrast to the Punitive narrative, the No place like Home narrative, the 
positioning of revealing the complainant’s identity as important does not appear to 
be out of concern with punitive punishment. Rather in the latter narrative, it seems 
that within a culture which supports complaints such rights would be unnecessary 
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as victims would be protected from secondary victimisation.  
Unlike the other narratives in which punishment for false allegations is agreed 
with, the D-I-Y narrative places emphasis on the need to take into account the 
victim’s past sexual behaviour as evidence for verifying a complaint (38: +4). 
This resonates with predominant conceptualisations of the relevance of the 
victim’s sexual reputation/character in court processes for establishing whether or 
not sexual violence as occurred (Anderson and Doherty, 2008). Interestingly, only 
one other narrative – the Rehabilitation narrative - prioritised agreement for the 
notion that the recipient’s past sexual behaviour needs to be taken into account 
within investigations (38: +3). However, within the Rehabilitation narrative, 
liberal conceptualisations of rehabilitation and reform are prioritised over punitive 
punishment and as such individuals who make false complaints are seen as 
undeserving of punishment (33: -4).  
Like the Rehabilitation narrative, within the Complaint Orientated narrative, 
people who make false complaints are positioned as undeserving of punishment 
(33: -5). However, whilst in the Rehabilitation narrative, a general point about the 
problems of favouring punishment over rehabilitation appears to be being made, 
in the Complaint Orientated narrative, disagreement with punishing the act of 
making false allegations appears to stem from a concern that this will inhibit 
reporting of sexual harassment. Therefore, in the Complaint Orientated narrative 
there appears to be a move away from constructions of false allegations which 
emphasise the vulnerability of those accused to those which highlight the 
vulnerability of individuals, to sexual harassment through recourse to the need to 
support reporting (Boyle, 2005). 
Only one narrative – the Impact narrative – strongly prioritised the irrelevance of 
the victim’s past sexual behaviour in investigations of complaints (38: -5). 
However, whilst this narrative appears to move away from more traditional 
representations of victim sexual conduct as having a bearing on experiences of 
sexual violence mentioned above, it does engage with notions of the danger of 
false allegations. More specifically, within this narrative, punishing those who 
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make false allegations is needed because of the possible negative emotional 
impact that untrue complaints have on those accused (33: +3).  As Boyle (2005) 
notes, “stories of false allegations...work to construct...sexual assault as stories 
about the vulnerability of men rather than men’s abuse of women” (P.78). The 
construction of false reporting as an ever-present possibility leaves open the 
positioning and repositioning of the accused as victim and the victim as the 
perpetrator of wrong-doing which functions to undermine claims of sexual 
violence in general and sexual harassment in particular. 
8.18 Summary: Moving Beyond Secondary Victimisation? 
The ten narratives identified highlight the complexity of perspectives of dealing 
with both victims and perpetrators of sexual harassment. Interesting to note that 
whilst only three of the narratives explicitly focused on the importance of taking 
up a sympathetic approach to victims of sexual harassment, the absence of this 
explicit stance in some narratives did not necessarily mean that victim-orientated 
practices were not advocated. However, even in the case where sympathetic 
stances were taken, the issue of the false allegation was raised as an ever-present 
possibility in seven of the narratives. As argued above, the continued doubt of the 
truthfulness of complaints allows open the possibility of repositioning victims as 
perpetrators and perpetrators as victims.  
In the next chapter, the exploration of the positionings of victims and perpetrators 
of sexual harassment is shifted from policy considerations to broader 
constructions of recipient-initiator relations operating in the sexual harassment 
discourses. More specifically, in the following  chapter, I use Foucauldian 
discourse analysis to explore how women victims/male perpetrators, women 
offenders/male victims, and same-sex victims/perpetrators become constructed in 
interview data. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which victim and 
perpetrator positionings become constituted through a heterosexualised gaze 
which functions to (re)produce heterosexualised femininities as passive/powerless 
and heterosexualised masculinities as active/powerful.  
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Chapter 9: ‘Proper’ victims, ‘proper’ perpetrators – Unwanted Sexual 
Attention as a Heterosexualised Relation 
9.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, dominant representations of sexual violence in general 
and sexual harassment in particular, construct “this set of behaviours as deriving 
from a man and directed at a woman” (Brewis & Linstead, 2000: 84). I argued in 
Chapter 2 that this particular gendered relation tends to re-inscribe a version of 
normative heterosexual power relations which prescribe feminine sexuality as 
passive and male sexuality as active. In this chapter, I seek to unpack the ways in 
which masculine and feminine sexualities are constructed in relation to victims 
and perpetrators of unwanted sexual attention within interview data. The central 
argument running through this chapter focuses on the ways in which constructions 
of active masculine and passive feminine heterosexuality are deployed in various 
ways to produce women as the ‘true’ and ‘proper’ ‘victims’ and men as the ‘true’ 
and ‘proper’ ‘perpetrators’ of  unwanted sexual attention. This exploration draws 
attention to the ways in which ‘deviations’ from normative versions of 
heterosexual masculinity and femininity are used to present women as ‘improper’ 
perpetrators and men as ‘improper’ victims. During this analysis, I will explicate 
the centrality of passivity in constructions of women as ‘true’ victims by 
examining how active feminine sexualities become embedded within notions of 
accountability in constructions of unwanted sexual attention. Throughout this 
discussion, I will explore how different discursive constructions aid the 
maintenance of ‘real’ hegemonic versions of masculinity and femininity.  
To explore the above issues, I will focus on five constructions identified. These 
were: (1) men as a sexual threat; (2) the sex-emotion distinction; (3) emotion, 
femininity and sexuality; (4) not ‘real’ women/ not ‘real’ men; and (5) unruly 
women. Each construction will be addressed in turn in the following sections. 
9.2 Men as sexual threat 
Physicality is understood as central to ideals of masculinity and masculine 
sexuality. As Weinke (1998) notes, cultural ideals of male embodiment are 
associated with “having a formidable presence in the world, one that conveys in 
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an instant notions of power, control and invulnerability, not to mention the 
capacity to exercise violence, when required” (p.1). The construction of men’s 
forceful physicality is bound up with representations of heterosexualised 
masculine sexuality in which men are positioned as active sexual initiators who 
have the capacity to force sexual attention on women (e.g. McCaughey, 1997).  
In relation to this construction of masculine sexuality, women’s bodies are 
portrayed as lacking force, as vulnerable, and as incapable of challenging male 
embodied power (e.g. Marcus, 2002). McCaughey and Neil (1995) suggest that 
these representations of feminine and masculine embodied sexuality are drawn on 
in sexual violence prevention programmes which serve to (re)produce and 
normalise men’s physical power to ‘do’ sexual violence and women’s 
vulnerability to this power. The construction of men’s power to rape and women 
as unable to prevent this expression of male power can be seen in the following 
excerpt from Chloe’s account. Here, Chloe discusses what issues might give rise 
to unwanted sexual attention: 
C:  ... Sex is power at the end of the day. You know, I think that's 
why they rape in the Congo or wherever it is they rape women, 
because it's the one thing that they can get they can have over 
us. 
L: Yeah 
C: It's a power thing, and I think at the end of the day, they want 
that, they, you know, they can take it and it's not, I  mean, you 
know, if a woman a woman did it to a man then yes it's the 
same thing. It's still to do with power but it's not as much if a 
man does it to a woman. I don't know if that makes sense.  
L: It does, yeah 
C: It's more, I think it's more of a power, I think it's such a power 
thing and at the end of the day they want to have that control. 
They want to be able to have sex in their ways, control over it 
Here, sexual violence is depicted as a means for ‘doing’ power over the victim 
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(see also, Kitzinger and Thomas, 1995; Dougherty, 2006). This means of ‘doing’ 
power is constructed as a specifically heterosexualised relation in which forced 
intercourse is a masculinised weapon which allows men to physically “take” sex 
from women. The notion that forced sex is primarily a male preserve is 
highlighted through the construction of it as “the one thing that they can get they 
can have over us”. This quote taken together with descriptions of men ‘taking’ sex 
also provides a sense of men’s physical ability to overpower women.  
Men’s physical capacity to ‘do’ power through forced sex and women’s inability 
to resist rape is further underscored by the positioning of women who are sexually 
violent to men as less powerful than a comparable man. Implicit but implied in 
this construction of male recipients and woman initiators is the notion that men 
are physically equipped with the power to ‘do’ rape but also that this physicality 
will allow them to resist any force a woman’s body might exert. The implication 
of this construction is that it is men who pose a sexual threat and women who are 
defenceless against sexual victimisation. This works to reinforce women’s 
position as passive and men as active in heterosexual relations and offers no 
possibility for women’s resistance (e.g. Gavey, 1999; Marcus, 2002). The notion 
of the male body as impervious to physical sexual violence by women can be seen 
further in Haley’s account: 
L:  ... Do you think it’s possible that women can do it to men? 
Give unwanted sexual attention? 
H:  Well I’m not sure... I’m almost inclined to say that I don’t think 
it could happen ... the guy, you know, almost physically in 
every way stronger than a woman so how could a woman pin a 
guy down and do it?  
The constitution of women as physically weaker compared to men casts doubt 
over the possibility of a woman initiator overpowering a male recipient in 
practical terms as can be seen in Haley’s question – “how could a woman pin a 
guy down and do it?” Implied in this account is that men are physically able to 
overpower women as they are “in every way stronger” in comparison. As with the 
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above excerpt, the difference drawn around men and women’s physical strength in 
this account works to both (re)produce men’s victimisation by women as unlikely 
and position men as a physical threat to women. 
9.3 The sex/emotion distinction – It’s only ‘natural’ 
The notion of sex as a male preserve was not only constructed through reference 
to men’s physical power but also as a fundamentally ‘natural’ state in which men 
want/need sex. For example, this can be seen in Gillian’s account below: 
L: Okay, so what does the term unwanted sexual attention mean 
to you? 
G: Right. Well usually its nasty, gropey men, groping up young 
women who don’t want to be groped, basically what I see it as. 
L: Yeah 
G: And I think occasionally it might happen in reverse, but that 
would be very odd occasion. Whereas I think it’s very common 
for blokes to give unwanted sexual attention to women. 
L: Why do you think it’s less common for it to happen the other 
way around? 
G: Because blokes are all bastards and they have testosterone 
hurtling around their system and think of nothing but sex for 
99% of the time and women are more sensible I think  
The gendered relation of men as perpetrators and women as victims is constituted 
through use of the male sex drive discourse in which men are compelled by 
‘natural’ biological processes to seek heterosexual sex (Hollway, 1984). The 
universality of these ‘male’ biological processes serves to depict unwanted sexual 
attention from men as a “common” phenomenon. The pervasiveness of such 
behaviour is further highlighted in the use of an extreme case formulation which 
is used to describe “blokes as all bastards”.  
The male initiator is represented as problematic. He is depicted as irrationally 
focused on sex as he thinks “of nothing but sex for 99% of the time”, which not 
only contrasts with the more rational “sensible” version of women in this 
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extract but also with versions of masculinity in which rationality is central (e.g. 
Whitehead, 2002). This does not suggest that the initiator is feminised by being 
constituted as irrational or that women are masculinised though being positioned 
as rational in this account. Rather, the presence of men’s extreme sexual interest 
and women’s reduced focus on sex re-inscribe heterosexualised gendered 
positionings of masculinity and femininity in which ‘real men’ are active pursuers 
of hetero-sex (e.g. Gavey, 2005). In contrast women are positioned as passive in 
sexual exchanges, they have sexual attention imposed upon them and the 
possibility of women’s desire for sex is absent and unarticulated (e.g. Tolman, 
2002; Fine, 1988). Indeed, the possibility of women initiators as active seekers of 
sex is described as rare. This description coupled with the ‘naturalness’ of men 
wanting and needing sex serves to locate women initiators of (unwanted) sex as 
an aberration.  
Whilst in this extract unwanted behaviour is problematised in descriptions of men 
initiators as “nasty gropey” “bastards”, the use of the male sex drive discourse 
works to normalise unwanted sexual attention through its appeal to the 
‘naturalness’ of the behaviour as well as offer little possibility for changing and 
eradicating ‘men’s’ behaviour. This can be seen further in Gillian’s account where 
she says. 
G: It’s quite natural for blokes to fancy younger women because 
as far as, er, Oh God, carrying on of the species sort of thing. 
L: oh right yeah 
G: Um blokes still have sperm, but young, you know, younger 
women are more likely to produce progeny and so there’s this 
evolutionary whatever the hell I mean. 
L: Yeah evolutionary yeah 
G: Yeah, it makes sense for an older bloke to fancy a younger 
woman whereas older women are less likely to become 
pregnant makes a lot more sense for older women to you know 
start crashing about after younger men. 
L: Yeah 
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G: Um and although it does happen on occasion, um, it just no it 
doesn’t make biological sense. Sorry I’ve lost my thread again 
[laugh] 
L: [Laugh] No that’s fine 
G: Oh God, but yeah, so I think yes that’s part of that happens 
less often because it’s like er confidence comes with age  
L: Yeah 
G: so sort of like horrible blokes will wolf whistle whatever [at] 
younger women because they have the confidence and so forth, 
whereas with er (.) older women don’t want to end up making 
fools of themselves really because it’s perfectly natural for 
older blokes to want women who are gorgeous.  
L: Yeah 
G: Whereas, although it’s quite natural for older women to think 
young blokes are gorgeous, it’s in a different sort of way 
because your not viewing it from a sexual point of view 
because if you’re that age then you’ve probably already got 
your kids and stuff, so you’re not looking for a sexual partner  
These notions of sexuality can be seen in the ways in which men and women are 
constructed in Gillian’s description. More specifically, men are constructed as 
active pursuers of women; it is they that ‘do’ the ‘fancying’ of women and it is 
they who will take active steps in communicating sexual interest by ‘wolf 
whistling’. Their positionings as active sexual subjects is naturalised through 
recourse to their biological need to “carry on the species” which for men can be 
undertaken at any age because they “still have their sperm” and so “it makes 
sense” for men to initiate sex.  
As is made explicit in Gillian’s account, it is not just any woman that will be the 
recipient of sexual interest. By privileging the reproductive function of sex, it can 
only be women who appear capable of child bearing, that is, “young women”. In 
addition to this, the discourse of desire described by Lea (2007) is drawn on to 
construct young women as sexually desirable to heterosexual men through the 
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reference to them as “gorgeous”. The discourse of desire posits physical 
attractiveness of the recipient as producing sexual desire in others. By drawing on 
this discourse, the male initiator’s position as active sexual subject is reinforced in 
that they ‘do’ the desiring and seek a ‘desirable’ sexual object. The positioning of 
“young women” as sexually desirable also (re)produces predominant 
constructions of older women as asexual and sexually unattractive (Fullmer, 
Shenk and Eastland, 1999) 
Biological notions of male and female sexuality are also used to explain why it is 
that older women cannot be initiators of unwanted sexual attention. Here, it is 
because they are no longer part of the process of reproduction because they 
already have “kids” or, as implied by the word “older”, can no longer have 
children. Since sex for women is governed by the need to reproduce, they no 
longer need to look for a “sexual partner”. What is absent in this account is the 
notion of sex as pleasurable for women. It appears that the privileging of the 
reproductive function of sex makes women’s pleasure in or desire for sex a non-
issue.  
The ‘male sex drive’ discourse and the discourse of ‘desire’ work to position 
unwanted sexual attention as ‘normal’ sex. For example, wolf whistling whilst 
problematised by the description of the initiator as “horrible”, is also normalised 
by positioning this behaviour as ‘natural’ and biological. In Gillian’s account 
above, there is a lack of explicit reference to women as victims of unwanted 
sexual attention and the absence of overt reference to victim identities works to 
locate sexual harassment as more normalised. However, the implicit circulation of 
gendered victim/perpetrator positionings in these constructions normalise men as 
the only ‘true’ sexual aggressor and women as the only ‘true’ victim. Thus, 
unwanted sexual attention becomes constituted as a heterosexualised relation. The 
construction of (unwanted) sexual attention as a heterosexualised relation is also 
evident in Gillian’s discussion of unwanted sexual behaviour in gay relationships: 
G: ... I do understand that a lot of um gay men are far more 
promiscuous ... men are naturally polygamous and perhaps 
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persuaded to be monogamous because of the connection with 
the female ... it’s probably statistically more common for, you 
know, gay men to be more promiscuous...so as far as gay 
blokes are concerned I suppose, yes, if they didn’t fancy if a 
bloke, didn’t fancy somebody, suppose that might be just as 
possible. But yes I think I would be less often that it would be 
rejected ... because of blokes being sex obsessed and more up 
for it ... as far as lesbians are concerned ... I would imagine 
there’s less, there would be less, um, unwanted sexual 
attention because I don’t think that, I don’t think they’d 
persevere in the same way because of not having testosterone 
The construction of gay men’s sexuality draws on what I will call the ‘male sexual 
need’ discourse. This discourse resonates with aspects of the ‘male sex drive’ 
discourse in that men are biologically driven to seek sex. However, unlike the 
‘male sex drive’ discourse, this need for sex is not governed by procreation. 
Instead, within the ‘male sexual need’ discourse, sex is simply about desire which 
can be seen in the use of “fancy” in describing men’s attraction to other men. This 
need for sex is not tied to relational or emotional investment in another, and does 
not need to be, because concern with relationship commitment is constructed as a 
female preserve.  
Hollway’s (1989) description of the ‘have/hold’ relationship discourse is relevant 
to the construction of the women in this extract. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
within the have/hold discourse, women aim to secure a committed, long-lasting 
relationship with a man. Sex in this discourse becomes imbued with notions 
around exclusivity, commitment and security. These notions are reflected in this 
account by the presentation of heterosexual women as concerned with 
“monogamous relationships” which suggests sex occurs in the context of a lasting 
relationship. Heterosexual women are also constructed here as regulative of 
heterosexual men’s sexual behaviour in that men are “persuaded to be 
monogamous because of the connection with the female”. This positions women 
as responsible for men’s ‘good’ behaviour and thus allows them to be blamed if 
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men behave ‘badly’ (e.g. Kurth, Spiller and Brown Travis, 2001). 
The question of whether gay men can experience unwanted sexual attention is 
described as an unlikely possibility because the male recipient is also located in 
the male sexual need discourse and, as such, he is also “sex obsessed and more up 
for it”. As with the use of the male sex drive discourse mentioned above, the use 
of the male sexual need discourse here locates (unwanted) sexual attention in the 
realms of ‘normal’ sex but it also works to undermine claims that gay men can be 
victims of unwanted sexual attention because, in this discourse, sex is always 
wanted by men. 
Interestingly, lesbian women initiators of unwanted sexual attention are also 
constructed as an unlikely possibility because they cannot be positioned in the 
sexual need discourse by virtue of being women. In this account, sexual attention 
is driven by the distinctly male biological need to have sex. Women lack this 
biology and so lack this need and because of this they don’t “persevere in the 
same way”.  
The absence of perpetrators and recipients of unwanted sexual attention and 
indeed the absence of unwelcome sex itself in gay/lesbian relationships 
reproduces the notion of unwanted sexual attention as a heterosexualised relation. 
Indeed, the use of the male sexual need discourse here constitutes men as the only 
possible initiator because they are driven to seek sex and women as the only 
possible recipient because they lack this particular need.  
The notion that women lack the ‘biology’ for wanting/needing sex is also 
discussed in Chloe’s account. Instead of wanting/needing sex, women are 
constructed as ‘biologically’ geared towards emotional commitment: 
C: Women are more into love and I think than sex, whereas men 
are more into like the sort of physical bit of it, whereas women 
will be like oh doesn't he love me, doesn't he want me, you 
know, they kind of crave that more kind of thing so I think it's 
different. 
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L:   Yeah 
C:  We want more kind of we give off we give off more unwanted 
emotional 
 [laugh] 
L: [laugh] 
C: whereas men give un unwanted sexual I think more than 
anything else so 
L:  Is the emotional stuff linked to the romance?  
C: Yeah I think so, yeah. I think we're more romantic than men 
are I think. 
L: Yeah 
C: Men are more kind of geared towards what's in between their 
legs and yeah, what's in their you know their xxx whereas we 
kind of give off something that when we have sex it kind of 
goes off in our brain and then basically it's kind of oh we love 
you 
Again, we see the ‘male sex drive’ discourse being used to construct men as 
wanting ‘just’ sex because “men are more kind of geared towards what’s in 
between their legs”. Women on the other hand are constructed as concerned with 
“love” and romance and “emotional stuff” rather than ‘just’ sex. This latter 
construction of women resonates with evolutionary discourses which posit women 
as ‘naturally’ linking sex with love for a sexual partner because women maximise 
their chances of reproduction if they can secure a long term commitment from a 
man (e.g. Burns, 2002; Crouch, 2001). This construction of an evolved gender 
difference posits men as the only possible initiator of unwanted sexual attention 
and women as the only possible initiators of “unwanted emotional” attention. 
Constructions of feminine emotionality appear to be integral to constructions of 
women as ‘improper’ perpetrators and it is this issue that will be explored in more 
detail next. 
9.4 Emotionality, Femininity & Sexuality 
The constitution of the woman initiator is firmly embedded in particular notions 
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of ‘deviant’ feminine sexuality within which extreme emotionality and 
irrationality play a central role. This form of ‘deviant’ feminine sexuality is 
presented in Kate’s description of the woman initiator of unwanted sexual 
attention: 
K: It’s more, can I say, bunny boiler? 
L: [Laugh] Yeah 
K:  It’s more persistent, I love you, I want you, love me back it’s a 
more, god, desperate. God that’s an appalling word to use 
yeah it’s, um, it’s less of an activity but more of a lifestyle. I 
suppose it’s not something that one girl would approach ten 
girls in one evening, it’s more it would be a genuine fixation 
with one person 
The term ‘bunny boiler’ is a cultural reference to a scene in the film ‘Fatal 
Attraction’ in which the female character Alex boils the pet rabbit of the man she 
is stalking. I will briefly describe some discursive constructions of the character 
Alex because they are directly relevant to the ways in which the woman initiator 
is constructed in this interview set. Alex is constructed as an active sexual initiator 
in that she is portrayed as assertive, sexually ferocious and – at least to begin with 
– a willing participant in casual sex with a married man (e.g. Siann, 1994). In 
short, this representation of ‘Alex’ deviates from acceptable sexually passive 
norms of femininity (e.g. Humpherys, 1992). She is also constructed as obsessive 
in her desire to form an emotional attachment and develop a committed 
relationship with this man. Her positioning of ‘active’ ‘pursuer’ is problematised 
through the construction of her behaviour as unstable, irrational and vengeful (e.g. 
Humpherys, 1992).  
In Kate’s account, the term ‘bunny boiler” is used to describe lesbian women 
initiators of unwanted sexual attention. The have/hold discourse is drawn on to 
(re)produce a distinction between the active lesbian initiator and masculinised 
active sexual initiation. More specifically, masculinised forms of sexual behaviour 
are constituted within the male sex drive discourse where the aim of sexual 
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attention is primarily about securing sexual activity and this might involve 
approaching “ten girls in one night”. In contrast, lesbian women initiators become 
located within the have/hold discourse and are positioned as active pursuers of 
emotional reciprocation and of committed relationships. This can be seen in 
Kate’s description of women as “desperate” for emotional reciprocation of their 
“love” from the recipient. Thus, notions of emotion and emotional connection 
become located as a feminine preserve which works to (re)produce gendered 
positionings within heterosex – it is women who seek love and men that seek sex. 
The positioning of women as agents within sexual relationships is further 
problematised and undermined through a ‘mental illness’ discourse which 
positions this need/want for relationship commitment as extreme and pathological. 
This can be seen in the use of the term ‘bunny boiler’ and the description of active 
attempts to secure a relationship as a ‘fixation’.  
The interweaving of notions of ‘extreme’ emotionality and ‘deviant feminine 
sexuality’ can further be seen in Philip’s account where he discusses his own 
experiences of unwanted sexual attention within a professional context. More 
specifically, Philip works as a carer and describes receiving unwanted attention 
from a client: 
P:  From my own, from my own experiences of that, particularly 
here in this job, ah, I've had um more than one situation one 
but one in particular where a young lady was, ah, she came on 
more than strongly, um and she obviously wanted sexual 
favours from myself and um it wasn't embarrassing in that 
sense but it was um (.) it was um, I was very concerned about 
it because of the ah problems I could have got into and um, it 
was of a particular concern to myself because of the way she 
went about it and it was obvious that, you know, the whole 
thing was planned.  
L: Um 
P: Ah, as I say it was a concern and obviously I reported the 
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overall situation to, not only to my manager but also to a 
counsellor that this young lady had from a previous 
organisation. 
L: Yeah 
P: You know, I flagged it up to them, um, and it was again it was 
obvious that this particular female was after she, she was it 
was more attention seeking than anything 
The woman initiator is positioned as a specific ‘type’ of woman – a ‘young lady’. 
The use of this formulation is interesting here because of its location with the 
gendered dichotomy of lady/whore. In this context, the description of ‘young 
lady’ works to desexualise her sexual behaviour. The desexualisation of the 
woman’s behaviour can be seen further in the use of the rather bland non-
sexualised description of events as ‘the overall situation’ and in the framing of her 
actions as ‘attention seeking’.  
This construction of the women initiator’s actions resonates with particular 
aspects of DSM IV classifications of histrionic (formerly hysterical) personality 
disorder of which it is said that women are more likely to suffer (e.g. Kaplan, 
1983). This personality disorder is characterised by a “pattern of excessive 
emotionality and attention seeking” and manifests in interaction with others in 
“inappropriately sexual or provocative behaviour” (Hale and Yudofsky, 2003, p. 
819) Characterisations of histrionic personality are interwoven with 
understandings of normative femininity (e.g. Kaplan, 1983). As Smith-Rosenberg 
(1972) points out, “for centuries hysteria has been seen as the embodiment of a 
perverse or hyper femininity” (p. 653). According to Wirth-Cauchon (2001), 
‘deviant’ feminine sexuality in which women take up active positionings or 
transgress particular social norms in relation to sex have been explained in terms 
of hysteria and its associated extreme emotionality. In Philip’s account, 
descriptions of the ‘young lady’s’ sexual behaviour is similarly constituted as 
emotional neediness which is invoked by the use of the term ‘attention seeking’. 
Thus the woman initiator’s positioning as an active subject is mitigated by 
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constituting her behaviour as feminised – dependent and emotional. 
There is a sense in this particular extract that the woman’s behaviour is almost 
‘nice’. She is described as wanting ‘sexual favours’ in which there is a sense of 
reciprocity which can be contrasted to some representations of masculinised 
sexual violence where physical overpowerment, imposition and invasion of bodily 
spaces are often central (e.g. Gavey, 2005). The way in which reciprocity features 
in Philip’s account is elaborated in the following extract: 
L: So cos you mentioned sexual favours, could you say bit more 
about that?  
P: She wanted to go the whole hog, she wanted sex with me. 
L: She wanted a relationship as such? 
P: Yes, yep, and she wanted, if you like, she wanted, she was 
offering herself, her body er as a favour to me and she would 
do it because she was saying that she would be a good girl for 
me 
Here, the woman initiator is firmly embedded within normative notions of 
feminine sexuality. She is positioned as a commodity for exchange in that her 
wants and needs are contingent on meeting Philip’s sexual desires. She is located 
as an object of male sexual desire which is emphasised by the noticeable absence 
of descriptions of her own sexual needs. In this sexual relation she appears to have 
limited power – she is only active in the sense that she can ‘offer herself’ (e.g. 
Gavey, 2005). The constraints around the actions she can take are further 
emphasised by the description of her as a ‘good girl’ which positions her as 
passive, compliant and infantilised which draws attention to her limited power in 
relation to Philip in this context. These particular femininised positionings serve 
to construct the woman initiator as non-threatening and undermines her position 
as an ‘active’ initiator of sexual relations. This can be further seen in Philip’s 
discussion of why the woman initiator was behaving ‘provocatively’ towards him: 
P: I think the strain she was under at the time of this, I think it 
was er self-induced if you like. Cos er she was trying to play two 
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residents off one against the other, um, and I think she was 
trying to um force an issue with one in particular as to how 
their relationship would develop. Um, at that particular time 
he was just, um from all accounts, was just um enjoying 
himself and um 
L: With her? 
P: With her yeah and he didn't put any great store in the 
relationship that they had. She wanted a lot more from him 
and so, you know, because of that she was under a lot of strain 
and I think quite apart from you know the attention aspect with 
myself I think she wanted also to use me as a, as a extra tool 
against this the one guy that she really fancied 
Again, the ‘have/hold’ relationship discourse is drawn on to construct the woman 
initiator’s desire as primarily for a committed relationship. For the woman 
initiator, sex in and of itself is not the ultimate aim of her interactions with these 
men. Rather, she is constructed as wanting “more” from one man, wanting this 
particular relationship to “develop”. Her sexual behaviour is thus constructed as a 
means to an end – the end being a committed relationship. In contrast, 
constructions of the man with whom she wishes to have a committed relationship 
draws on aspects of the ‘male sex drive’ discourse in which men are positioned as 
simply wanting sex. Sex is not tied to relational and/or emotional investment and 
is pleasurable in and of itself. The woman initiator is also located in what I will 
call the ‘feminine wiles’ discourse, in which she is positioned as needing to ‘bait 
her man’ and does this by using her sexuality to position herself as sexually 
desirable to other men. 
Within these discourses the woman initiator is complexly positioned as 
active/passive. For example, she is located as a passive object of male sexual 
interest in the male sex drive discourse but also as an active pursuer of a 
committed relationship (have/hold discourse) and active social engineer within the 
feminine wiles discourse. However, despite these positionings, her role as ‘active 
initiator or pursuer’ is constructed as unsuccessful in a number of ways – the man 
  240 
with whom she wants to have a committed relationship sees her as nothing more 
than a sexual object. Her “planned” attempts of attracting sexual interest from 
Philip are unwanted and rejected on three occasions, as he says: 
P: “she didn't get the message the first one she didn't get it on the 
second one when I stated that you know that if it continued I 
would have no alternative but to give her a warning and on the 
third occasion um you know as I say I I then reported it to a a 
further counsellor”.  
Thus, in this extract and previous ones outlined above, there is a sense of the 
woman initiator as desperate and clumsy in her advances which serve to 
undermine her position as ‘active pursuer’. 
Interestingly, in Philip’s account he does not position himself as a ‘victim’ of 
unwanted sexual attention. As mentioned above, he explicitly states that “it wasn’t 
embarrassing in that sense” and there is a lack of emotive terms to describe his 
feelings towards his interactions with the women initiator. This woman’s sexual 
behaviour is only constituted as a problem in terms of the implications it might 
have for his professional identity, as he says “I was very concerned about it 
because of the ah problems I could have got into”. It appears that in Philip’s 
account, actual unwanted sexual attention from the woman initiator, in and of 
itself, is not a threat and does not constitute him as a ‘proper’ victim. What is, 
however, a problem is the danger of being falsely accused, as he explicitly states: 
P: Where a female's concerned, it's always, again dependent on 
rota and whatever, I try to make it with another female 
member of staff. 
L: Why is that? Why? 
P: Why what 
L: Why um, why with another female member of staff is that? 
P: Well because of safeguard, because I suppose there's always 
the danger they could ah, you know, try and turn the situation 
and possibly they could say, you know ,I've molested them or or 
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whatever. So, you know, as I say I try to be on guard all the 
time and try and safeguard myself” 
As potentially accused, Philip is positioned not only as a possible victim of 
women’s lies but also as a possible sexual threat simply through being a man. 
This positioning of Philip coupled with constructions of other men in the above 
extracts work to reinforce particular representations of masculinised sexuality and 
sexual violence in that men are implicitly or explicitly depicted as wanting sex 
and that there is always the possibility that they might take it by force. The ways 
in which the woman initiator is variously constructed throughout this account 
draw on representations of feminised sexuality: women are not a ‘real’ sexual 
threat; women want relationship commitment rather than sex per se and they are 
passive objects of male sexual desire. Taken together, these various discourses 
work to consolidate women as ‘proper’ or ‘true’ victims of sexual violence and 
men as ‘true’ sexual aggressors. 
9.5 Not ‘Real’ Women/ Not ‘Real’ Men 
The positions of women as initiators and men as recipients were undermined by 
constructions of them as falling short of the heterosexual norms for masculinity 
and femininity. This can be seen in Mike’s account of unwanted sexual attention. 
Mike begins his discussion of this issue by positioning both men and women as 
equally capable of giving unwanted sexual attention to the opposite gender: 
M: um it could be one sex picking on another sex I mean whether 
it be a group of men picking on a single female or a group of 
females or the other way around 
L: yeah 
M: I do think it does happen both ways  
Here, Mike uses the phrase “picking on” to describe a particular set of gendered 
power relations. The use of this particular phrase draws attention to the power 
positions in play, that is, an individual or individuals exerting dominance over 
others. Through this unwanted sexual attention is constituted as about power 
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rather than sex per se. Interestingly, both men and women are positioned as 
having equal access to this power in that both men and women are constructed as 
able to dominate members of the opposite sex. The assumption of equality in this 
account is not unlike versions of gender equity informed by liberal perspectives in 
which men and women are positioned as equals (e.g. Samuels, 2004; see also 
Chapter 4 for a full discussion). To demonstrate this, Mike provides the following 
example: 
M:  I've had examples of um, young, sort of, males, young males 
um being intimidated by a group of older women. 
L: Oh right 
M: Um, you know, talking about um sex and stuff, him in 
particular and yes it did make him feel very uncomfortable 
L: You also mentioned mental and physical 
M: Yes 
L: could you think of any examples of that? 
M: Um, well, mental, going back to that last one, the mental, was 
that this kid didn't want to go in to work at the end of it 
because he was he was so, he felt so intimidated by it  
The male recipient is positioned as victimised through the positioning of him as 
the focus of ‘sex talk’. However, the constitution of the male recipient as ‘victim’ 
of unwanted sexual attention does not in and of itself present a challenge to the 
dominant idea of women as ‘proper’ victims and men as ‘sexual aggressors’. This 
is accomplished through the description of the male recipient as ‘young’ and as a 
‘kid’. The infantalisation of the male recipient works not only to draw attention to 
his vulnerability as a victim but also serves to position him as not fully masculine 
– he is not a fully grown man. As with the constructions identified in the previous 
two sections, a victimisation discourse appears to be in operation through 
reference to both the recipient’s vulnerability as “kid” and feelings of 
intimidation. However, discourses of victimisation are not explicitly drawn on 
since he is not described as ‘victim’. The representation of the recipient as not 
fully masculine and the absence of an overt victim identity here work to 
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(re)produce the notion of masculinity as resistant to victimisation (Epstein, 1997; 
Lee, 2000). 
Just as the above construction of the male recipient does not represent a challenge 
to conventional heterosexual power relations in which men actively dominate the 
passive women, in Gillian’s account the woman initiator is constructed as falling 
short of normative femininity: 
G: ... Older women going around chasing men, I mean, possibly 
they have too much testosterone, because we all have 
testosterone too and particularly when you get to a certain age 
your hormones start going berserk ... because your female 
hormones become less, testosterone levels in comparison are 
higher ... there was this friend that I worked [with] ... in his 
twenties, he got chased round the desk when he stayed, when 
he was the one person that stayed late at work this one night 
and he got chased round the desk by the cleaner ... who must 
have been 55 plus ... she wanted sex with him on the desk sort 
of thing apparently, I mean he may have exaggerated it to 
make it a funny story ... but he did swear blind that, you know, 
he dodging round the desk to escape this woman [laugh] 
The construction of the woman initiator is firmly embedded in biological 
discourses. More specifically, women who take an active role in sex are 
constructed as menopausal. Dillaway (2005) argues that the menopause is 
characterised in bio-medical discourses as a dysfunctional state. Indeed, female 
biology such as menstruation and the menopause have been constructed in 
dominant discourses as producing psychological deficiency in women, making 
them behave in irrational and negative ways (e.g. Nicolson, 1995). This 
construction of the menopause resonates with Gillian’s account, in that women are 
depicted as irrational as implied by the descriptions of their hormones “going 
berserk”.  
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Menopausal women have also been represented as falling short of being ‘real’ 
women because femininity is dominantly constructed as synonymous with the 
ability to bear children (e.g. Ussher, 1989). In Gillian’s description, menopausal 
women are constructed as increasingly masculinised which is accomplished 
through reference to the dominance of the ‘male’ hormone relative to “female 
hormones” in these women. This construction serves to distance ‘real’ feminised 
women from the position of initiator of sex which in turn undermines women’s 
position as active sexual beings. In addition to this, the construction of this 
behaviour as irrational undermines women’s desire for sex and their ability to be 
sexual initiators of unwanted sexual attention. 
What further undermines the notion of women as active sexual subjects is the 
construction of the “cleaner” as desperate and clumsy in her sexual advances. This 
is depicted in the description of her chasing him round the desk and the male 
recipient as “dodging to escape this woman”. Her desperation makes her seem 
ridiculous in this account and the absurdity of her behaviour is compounded 
through the construction of her as old. As Fullmer, Shenk and Eastland (1999) 
point out, older women are seen as both asexual and sexually unattractive. Thus, 
her status as old makes her sexually undesirable and her active attempts to pursue 
sex as an aberration as well as hopeless. This image of the woman initiator as 
ridiculous makes it impossible for the recipient to take her unwanted sexual 
attention seriously as he is described as recounting it as a “funny story”. This 
serves to construct the recipient as not a ‘true victim’ of unwanted sexual attention 
and the woman initiator as not a true perpetrator because she is seen as laughable 
rather than as a ‘real’ threat. 
The construction of male recipients as not ‘real’ men and women initiators as not 
‘real women is further highlighted in Chloe’s account. Here, men who are 
victimised by women are portrayed as falling short of normative masculinity and 
women initiators as falling outside normative femininity: 
L: Can it happen the other way around? 
C: Yeah, I mean I guess, it's not documented so much as it but you 
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do hear stories of it and I'm sure there are women that 
probably do it to men. I mean just as you get men who are the 
aggressor, I'm sure women are the aggressor and I'm sure 
there are, there are quite a few weak not weak, kind of weakish 
kind of men out there who do, you know.  
L: Yeah 
C: Get preyed upon and will go oh, yeah, ok, and don't know 
what's happening to them and stuff like that cos we are 
growing, women are becoming more assertive and knowing 
what we want and so comes with that the bad things as being 
aggressive and, you know, dominant I guess, and wanting it 
really. So yeah, so I guess, I mean I, I've never seen any cases, 
you know, heard of any particular cases what you hear are 
sort of men against women but, you know, I guess I'm sure 
there is so I've read so in magazines [laugh] 
L: [laugh] 
Here, the notion that men are not victims of unwanted sexual attention is deflected 
by the use of the disclaimer “but you do hear stories of it”. However, this claim is 
then undermined by the claim that Chloe has not come across actual cases of it 
which is emphasised by the use of extreme case formulations such as “never seen 
any cases or you know heard of any particular cases”. What is implied in this 
account is that cases of female initiators and male recipients have not been 
reported through legitimate sources; what she describes are “stories” reported in 
“magazines”. Through the construction of the absence of legitimate sources 
documenting men as recipients and women as initiators, the notion of men as 
victims of women’s sexual attention is turned in to fiction. 
9.6 Woman as Victims? 
As Barter (2006) notes, the construction of women recipients of sexual violence 
as evidencing either feminine passive or unfeminine active sexual behaviour has 
been taken as an indicator of the degree to which women are culpable for their 
own victimisation. More specifically, Richardson and May (1999), argue that 
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women recipients of gendered violence become constructed as ‘innocent’ victims 
and ‘undeserving’ victims. Representations of the innocent victim include women 
who subscribe to traditional feminine behaviours and who modify their own 
behaviour to protect themselves from male sexual violence. Undeserving women 
victims, in contrast, behave in a sexually provocative manner towards men and 
thus make themselves vulnerable to sexual assault by failing to modify their 
behaviour. In the following section, I will explore the ways in which women’s 
victimisation becomes interwoven with representations of femininity and 
deviations from it with a view to exploring how notions of accountability and 
blame circulate in and through these representations. 
9.7 Unruly women? 
According to Gavey (2005), up until the latter part of the twentieth century, rape 
was predominantly viewed as ‘seduction’ and women who were ‘really’ raped 
were understood as morally dubious. Gavey (2005) argues that these notions of 
rape were underpinned by particular, often contradictory, ideas about feminine 
sexuality. More specifically, Gavey (2005) suggests that “while women were 
portrayed as sexually passive in relation to men, they were also imbued with a 
dangerous lurking sexuality that could be invoked in all sorts of ways to explain 
and justify rape” (p. 19). This potentially active, ‘dangerous’ sexuality becomes 
interwoven in dominant versions of female ‘provocation’ of male sexual violence 
which serve to minimise male responsibility for violence (see also Chapter 2). 
Similar representations of female ‘provocation’ were presented in some 
participant accounts of unwanted sexual attention. This can be seen in Chloe’s 
account where she discusses the ways in which particular clothing choices made 
by women can be read as inviting unwanted sexual attention: 
C: I also think that sometimes, just the kind of way that you look 
and the kind of things that you might wear, tight huggy clothes 
or might wear and I know that yeah, you know, in this day 
where you should be able to wear exactly what you want but at 
the end of the day if you, if you dress like a tramp or you dress 
like a a tart, people are going to think that you are one and 
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there is it is a society role model and people are going to think 
she's dressing like that so she's slutty 
L: yeah 
C: and it's, you know, so she must be easy so we must be able to 
give her something, you know what I mean so they give you 
that unwanted sexual attention which you don't really want. I 
mean in nowadays people in magazines, there's all these 
women half naked, half this and that's why they sell ... 
obviously we're playing straight into the man's hands, we're 
giving it, you know, and you know, if you wore that I, I respect 
at the end of the day yes you've still got your mind and your 
body and everything like that and I might wear it and I 
wouldn't expect it but you are going to get it 
Webbed through the above excerpt is the notion that active feminine sexuality is 
problematic as can be seen in the derogatory expressions used to describe it such 
as “tramp”, “tart” and “slut”. Within this construction, the so called “easy” 
woman is agentic in the sense that she can chose to seek sexual attention but her 
positioning as an active agent is constrained in that she becomes located as a 
sexual object for men. There is a sense here that once a woman is positioned as 
“easy” she becomes sexually available to all men and that men’s (unwanted) 
sexual behaviour towards her is permissible. The pejorative descriptions of active 
feminine sexuality here reinscribe the lady-whore dichotomy mentioned earlier 
with passive feminine sexuality being implicitly constituted as uninviting of 
unwanted sexual attention because the passive women does not actively seek out 
sexualised responses from men. 
Importantly, women’s clothing is constructed as an indicator of the location of 
women as “easy” and is seen as provocative of men’s unwanted sexual behaviour. 
In Chloe’s account, the notion that revealing clothes is synonymous with being a 
“tramp”, “tart” or “slut” is common knowledge as implied by the construction of 
“people” thinking it. Since this is common knowledge, women are positioned as 
choosing to sexually objectify themselves and, as such, they should know that 
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they are “going to get” sexual attention. Thus, it is women’s choices – women’s 
behaviours – which provoke unwanted sexual attention. In addition to this, 
women are constructed as being complicit in men’s sexual objectification of them 
at a broader societal level which can be seen in the presentation of women in 
magazines as “half naked” and is described as “playing straight in to the man’s 
hands”. Women are thus at least partially accountable for their objectification and 
sexual victimisation.  
Within Chloe’s account, the point is made that it is not simply clothing preference 
which give rise to unwanted sexual attention. More specifically, Chloe describes 
the ways in which particular expressions of active feminine sexuality open up 
possibilities for non-consensual sexual activity in heterosexual encounters: 
C:  There's such a fine line between giving consent ... the thing 
with giving consent, you know, one minute you're like yeah 
yeah yeah and the next minute, you know, no, but then you've 
got the you've got the, depends on the situation I guess, but 
there is, you know, there's particular behaviours of like if 
you're rubbing yourself up against a guy and you're wanting 
you know and then you think no, then you know poor guy 
you've led him on completely and guys are ruled by what's in 
between their pants that's it  
L: [laugh] 
C: and, you know, when it but if you’re not doing anything say 
like a guy just follows you home and you're you know then, you 
know, it's more severe than say your actually giving it giving 
him everything and being a bit of a cocktease, you know what I 
mean  
Women’s sexuality is portrayed as changeable and capricious which makes the 
consent rule a somewhat arbitrary yardstick with which to judge whether activities 
were ‘just’ sex or violence. Men’s sexuality on the other hand is constructed 
through the male sex drive discourse as a barely controllable ‘urge’. It is implied 
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that men might have difficulty stopping their sexual response once started because 
“guys are ruled by what’s in between their pants”. Implied in this account is that 
the unpredictability of feminine sexuality is dangerous for men. Women’s consent 
to sex is depicted as unreliable and this coupled with the construction of the 
difficulties men experience controlling sexual urges once aroused (re)positions 
male initiators of rape as victims of feminine whims. 
The unpredictability of active feminine sexuality is constructed as worthy of insult 
as can be seen from the use of the derogatory expression “cocktease”. Here, the 
word “cocktease” highlights women’s role in provoking unwanted sexual 
attention from men. More specifically, it draws attention to the ways in which 
women’s sexual behaviour can be read as implicit consent when they give “him 
everything”. However, central to the use of the word “cocktease” here is that 
implicit consent is later withdrawn. Thus, women positioned as provoking men’s 
uncontrollable sexuality through engaging in unpredictable sexual behaviour 
become located within notions of accountability and become more blameable for 
experiences of unwanted sexual attention. In contrast, women positioned as 
passive rather than active, women that can described as “not doing anything” 
become positioned as unaccountable, less blameworthy, and their experiences of 
unwanted sexual attention located as “more severe” because they did not 
‘provoke’ men’s sexual behaviour. Notions of female provocation and 
accountability were also drawn on in Haley’s account during a discussion of why 
men give unwanted sexual attention to women: 
H: I think you would have to be leading someone on to make them 
want to push you and get that idea in their head ... if you’re 
giving them attention and you’re flirting with them and your 
putting ideas in their head then, but you’re not interested at all 
then ... that could really frustrate them, make them angry and 
that’s when I’ve only heard like in papers and from talking to 
people then that’s when people do turn and get really vicious 
and aggressive 
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Here, “attention” and “flirting” are constructed as indicators of sexual interest, as 
markers for the likelihood of sexual activity occurring and of implied consent. 
Women are positioned as contradictory – their behaviour does not match their 
intention because they are “flirting with them” but they are “not interested at all” 
in engaging in sexual activity with the man in question. The act of flirting is 
constructed as setting up men’s expectations for subsequent sexual activity. 
Importantly, it is women who put “ideas in their head” which positions them as at 
least partially accountable and blameable as they play an active part in setting up 
the possibilities for the manifestation of unwanted sexual attention. More 
specifically, women’s active sexuality coupled with contradictory positions taken 
up by women in this context is depicted as provoking men’s aggressive sexual 
behaviour. Men, when provoked, are portrayed as a threat to women; they become 
“angry”, they might “turn and get really vicious and aggressive”. However, in this 
account, men are constructed both as passive in the sense that they respond to 
women’s active sexual behaviour and as active in the sense they may force sexual 
attention when implicit consent is withdrawn. Thus men are complexly positioned 
as both sexual aggressors and victims of active, contradictory feminine sexuality. 
In this way, women’s active, contradictory sexuality is (re)produced as dangerous 
for both the initiator and recipient. By “leading someone on”, women run the risk 
of provoking men’s sexual aggression which implies that the recipient plays an 
active part not only in their own victimisation but also in positioning men as 
perpetrators of sexual violence.  
As mentioned above, women positioned within what I will call the ‘contradictory 
sexuality discourse’ are depicted as at least partially culpable for their experiences 
of unwanted sexual attention. This can be seen in further Haley’s account:  
H: I think sometimes you do get girls who are stupid and do lead 
guys on and give them the wrong idea, and, you know, an 
sometimes do even offer it and when it comes to it they say no. 
So I think you can get some girls who have been stupid like 
that um 
L: yeah 
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H: and I don’t think they should you know imply it or give off the 
impression that they want it if they don’t want it, um, cos I 
think they’ve then got themselves in a position with, like 
you’ve made your bed your gonna have to lie in it 
As with the above excerpts from Haley and Chloe’s account, women located in 
the contradictory sexuality discourse provoke unwanted sexual attention from 
men by implicitly or explicitly giving consent to sexual activity. In this account, 
setting up such expectations within heterosexual encounters is constituted as 
risky; in engaging in contradictory sexual behaviour, women are “putting 
themselves in a position” where the occurrence of sexual activity has been 
implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. It appears that once such agreement has been 
made it is not easily reneged upon. Thus, by engaging in contradictory behaviour, 
women appear to give up rights to withdraw consent and can be positioned as 
“stupid” for engaging in risky behaviour. What appears to underpin the 
construction of women’s sexual activity is the agreement made with men. The 
giving or withholding of consent becomes constituted not in relation to the 
presence or absence of women’s desire to have sex but in relation to whether an 
implicit or explicit agreement has been made with a man.  
The construction of women ‘provoking’ unwanted sexual attention renders them 
accountable and blameable for expression of men’s unwanted sexual attention. 
Here, there is a sense that the ‘accountable’ woman is less deserving of sympathy. 
Instead, women are described here as having “made their bed, your gonna have to 
lie in it”. Since women are constructed as “putting themselves in a position” 
where men expect sex, they are positioned as having to expect and deal with 
possible negative repercussions of their contradictory sexual behaviour. The 
portrayal of women located in the contradictory sexuality discourse as less 
deserving of sympathy is stated more explicitly in Chloe’s account below:  
C: people who cry rape, like cry wolf and it didn't really happen 
then I, I don't have the least bit if sympathy for them and 
people who say consented to, not consented, but have 
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consensual sex and then say oh I didn't consent to sex, I don't 
feel sorry for either cos I think at the end of the day you 
consented at the first place and you've screwed the guys head 
up, and you, you know what I mean, like you're not playing 
fair game here kind of thing um but people who have been 
raped I do feel incredibly sorry for and I think, you know, I 
wouldn't wish that on anybody cos it's a violation 
Here, women located in the contradictory sexuality discourse are described as not 
deserving of sympathy because they are “not playing fair game”. As mentioned 
above, these women are constructed as setting up an implicit or explicit agreement 
with a man to engage in sexual activity and by reneging on this agreement they 
are positioned as not being “fair”. Thus, by provoking unwanted sexual attention, 
these women are positioned as accountable and at least partially blameable for 
their victimisation. Interestingly, these women are distinguished from people 
“who have been raped”. Implicit in this construction is that the unwanted sexual 
experiences of women located in the contradictory sexuality discourse falls short 
of ‘real’ rape. Thus, these women are positioned as not ‘true’ or ‘proper’ victims 
of unwanted sexual attention. It seems that for a woman to be positioned as a 
‘true’ or ‘proper’ victim of ‘real’ rape they must avoid displaying active and 
contradictory forms of sexuality prior to the manifestation of unwanted sexual 
attention. 
Alongside women located in the contradictory sexuality discourse, individuals 
who make false claims about experiences of unwanted sexual attention are 
similarly constructed as problematic. This can be seen in the following excerpt 
from Chloe’s account where we discuss the reasons why people might “cry wolf”: 
L: why do you think people cry wolf? 
C: because I think sometimes like, cases like Mike Tyson when he 
raped that woman. He didn't actually rape her and she says oh 
yeah I was raped and all that kind of stuff, and I think I, you 
know, I mean certain TV programmes they always say it I 
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think some women do it after they done it with a guy and go oh 
yeah but they didn't consent and I think you know sometimes 
it's like either out of guilt, or either out of, they've got they've 
got a husband or they've something, something that's triggered 
it and I think at the end of the day they've they've cried wolf 
they've kind of, you know, they've said oh I was raped, I was 
raped but they weren't  
L: yeah 
C: so in the end you know they've looked like I dunno the word 
they've looked like a a dick I guess whatever you know what I 
mean... they look like somebody who hasn't, you know, who 
something and no-one's gonna believe them again, you know, 
if they go out in exactly the same or a similar thing and they've 
actually got raped and it's yeah but I got raped yeah but you 
got raped before and then it turned out to be ... a crock of shit  
L: yeah 
C: at the end of the day you've blown your chances I think and ... 
you've ruined it for other people who were raped 
In this construction of women that “cry wolf”, rape is used by women to deflect 
blame for ‘bad’ behaviour such as adultery. The reference to guilt in this extract 
resonates with Weihofen’s (1959) claim that women may experience guilt after 
consensual activity and may re-label the act as rape partially because women 
consciously or unconsciously want their partner to be aggressive and dominant 
during sex and also because the label of ‘rape’ allows women to avoid derogatory 
comments about her ‘active’ sexual behaviour. As Gavey (2005) points out, 
underlying such constructions of women’s rape accusations is an image of 
women’s sexuality as active but constrained by social norms of passive feminine 
sexuality. In this extract, this kind of sexuality is dangerous to men because 
women will need to ‘blame’ them for sex to appear to be in line with required 
norms of femininity. The danger of this kind of femininity is emphasised by the 
suggestion that deflecting blame through ‘lies’ is not only dangerous for men but 
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also for ‘real’ victims of rape. 
9.8 Summary 
The gendered dynamic between initiators and recipients presented here appears to 
reflect and reinforce heterosexist positionings of the feminine as passive and the 
masculine as active. Importantly, discourses of victimisation often appear to work 
implicitly in the constructions identified above. As discussed above, victimisation 
discourses position sexually violent acts as non-normative and the absence of 
overt reference to victim identities works to locate unwanted sexual attention as 
more normalised. However, the implicit circulation of victim/perpetrator 
positionings in these constructions normalise men as the only ‘true’ sexual 
aggressor and women as the only ‘true’ victim. However, to constitute a ‘true’ 
victim, women must conform to normative notions around passive feminine 
sexualities. 
As noted in Chapter 1, predominant association of both femininity and victimhood 
with passivity functions to reinforce images of women victims as powerless. As 
can be seen in the above constructions, this serves to constrain articulation of 
agentic sexual subjectivities for women as well as possibilities for resistance 
against sexual harassment. Similarly, the representation of masculine sexuality as 
always-already active leaves little room for men to withhold consent or 
acknowledge personal victimisation.  
In the next chapter, I draw together arguments made across this thesis. In doing 
so, I attempt to articulate possible spaces in which the heterosexualisation of 
victim-perpetrator positionings within constructions of unwanted sexual attention 
could be destabilised. As argued in Chapter 1, the positioning of feminine 
sexualities as passive in relation to active masculine sexualities (re)produces a set 
of power relations which contribute to the perpetuation of sexual harassment (see 
also Lee, 2000; Gavey, 2005). The purpose of this examination is to explore how 
the expression of active femininised and passive masculinised positionings may 
contribute to the unsettling of the conditions which give rise to sexual harassment. 
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Chapter 10: Joe’s Story 
10.1 Overview 
In drawing together the main arguments made in this thesis, I would like to begin 
by recounting a story which in some ways embodies the core preoccupations 
which faced me as I worked with and framed this thesis. During the time I was 
writing my initial proposal for this project, an acquaintance – “Joe” – described 
the difficulties he was having in managing his friend “Sarah’s” sexual advances 
towards him. He felt that Sarah’s behaviour had for some time crossed the line 
from friendliness to more overt flirtation but the subtlety of her sexualised 
behaviour towards him made it hard for him to find a way to communicate the 
unwantedness of her actions. On one occasion, Sarah stayed overnight at Joe’s 
house. He made up a bed for her in the living room after which he went to his own 
bedroom to sleep. During the night Joe awoke to find Sarah performing a sex act 
on him. What struck me about Joe’s story was his ambivalence in relation to his 
experience. On the one hand, he was upset by it, seeing it as intrusive and abusive,  
but on the other hand, he also seemed aware that this would be framed socially as 
something that men ‘should’ like, that a man would be ‘lucky’ to have a woman 
do this to them. There was a sense that the feeling/being abused and being a man 
were incommensurable for Joe, making it difficult for him to find a label for his 
experience. 
This story highlights how multiple issues impact and complexify the process of 
drawing boundaries around and distinguishing between ‘normal’ experiences and 
gendered/sexualised violence. As Joe’s story illustrates, the multiple ways in 
which gendered/sexualised experiences can become constituted open up as well as 
preclude particular positionings for those involved. This aspect of Joe’s 
description of his experience resonates with the broad concerns of this project. 
More specifically, I have explored how a diversity of issues become relevant, 
included and excluded in the constitution and (re)production of phenomena as 
sexual harassment with a view to unpacking the implications that particular 
versions of sexual harassment have for recipients and initiators. Central to this 
exploration has been the predominant conceptualisation of the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ as integral to victim resistance against manifestations of 
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gendered/sexualised power relations. I have not only attempted to explore various 
constructions of what sexual harassment is and what it is not in terms of how they 
may enable or disable challenges to be made against problematic power relations 
but also I have interrogated the predominant assumption around the positioning of 
sexual harassment as crucial for resistance to take place. More specifically, this 
project has examined how representations of sexual harassment as a strategy for 
resistance often work to privilege it over other means of problematising 
behaviour.  
This thesis considered a series of questions raised by the privileging of sexual 
harassment as a tool for resistance which included: what versions of sexual 
harassment constitute a crucial challenge to power relations? What forms of 
resistance are made possible by particular versions of harassment? In what ways 
do strategies other than sexual harassment enable or constrain challenges to be 
made? How are recipient-initiator relations framed and constituted by versions of 
sexual harassment and strategies of resistance to it? What are the implications of 
problematising and/or subordinating strategies other than sexual harassment for 
recipients who have drawn on them to make sense of experiences? 
Central to addressing these questions has been the analysis of the operation of 
normalised notions of gender in sexual harassment discourses. A key argument 
running through this project has been concerned with how the gendering of 
various aspects of the construct of sexual harassment can work to (re)produce, 
naturalise and stabilise dichotomous, gendered versions of femininities and 
masculinities. I have attempted to explicate the ways in which the constitution of 
the feminine (as for example, powerless, passive, caring, emotional) and the 
masculine (as for example, powerful, active, aggressive, rational) within 
constructions related to the above broad issues can work in various ways to 
(re)produce normative gendered power relations in which the feminine is 
positioned as subordinate to the masculine. This in turn has implications for the 
construction of sexual harassment itself, in the sense that normative gender 
assumptions frame the constitution of recipient and initiators as feminised and 
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masculine respectively. 
Throughout this project, I have attempted to draw attention to the ways in which 
these power differentials operating in the construction of gender binaries not only 
open up possibilities for the manifestation of sexual harassment but also become 
intertwined and (re)produced in a myriad of ways in conceptualisations of the 
construct of sexual harassment as a tool for resistance against gendered/sexualised 
power. To contextualise these points, I seek to trace a path through the main 
arguments made in the preceding chapters with a view to highlighting key 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications of this thesis. In doing so, I 
will reflexively consider and make explicit how my own gendered assumptions 
about sex, sexuality and sexual harassment not only framed the processes of 
knowledge production undertaken in this thesis but also how particular stories,  
like Joe’s, impacted and shaped my ideas.  
10.2 Politicising Gendered Experiences: Examining the Problem of 
Resistance 
What has been of central concern to my examination of sexual harassment as a 
mechanism for resistance is the predominant framing of it within academic, policy 
and popular discourses as a political strategy developed by and for women – it “is 
a word invented as part of women’s renaming of the world, reflecting and 
constructing women’s experiences and labelling a form of behaviour newly 
recognised as something which women need not passively endure but can actively 
protest against and resist” (Kitzinger and Thomas, 1995: p. 32). As Brewis and 
Linstead (2001) note in relation to research on this issue, “although many 
commentators do make the effort to state that harassment is not something which 
exclusively happens to women, to acknowledge that harassers and recipients can 
be of either gender, it would be inaccurate to say that ... [sexual harassment] 
discourse actually succeeds in producing harassment as a non-gendered 
phenomenon” (p. 84). Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that within such 
descriptions it is women who take centre stage, not only as victims but also as 
possible agents of resistance against male violence.  
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The feminisation of both victimisation and resistance in sexual harassment 
discourses was the primary focus of Chapter 2. Debates were highlighted which 
drew attention to how victim status can both function as a tool for resistance and 
work to stabilise problematic gendered power relations. For example, whilst 
victim status can work to undermine normalising constructions of masculinised 
sexual dominance and (re)positions such acts as violence, its connotations with 
weakness and powerlessness may also (re)produce normative versions of 
femininities as passive and masculinities as active. I argued that the (re)production 
of such gendered assumptions may contribute to the perpetuation of sexual 
violence. For example, normative gendered active/passive positionings may 
maintain the conditions under which extreme versions of gendered 
dominance/subordination are made possible (Gavey, 2005). 
Threaded through Chapter 2 was a discussion of how the importance accorded to 
victim status within conceptualisations of resistance has turned scholarly attention 
to (women) recipients who do not challenge experiences using the construct of 
sexual harassment. I argued that the focus on recipient non-labelling of 
experiences as ‘sexual harassment’ coupled with the notion of it as crucial to 
resistance has worked to dichotomise women recipients as either challenging or 
failing to resist manifestations of gendered/sexualised power. It was noted that the 
latter women were variously problematised within a body of work as, for 
example, normalising expressions of gendered power, ‘failing’ to understand the 
concept of sexual harassment and as needing assistance to recognise it. As Brewis 
and Linstead (2000) contend, “the female subject is constituted [within such 
academic and policy accounts] ... as helpless in the face of such attention ... there 
is a certain ‘hysterization’ of female sexuality, a construction of this sexuality as 
peculiarly, even pathologically vulnerable” (p. 89). I argued that not only do such 
constructions run the risk of reproducing women as fragile, powerless and 
vulnerable but also that the focus on women as ‘failing’ to perform resistance as 
prescribed in these accounts allows women recipients to be positioned as 
responsible and/or accountable for the continuation of sexual harassment. 
Important to note is that in the process of examining the above issues raised by 
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particular representations of non-labelling, I have not argued that experiences 
recounted as something other than sexual harassment are in some way 
unproblematic. Throughout this thesis, I recognise and have explored versions of 
gendered experiences that locate sexual harassment as, for example, normal 
and/or trivial work to maintain problematic relations of dominance/subordination. 
That said, I have expressed caution about homogenising the phenomenon of ‘non-
labelling’ as representative of some form of acceptance of gendered/sexualised 
power. In a similar vein, I have argued that conceptualising the deployment of the 
construct of sexual harassment as resistance may distract attention away from the 
ways in which versions of sexual harassment can work to stabilise and maintain 
particular relations of power that it seeks to counter. It is these complexities that I 
have attempted to express and work with in this thesis.  
In Chapter 3, the discussion moved to how sexual harassment as a tool for 
resistance may translate into practical challenges against problematic behaviour in 
the form of legal and policy regulation. Here, I explored how normative notions of 
masculinities and femininities become interwoven in resolution strategies and can 
work to both (re)produce gendered power relations and inhibit the uptake of legal 
and policy ‘solutions’. I began by unpacking constructions of gendered equality 
underpinning sexual discrimination laws. In early laws, it was noted that liberal 
conceptualisations of men and women as equal posited behaviours which could be 
directed at both men and women as gender-neutral and not sexually harassing. It 
was argued that such conceptualisations overly simplified gendered power 
relations and ignored how the impact of behaviours can have differential gendered 
consequences and implications for men and women.  
We also saw how the constitution of an experience as discrimination in both law 
and workplace policy (for example, the reasonable person test, ‘formal’ 
components of grievance procedures) draw on masculinised norms of 
‘appropriate’ conduct which has the potential to reproduce the prioritisation of 
idealised masculine identities over the feminised other. In relation to grievance 
processes, it was argued that masculinised bias operating in procedures may 
function to discourage women from using them. However, the adoption of 
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‘women-sensitive’ approaches (for example, the reasonable woman test, informal 
grievance policies) is predicated on notions of fundamental gender differences and 
as such reproduces the feminised other as fragile, powerless and in need of special 
protection. As with the preceding chapter, the point was made that the 
(re)production of the feminine in various ways as normatively subordinate to the 
masculine may work to make possible extreme versions of gendered 
dominance/subordination underpinning instantiations of sexual harassment. 
As I examined the issues raised in the literature around legal/formalised strategies 
of resistance, I considered instantiations of gendered/sexualised experiences of 
power which do not easily lend themselves to the enactment of formal procedures. 
This prompted me to ask the question of how recipients can tackle such behaviour 
when these grievance routes are not easily open to them. In both Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, I noted that women have been described as dealing with such 
behaviours in various ways such as avoiding initiators, ignoring behaviour and/or 
deflecting and/or (re)constituting power relations as, for example, humour. Such 
strategies are often positioned in the literature as falling short of resistance, as 
being complicit with behaviour, as normalising or at least ‘failing’ to draw 
attention to the serious of the problem. Whilst the contextualisation of some 
strategies in some instances may well be limited in the challenge that they offer to 
harassing behaviour, I would argue there is a tendency in some of these academic 
accounts to implicitly position the women that use these strategies as the problem. 
Importantly, within this literature there is not a clear sense of how other forms of 
resistance can be done in the absence of legal/formal remedy. In this thesis, I have 
attempted to move away from these implicit assumptions to ask questions about 
what kind of cultural understandings are in circulation about how sexual 
harassment should be dealt with. What are the implications of these constructions? 
What barriers are there to dealing with sexual harassment in the context of 
people’s lives? Whilst I make no claims to have devised a set of ‘fool-proof’ 
practical steps to deal with sexual harassment, I will, however, consider later on in 
this chapter how some of the analytical focuses of this thesis may point to areas 
which open up possibilities for action against sexual harassment other than formal 
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regulation. 
10.3 The Practical Production of this thesis  
In the preceding sections, I have discussed how instantiations of normative 
assumptions around femininity as other to masculinity are not only implicated by 
a body of work as central to the construction and maintenance of sexually 
harassing behaviour but often also become interwoven and (re)constituted in the 
research of it as a problem. This highlights the pervasiveness of and difficulties 
around negotiating problematic gendered discourses when producing knowledges 
around gender in general and sexual violence in particular. In the production of 
this thesis, I have reflectively engaged with how Othering processes, including 
those around gender and sexuality have variously impacted and shaped this thesis 
and considered how such processes can be disrupted. 
In Chapter 4, I considered how the broad theoretical, methodological and topic 
focus of this project (feminist, qualitative and ‘sensitive’) has occupied a 
marginal, Othered position within the broader institution of psychology. The 
Othering of non-mainstream work has not only worked to throw doubt on the 
legitimacy of such research but also to minimise practical research concerns that 
arise in marginal areas of study. As a case in point, I considered how the British 
Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines prioritise theoretical and 
methodological concerns of mainstream work which often do not capture the 
complexities of ethical issues arising in the aforementioned marginalised areas of 
research. To illustrate this point, I discussed debates highlighting the difficulties 
around negotiating power dynamics when researching participants variously 
positioned as Other to the researcher. To draw attention to the complexities of 
such power relations in this project, I described how I was located in Othered 
feminised positions when working with some male participants but also how I 
Othered LGBT participants by not engaging sufficiently with unequal power 
relations produced by my heterosexualised positioning. This chapter argues that 
there is no easy way to ‘solve’ unequal power relations when researching Others. 
Rather it is through continual reflective engagement with Othering processes that 
come into play during research that spaces for potential disruption of these 
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processes can be explored. 
Following on from the above reflexive consideration of Othering in the research 
processes, Chapter 5 elaborates on specific issues concerning marginality, 
Othering and Power during discussion of specific methodological stances and 
considerations taken up in this project. The first half of this chapter focused on the 
use of Q methodology in this thesis. In this description of Q methodology, I 
discuss its marginal position within both quantitative and qualitative research. I 
argue that its non-hypothetico-deductive position coupled with conceptualisations 
of it as generating narratives composed of manifold discourses align this 
methodology with qualitative research traditions. It is this conceptualisation of Q 
methodology that is drawn on in this thesis. I argued that Q methodology’s ability 
to move away from polarised understandings of an issue and to focus on more 
marginal as well as dominant cultural narratives make it particularly suited to 
address questions and concerns outlined earlier around boundary construction of 
how phenomena become constituted or precluded within constructions of sexual 
harassment as well as multiple constructions of sexual harassment policy. The 
practicalities of each Q study (Chapter 6 and Chapter 8) were outlined and 
explained.  
The second half of Chapter 5 outlined and justified the use of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis of interview data collected. I discuss the ways in which notions 
of disciplinary power, agency and resistance can be conceptualised within a 
Foucauldian discursive framework and how I have used these particular notions to 
unpack the productive effect of discourses and gendered/sexualised power –
resistance dynamics therein in relation to constructions of sexual harassment 
explored in interview data (Chapters 7 and Chapter 9). I then provided a 
description of procedural aspects employed in the collection of the interview data. 
During this discussion, I flagged up specific instantiations of power relations 
within the researcher-participant relationship. I highlighted the shifting nexus of 
power along a number of fault-lines including age, experience and occupational 
status and the ways in which these instances framed particular aspects of specific 
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research encounters.  
As noted at the beginning of this section, my purpose of building in this reflective 
commentary was to draw attention to how this project not only ‘speaks of’ 
problematic power relations but also becomes enmeshed in them.  I have sought to 
draw attention to both the difficulties around negotiating power relations in the 
production of this work and attempted to resist the (re)production of particular 
forms of power through sustaining politicised engagement in my analysis of these 
issues and reflection on them. 
10.4 Synopsis of Analytical Chapters 
In this thesis, four analytical chapters were presented. In this section, I will 
provide a synopsis of each chapter before moving on to consider the intersecting 
implications and applications of each set of analyses.  
The first of the analytical chapters presented in this project – Chapter 6 – used Q 
methodology to explore the ways in which a diversity of issues and considerations 
that may become relevant to constructions of behaviours as ‘sexual harassment’. 
In this study, 10 narratives were identified, all of which drew different boundaries 
around the issue of what does/does not count as sexual harassment. In relation to a 
body of work on labelling behaviour, I argued that the implicit polarisation of 
labelling/non-labelling behaviour in the literature does not capture the 
complexities of the ways in which the construct of sexual harassment is used in 
this cultural context. Indeed, in some of the narratives, problematisation of 
specific behaviours occurred in the absence of the term ‘sexual harassment’. 
Given this, Lee’s (2001) suggestion for extending the vocabulary of problematic 
gendered behaviour may well have some purchase in terms of providing recipients 
with the means to problematise behaviour in ways which resonate with their 
experiences of it (see also Chapter 1). As we saw above, the predominant 
problematisation of individuals, particularly women, who do not use the label, 
runs the risk of stigmatising recipients and possibly alienating them from support 
systems. Therefore an extension of the gendered violence vocabulary could 
represent an important step towards providing recipients with a means to make 
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sense of experiences in ways which fit in to the context of their lives. 
It is important to note that I am not idealising the narratives identified here. As 
noted in Chapter 6, some narratives could be read as problematic in terms of the 
gendered assumptions drawn on in these stories of sexual harassment. However, I 
have argued that it is equally important to subject the use of the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ to critical scrutiny as it is to explore the absence of the phrase in 
accounts. The implicit assumption of labelling as ‘good’ in some research 
discussed above can function to distract attention away from problematic 
gendered assumptions which may become interwoven in constructions of 
experiences as ‘sexual harassment’. 
The focus on boundary construction is continued in Chapter 7 with an exploration 
of how the public-private dichotomy is deployed to (re)produce sexual harassment 
as an impermissible infraction of the formal relations in the public sphere and as a 
permissible problem in private relationships. More specifically, constructions of 
the workplace as a formalised, hierarchically organised arena allow 
gendered/sexualised behaviour to be framed as an abuse of superior employment 
status and/or inappropriately ‘personalised’ behaviour. However the construction 
of the workplace as an increasingly personalised sphere (re)produced sexual 
harassment as a ‘permissible problem’, that is, a behaviour that is permissible in 
personal relationships and a problem when these personal relationships are located 
in and require sensitivity to formal professionalism.  
Sexual harassment as a ‘permissible problem’ was further articulated in 
constructions of it in the personal sphere, outside of the workplace. Here, dealing 
with sexual harassment is constituted as risky because initiation of such behaviour 
locates the recipient as responsible for negotiating it in a manner which is 
sensitive to a number of considerations such as the impact of rejection on the 
initiator, on their personal relationship and the wider social network of which they 
are a part. It was noted that these constructions are embedded within 
heteronormative practices of sexualised activity. Here, the recipient becomes 
feminised in that sexual refusal becomes intertwined with being “collective, 
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caring and relational” which represent idealised standards of the feminine woman 
(Burns, 1999). The initiator, on the other hand, was variously represented as 
pursuer – a position associated with masculinised sexual initiation. These initiator 
positionings work to locate instances of sexual harassment as part and parcel of 
the normal albeit problematic implications of communicating sexual interest. 
In Chapter 8, I focused more extensively on representations of how sexual 
harassment should be dealt with through the analysis of nine policy narratives 
generated in the second Q methodological study I conducted. Here, I attempted to 
articulate problems/barriers to dealing with sexual harassment opened up by 
specific narratives. Of particular interest were the ways in which narratives 
opened up possibilities for secondary victimisation as this has been identified as a 
significant barrier to challenging sexually harassing behaviour (see also Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3).  
It is important to note that I am not arguing that responses to recipients of sexual 
harassment are uniformly negative or polarised. Instead, I explored the complexity 
of responses to both victims and perpetrators in sexual harassment policy 
narratives. For example, the absence of an overt victim-sensitive approach in 
some of the other narratives did not preclude the inclusion of victim-orientated 
practices. This is not to say that some indication of alignment with the victim is 
entirely unproblematic. We saw how emphasis on practices designed to protect 
the victim from emotional upset can function to (re)produce versions of 
femininity in which women victims are constructed as fragile and passive. 
Moreover, sympathy for the victim and/or a rejection of victim-blaming practices 
does not necessarily mean that secondary victimisation is not in operation in 
particular ways. For example, the notion of ‘crying wolf’ was raised as a 
significant issue in various ways across the majority of narratives. I argued that 
the continued doubt of the truthfulness of complaints opens up the possibility of 
(re)positioning victims as perpetrators and perpetrators as victims which may act 
as a barrier to reporting instances of sexual harassment.  
In Chapter 9, the exploration of representations of victims and perpetrators shifts 
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from policy constructions to broader sexual harassment discourses drawn on in 
interview data. Here, I explicate the productive effect of the predominant 
construction of sexual harassment as a heterosexualised relation, as something 
that is done by men to women. More specifically, I unpacked the ways in which 
versions of active masculine and passive feminine hetero-sexualities were 
deployed in a range of constructions of men/women, women/men and same sex 
victims/perpetrators, to produce women as ‘true’ victims and men as ‘true’ 
‘perpetrators’ of sexual harassment. I also explored how ‘deviations’ from 
normative gendered sexualities such as active feminine sexualities are used to 
present women as ‘improper’ perpetrators and men as ‘improper’ victims.  
Taken together, these versions of sexual harassment worked in concert to 
(re)produce heterosexualised power positionings of the feminine as passive and 
the masculine as active. Importantly, discourses of victimisation appear to be in 
implicit operation. As discussed above, victimisation discourses position sexually 
violent acts as non-normative and the absence of overt reference to victim 
identities works to locate sexual harassment as more normalised. However, the 
implicit circulation of victim/perpetrator positionings in these constructions 
normalise men as the only ‘true’ sexual aggressor and women as the only ‘true’ 
victim. 
10.5 Shifting ‘Sex’: Joe’s Story 
The heterosexualisation of victim-perpetrator relations discussed in the final 
analytical chapter of this thesis, in many ways, reflects and resonates with the 
gendering of resistance within sexual harassment discourses discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter.  As mentioned earlier, in this project, I have pointed to a 
number of potential difficulties faced by women that become produced and 
reproduced through gendered constructions of resistance and victim – perpetrator 
relations therein. I have argued that such constructions of resistance to sexual 
harassment can work to position women within problematic notions of femininity 
in general and feminised victimisation in particular. Importantly, they can also 
function to displace perpetrator responsibility for problematic behaviour through 
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the shift in emphasis to women’s accountability in the process of resistance.  
The gendering of victims and perpetrators of sexual harassment not only throws 
up difficulties for women recipients but also makes it difficult to create space for 
experiences of sexual harassment that deviate from this gendered pattern of 
recipient-initiator relations. As Brewis and Linstead (2000) note, this is reflected 
in the ways in which sexual harassment is routinely (re)produced as a particular 
kind of gendered phenomenon in sexual harassment literature – “the use of the 
female third person pronoun when referring to recipients of harassment is so 
widespread in the discourse as to almost escape detection. Same sex harassment 
also tends to be ignored” (p. 86). In some ways, the difficulties around the lack of 
space for ‘alternative’ gendered/sexualised configurations of victim-perpetrator 
relations are illustrated by Joe’s story. The difficulties I described above that Joe 
expressed in making sense of his experience seems to point to the ways in which 
this gendering of sexual harassment as a tool for resistance may constrain 
articulation of more passive versions of masculinised sexual subjectivities as well 
as agentic sexual subjectivities for women. 
In a similar vein to Gavey (2005), I would argue that opening up spaces which 
allow for active feminine and passive masculine sexualities may well have 
transgressive potential in terms of unsettling heteronormative power dynamics in 
which the feminine is subordinated in various ways in the masculine. As noted 
throughout this project, the normativitity of this power relation may maintain the 
conditions under which extreme versions of gendered dominance/subordination 
are made possible. One potential site for deconstructing this gendered power 
relation may lie in the troubling of the heterosexualisation of sexual harassment 
discussed in Chapter 9. More specifically, to move past problematic versions of 
feminine passivity and masculine agency, it seems pertinent to question the 
construction of women as always-already ‘true’ victims and men as ‘true’ 
perpetrators. The exploration of spaces where femininity and victimhood are 
decoupled in accounts of sexual violence may have transgressive potential. For 
example, whilst constructions of male victimisation presented in Chapter 9 
(re)produce heteronormative versions of masculine and feminine sexualities, there 
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may also be potential space within such accounts for the articulation of passive 
versions of masculine sexualities – a space where recipients such as Joe could 
withhold consent and/or clearly acknowledge personal victimisation. It should be 
noted that I am not arguing for a gender-neutral approach to be taken to the 
problem of passivity. As illustrated in the analysis in Chapter 9, non-typical 
versions of victim/perpetrator relations do not imply that a gender-neutral power 
relation is in operation. Rather, I would argue that a shift in research focus to the 
exploration of a range of gendered/sexualised victim-perpetrator positionings may 
contribute to the destabilisation of discourses which position men as always-
already active agents and women as always-already passive recipients of 
(hetero)sex. 
In this project, I have attempted to articulate such potential spaces that may be 
fruitful to this kind of exploration. For example, by focusing on the complexity of 
both marginal and more predominant narratives of sexual harassment in Chapter 
6, the possibilities for resistance for a diversity of recipients afforded by these 
particular cultural understandings could be unpacked. More specifically, some of 
the narratives identified here could be conceptualised as opening up alternative 
possibilities for making sense of gendered/sexualised positionings in victim-
perpetrator relations in constructions of sexual harassment. As a case in point, 
narratives such as the one entitled ‘dispersed power’ in Chapter 6, which 
emphasise the complexity of power relations and allow for the possibility that a 
range of variously positioned people can be located as recipient or initiator, could 
play an important role in the self-narratives of recipients who become positioned 
as ‘non-typical’ victims. Increasing airspace given to such narratives in both 
academic and popular forums may not only promote alternative ways for 
recipients like Joe to contextualise and problematise their experiences in a way 
which is preferable to them but also might contribute to the destabilisation of 
predominant constructions of women as victims discussed above.  
An increased shift in attention to the diversity of gendered/sexualised victim-
perpetrator relationship patterns is not without problems. The danger in focusing 
on women perpetrators of sexual harassment specifically runs the risk of 
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(re)producing active femininities as problematic and/or pathologised as was 
evident in some such constructions discussed in Chapter 9. The ways in which 
agentic forms femininities are positioned as variously problematic were also 
discussed in relation to victim-blaming discourses across Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 8 in which representations of feminised sexual subjectivities as active 
rather than passive are frequently used to locate women recipients as ‘deviant’.  
Such constructions work in various ways to undermine claims that particular 
experiences of sexualised/gendered behaviour are a ‘real’ problem for the sexually 
agentic woman. As we have seen, the possibilities for this kind of secondary 
victimisation can work as a barrier for reporting sexual harassment and using 
grievance procedures. Thus, the kind of deconstructive project I have been 
suggesting in this thesis is one that must proceed with caution, occurring in a 
context which works towards both the legitimisation of passive masculinities as 
well as positive versions of active femininities. 
Although this latter suggestion is not a new one in the field of sexual violence 
research (e.g. Fine, 1988; Gavey, 2005) I would like to suggest one other potential 
shift in research focus that has arisen from this project more broadly and from 
Chapter 7 specifically. As has been broadly argued throughout this thesis and at 
various points within this chapter, the construction of both women as victims of 
sexual harassment and as agents of social change has focused attention in a body 
of research as well as policy and popular accounts to the woman recipient’s 
behaviour – how or whether they enact forms of gendered resistance, how they 
communicate unwelcomeness, how they deal with sexual harassment. Similarly, 
in Chapter 7, dealing with problematic behaviour in the personal realm centred on 
the recipient and was framed within feminised versions of relationship 
maintenance and management. More specifically, through notions of emotional 
labour and care, responsibility for managing unwelcomed behaviour was shifted 
from the initiator to the recipient which may function to displace accountability 
accordingly. One avenue for shifting accountability back to the initiator might lie 
in turning attention from how non-consent is communicated to how ‘rejection’ 
becomes performed, constructed and constituted. As illustrated in Chapter 7, the 
rejection of an array of gendered/sexualised behaviours is implicitly constituted as 
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an unpleasant experience for the initiator. It would seem that the difficulty of 
communicating non-consent lies not only in gendered practices around sexual 
consent and refusal (see, for example, Chapter 3), but also how these practices 
become interwoven with broader cultural notions of ‘rejection’ and how these 
issues become enmeshed in other relevant cultural expectations for behaviour, 
such as politeness for example. I would argue an alternative point of departure 
might lie in explorations of alternative meanings of rejection, how rejection and 
hence the rejecter can be positioned in ways other than unpleasant and ‘bad’. 
Through such analysis, problematic gendered assumptions operating in the 
process of sexual refusal may become destabilised. 
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Appendix A1 
Consent form 
I am a PhD student attending the University College Northampton. I am 
undertaking a research project that is investigating people’s opinions of Sexual 
harassment. During this project I will be conducting a Q-sort study. The first part 
of this project involves conducting a pilot study. If you consent to participating in 
the pilot study, you will be given a form that contains a number of statements 
about sexual harassment. Next to each statement are four boxes labelled “agree”, 
“disagree”, “neutral” and “not clear”. You will be asked to tick the most suitable 
box according to whether you: 
1. Agree with the statement (“Agree” box) 
2. Disagree with the statement (“Disagree” box) 
3. Hold a neutral position with regard to a statement (“Neutral” box) 
4. Find a statement to be unclear (“Not clear” box) 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to these statements. A space is provided 
below each statement for comments that you might want to make about the items. 
For example, you may find that some statements are similar, or have ideas about 
sexual harassment that have not been included in the statements. Your comments 
would be very valuable to the project, and any suggestions. Your comments 
would be very valuable to the project, and any suggestions that you have would be 
very much appreciated. If you have any further questions please don not hesitate 
to contact me. 
Please find my contact details below. 
 
Contact details 
 
Lisa Lazard 
University College Northampton 
  297 
Park Campus 
Boughton Green Road 
Northampton 
 
Telephone numbers 
Work: 01604 735500 (ext 2490) 
 
Email 
lisa.lazard@northampton.ac.uk 
 
I consent to being a participant in this research………………………………. 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
1. Lewd comments about men is a form 
of sexual harassment 
    
 
2. Touching someone’s bottom is 
harmless 
    
 
3. Obscene phones calls can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
    
 
4. A person can be sexually harassed by 
their partner 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
5. Sexual harassment laws have made 
people suspicious of each other 
    
 
6. Suggesting that child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a form of 
sexism 
    
 
7. Wolf-whistling can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
    
 
8. Being called “darling” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
    
 
9. Touching a person’s genitals can be 
a form of sexual harassment 
    
 
10. Let’s be honest! Receiving any sort 
of sexual attention is an ego boost 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
11. Children can sexually harass adults 
 
    
 
12. Calling a man gay because he will 
not engage in manly activities can be 
a form of sexual harassment 
    
 
13. Sexual harassment is when a person 
pesters you for sex 
    
 
14. Women learn to watch men watching 
them and become wary of what 
might happen next 
    
 
15. Humorous sexual remarks are 
harmless 
    
 
16. A person can be sexually harassed by 
a relative 
    
 
17. Sexual behaviour or comments from 
children is just naughtiness 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
18. Sexual harassment can happen 
anywhere 
    
 
19. People should be unafraid of voicing 
negative opinions about 
homosexuality 
    
 
20. Excluding a person from an activity 
because of his or her sexual 
preference can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
21. People that are offended by sexual 
banter are over sensitive 
    
 
22. Staring can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
23. Having pornographic images in the 
workplace is an example of sexual 
harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
24. Touching a pregnant woman’s 
stomach can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
 
25. Sexual harassment happens over a 
period of time 
    
 
26. A man who calls a women a lesbian 
because she refuses to date him can 
be a form of sexual harassment 
    
 
27. A person can be sexually harassed by 
a friend 
    
 
 
    
28. Feminists have made a bigger deal of 
sexual harassment that it really 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
 
 
29. Friendliness can be mistaken for 
sexual harassment 
    
 
30. Sexual harassment is a case of 
unrequited love 
    
 
31. Having a pin-up calendar on the wall 
at work is unacceptable 
    
 
32. A person who criticises someone’s 
work after he or she has said no to 
sex is sexual harassment 
    
 
33. Stroking someone’s back can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
34. A group of people can be sexually 
harassed 
    
 
35. Money is the main reason why 
people sue for sexual harassment 
    
 
36. Sexually harassment is an important 
issue 
    
 
37. Everyone differs in what they would 
call sexual harassment 
    
 
38. In this era of political correctness 
men can’t even look at women for 
fear of being accused of leering 
    
 
39. An example of sexual harassment is 
when a person uses sexual comments 
or behaviour to undermine someone 
    
 
40. Complimenting a person’s looks can 
be a form of sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
41. Only women can be sexually 
harassed 
    
 
42. Hugging can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
43. To say that children can sexually 
harass other children ridiculous 
    
 
44. I know what kind of behaviours or 
comments count as sexual 
harassment 
    
 
45. An example of sexual harassment is 
looking someone up and down 
    
 
46. Having hardcore pornographic 
pictures in the workplace is 
unacceptable 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
 
 
47. Excluding a person from an activity 
because of his or her sex can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
    
 
 
 
48. Flirting can be mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
    
 
49. Being called “dear” can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
    
 
50. Women like men whistling at them     
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
51. Insulting gay people because of their 
sexual preference can be a form of 
homophobia 
    
 
52. A person who puts their arm around 
another person can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
    
 
53. Flashing can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
54. Adults can sexually harass children     
 
 
 
55. There is a difference between sexism 
and sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
56. A person can be sexually harassed by 
a work colleague 
    
 
57. Sexual harassment is a common 
occurrence in the lives of women 
    
 
58. One person can be sexually harassed 
 
    
 
59. Being called “love” can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
    
 
60. Sexual harassment is about using sex 
to get power over someone 
    
 
61. Sexual humour can make people feel 
uncomfortable 
    
 
62. Suggesting that a woman sleeps 
around can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
63. Sexual harassment is about the abuse 
of power 
    
 
64. Suggesting that housework is a 
woman’s job can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
 
65. All offensive sexual behaviours or 
comments are worth reporting. 
    
 
66. Sexual harassment is a case of 
making a mountain out of a molehill 
    
 
67. Sexual harassment happens in the 
workplace 
    
 
68. A woman who calls a man gay 
because he refuses to date her can be 
a form of sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
69. Lewd comments about women is a 
form of sexual harassment 
    
 
70. Sexual harassment usually occurs 
because one person has mistakenly 
thought that another person is 
attached to them. 
    
 
71. Women wear revealing clothes 
because they want to attract sexual 
attention. 
    
 
72. Men directing sexual comments or 
behaviour at other men is harmless. 
    
 
73. Sexual harassment! I wish I could 
get some 
    
 
74. Touching any part of a person’s body 
can be a form of sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
75. You should judge how serious 
unwanted sexual attention is by how 
the person on the receiving end feels 
    
 
76. Sexual banter is part of everyday life     
 
 
 
77. Sexual comments that offend a 
person is an example of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
78. If you find someone attractive you 
are bound to stare at them 
    
 
79. Any comment or behaviour that 
undermines a person because of his 
or her sex is sexual harassment 
    
 
80. Touching someone’s knee can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
81. Treating pregnant women like 
invalids can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
82. Telling gay people that they are 
really straight can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
    
 
83. Suggesting that a man sleeps around 
can be a form of sexual harassment 
    
 
84. In this era of political correctness it 
is all too easy for innocent remarks 
to be misunderstood as sexual 
harassment 
    
 
85. Having someone look up and down 
your body can be intimidating 
    
 
86. Political correctness has created a 
victim culture 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
87. Sexual harassment can be a one off 
event 
    
 
88. Having pornography in the 
workplace is unacceptable 
    
 
89. Touching someone’s bottom can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
    
 
90. Sometimes when a person says no to 
a date that are just playing hard to 
get 
    
 
91. Suggesting that child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
92. Touching someone’s hand can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
    
 
93. Beeping a car horn at someone can 
be a form of sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
94. A person can be sexually harassed by 
a stranger 
    
 
95. Political correctness had made 
people fearful of saying or doing the 
wrong thing 
    
 
96. The point of view of the accused is 
valuable when deciding whether 
sexual harassment has occurred. 
    
 
97. Having someone look up and down 
your body can make you feel 
uncomfortable 
    
 
98. Sexual harassment is about someone 
using their power to get sex 
    
 
99. Any behaviour or comment that 
suggests a person is immature can be 
a form of sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
100. Sexual comments about women’s 
clothes can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
101. A person can be sexually harassed by 
an acquaintance 
    
 
102. Asking someone personal questions 
can be a form of sexual harassment 
    
 
103. Sexual comments can make people 
feel uncomfortable 
    
 
 
 
104. Obscene letters can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
 
 
 
    
105. A boss that asks an employee to 
sleep with him or her in exchange for 
a promotion can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
106. Invading someone’s personal space 
is a form of sexual harassment 
    
 
107. Obscene emails can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
    
 
108. Touching a pregnant women’s 
stomach can be a sexual act 
    
 
109. Sexual harassment rarely has 
anything to do with sexual attraction 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
110. Calling a woman a lesbian because 
she will not engage in feminine 
activities can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
111. The idea of being a victim would 
discourage people from calling their 
experiences sexual harassment 
    
 
112. Suggesting that women should wear 
feminine clothes can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
    
 
113. Only gay people can sexually harass 
someone of the same sex 
    
 
114. Repeatedly asking someone out for a 
date can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
115. Insulting gay people because of their 
sexual preference can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
116. Sexual banter is part of everyday life     
 
117. A person is only guilty of sexual 
harassment if they intended to be 
offensive 
    
 
 
118. Suggesting that housework is a 
woman’s job can be a form of 
sexism 
    
 
119. Suggesting that pregnant women are 
incapable of working can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
    
 
120. Sexual behaviour or comments from 
children can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
    
 
121. Negative comments about a person’s 
looks can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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Item 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Not 
Clear 
122. If a man said he had been sexually 
harassed he would be called a wimp 
    
 
123. Sexual harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only natural for men 
to make a pass at women 
    
 
124. Touching a woman’s breasts can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
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Appendix A2 
 
Q Response Booklet 
 
It would be extremely useful if you could comment on the reasons for your sorting 
of the items or to comment on the items that you feel strongly about (e.g. those 
items that you least agreed/most agreed with). 
 
1 
A person is only guilty of sexual 
harassment if they intended to be 
offensive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Sexual harassment is a series of 
incidents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Treating pregnant women like 
invalids can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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4 Adults can sexually harass children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Any comment or behaviour that 
undermines a person because of his 
or her sexual preference can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Obscene phones calls can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
Wolf-whistling can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
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8 
Being called “dear” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
Pestering someone for sex can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Children can sexually harass adults 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Suggesting that a woman sleeps 
around can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
A boss who criticises an 
employee’s work after the 
employee has said no to sex is a 
form of sexual harassment 
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13 
Sexual comments that offend a 
person can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
There is a difference between 
sexism and sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Invading someone’s personal space 
can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
Calling a man gay because he  
will not engage in manly activities 
can be a form of sexual harassment 
 
 
17 
Sexual harassment can be about the 
abuse of power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
Beeping a car horn at someone can 
be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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19 
Complimenting a person’s looks 
can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
Suggesting that housework is a 
woman’s job can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
Asking someone personal 
questions can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
Having pornographic images in the 
workplace can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Calling a woman a lesbian because 
she will not engage in feminine 
activities can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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24 
A boss that asks an employee to 
sleep with him or her in exchange 
for a promotion is sexual 
harassment 
 
 
25 
 
The person on the receiving end 
should be the one who decides 
whether sexual harassment has 
occurred 
 
 
26 
Any comment or behaviour that 
undermines a person because of his 
or her sex can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Touching a person’s genitals can 
be a form of sexual harassment 
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28 Only gay people can sexually 
harass someone of the same sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 Sexual harassment can happen 
anywhere 
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30 Flashing can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
Hugging someone can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
 
32 Touching any part of a person’s 
body can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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33 
Sexual comments about men’s 
clothes can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
A person putting his or her arm 
around another person can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
 
 
35 Flirting can be mistaken for sexual 
harassment 
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36 Being called “love” can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 Leering can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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38 Obscene emails can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
Excluding a person from an 
activity because of his or her sex 
can be a form of sexual harassment 
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40 Sexual harassment rarely has 
anything to do with sexual 
attraction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Sexual comments about women’s 
clothes can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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42 
Staring can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 Stroking someone’s back can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
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44 
 
Suggesting that child-care is a 
woman’s job can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
Insulting someone by calling them 
gay can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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46 
Touching someone’s bottom can be 
a form of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Suggesting that a man sleeps 
around can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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48 Being called “darling” can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Touching someone’s knee can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
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50 
Negative comments about a 
person’s looks can be a form of 
sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 Telling sexual jokes can be a form 
of sexual harassment 
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52 
Suggesting that women should 
wear feminine clothes can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
Repeatedly asking someone out for 
a date can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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54 Touching someone’s hand can be a 
form of sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
comment or behaviour that 
suggests that a person is immature 
can be a form of sexual harassment 
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56 Friendliness can be mistaken for 
sexual harassment 
 
 
 
 
57 Sexual harassment! Don’t be 
ridiculous! It’s only natural for 
men to make a pass at women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Touching a pregnant woman’s 
stomach can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
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59 
You can only call an incident 
sexual harassment when sexual 
comments or behaviour are aimed 
at a person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
In this era of political correctness it 
is all too easy for innocent remarks 
to be misunderstood as sexual 
harassment  
 
 
61 Touching a woman’s breasts can be 
a form of sexual harassment 
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62 
Excluding a person from an 
activity because of his or her sexual 
preference can be a form of sexual 
harassment 
 
 
 
 
  342 
Other comments or observations: 
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Appendix A3 
 
Q study on sexual harassment 
 
Instructions for participating in the study 
Enclosed you should find the following: 
 Q Grid 
 Envelop containing Q Items (cut-up statements) 
 Envelop containing a set of Markers (going from +6 to 0 to -6) 
 Q Response Booklet 
 SAE to return the materials 
 
Please read through the instructions before you begin, as you will find the task 
more ‘user-friendly’ once you have. 
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The following instructions will explain how to complete the Q sort. 
The Q Grid 
What you need to know is that doing a Q sort takes space. You will need a large 
table, some floor space or similar. Begin the Q sort by taking the Markers out of 
the appropriately marked envelope. Place these in front of you at the bottom of 
your workspace like this: 
 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (9) (7) (6) (5) (3) (2) 
 
Make sure you leave plenty of space above. Now look at the Q Grid and you will 
see that these markers make up the base of that grid. The numbers in brackets 
(bottom line) tell you the number of items that should be placed above each 
marker. So, for example, you should place the two statements that you MOST 
AGREE with above the +6 and the two which you LEAST AGREE above the -
6. 
Now open up the envelope marked Q Items. Usually the easiest way to start is to 
divide up the items into three piles: 
 
These items are 
the ones I least 
agree with 
I neither agree or least 
agree with these or I 
find these items not 
relevant 
These items are 
the ones that I 
agree with 
 
When you have done this, work on each pile separately. For example, starting 
with the right hand pile, choose the two that most strongly agree with from the 
‘agree’ pile and put them in +6. Go through the pile allocating items as you go. 
You can move the items around as much as you like - your original  +6s could end 
up as +3s or even lower. Then, do the ‘least agree’ pile in the same way. Finally, 
fill in the centre with the ‘undecided’ pile. Shuffle the items around until you feel 
reasonably happy with the overall pattern. 
The second thing to remember is that this technique is good for finding overall 
patterns, but it is not very good for getting at very precise ideas.  So, you should 
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not spend too long pondering over choice - which one of two statements to put in 
+3, for example, and which in +4.    Obviously, it is best if you think carefully 
about your sorting, but there is no need for you to get bogged down and it should 
not demand too much of your time.  So, please, do settle for a reasonable estimate 
and leave it at that. I would suggest that when you find issues are raised or 
distinctions are difficult to draw, you write notes about these in the Q Response 
Booklet. 
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When you have finished the Q sort you should have the items arranged exactly as 
the grid. To complete the Q Grid the last thing you need to do is write in the 
number of the items.  For example, if you chose statements 38 and 61 for the  +6 , 
then you should enter 38 and 61  in the spaces above  +6 in the grid.  Please do 
make sure you follow the grid exactly. It might be hlpeful if you cross out the 
numbers below the grid as you write them in, that way you will know what 
statements you have already used. Again, if you find you want to add any 
comments or observations, please do so in the Q Response Booklet. 
 
Q Response Booklet 
When you have finished filling in the Q Grid, you should turn to the Q Response 
Booklet.  The main purpose of this is for you to give information that might help 
to interpret the patterns that emerge. What would be particularly useful is for you 
to fill in the space beside every item saying how and why you placed it where you 
did or making any other comment you think might be relevant.  However, this 
would require a fair amount of time, so I would appreciate it if you would try to 
give comments, at least, for those items that come up on the extreme ends of the 
grid or which you found especially difficult to place. 
Returning the materials 
When you have finished, all you need to do is return the following in the enclosed 
SAE with: 
1. The filled in Q Grid. 
2. The completed Q Response Booklet.    . 
 
Thank you once again for helping with my research.  I very much appreciate it. 
 
 
Lisa Lazard 
Department of Psychology 
University College Northampton 
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Appendix A4 
Q grid 
(8) 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
(7)  (7)  
(6) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
   
     
       
         
           
             
             
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Least Agree                                                                                                                                                                                                Most Agree 
You might find it helpful to cross out the numbers as you write them in the grid: 
1       2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10   11    12    13    14    15    16    17    18    19    20     
21    22    23    24    25    26    27    28    29    30   31    32    33    34    35    36    37    38    39    40 
41    42    43    44    45    46    47    48    49    50   51    52    53    54    55    56    57    58    59    60 
61    62 
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Appendix A5 
Table of Factor Loadings for Q Study 1 
 Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
P29 .876 .227 .151 5.696E-02 .185 -.320 -.049 -.097 5.779E-02 -.062 
P9 .790 .125 .327 5.733E-02 3.937E-02 3.548E-02 .164 3.100E-02 .188 -.002 
P19 .716 2.700E-02 -.299 -.012 3.408E-02 .264 -.021 .205 .190 .129 
P32 .673 .342 5.304E-02 .209 9.144E-03 .146 .314 .166 -.016 -.056 
P28 .578 5.025E-02 .413 .148 8.320E-03 -.015 .482 -.027 .162 .183 
P30 .571 .217 .459 7.840E-02 .160 .385 -.248 .103 4.957E-02 -.012 
P41 .566 .149 .133 .257 9.908E-02 .542 -.086 .170 5.586E-02 -.071 
P20 .484 .469 .152 .155 5.929E-02 .233 4.246E-02 .162 -.102 .190 
P34 5.350E-02 .779 .209 .195 9.282E-02 9.383E-02 .232 8.730E-03 .245 -.003 
P27 .201 .747 .175 .144 1.534E-02 .193 7.653E-02 -.076 .237 .142 
P40 .276 .662 .181 .223 .266 -.097 8.658E-02 .124 .245 -.039 
P43 .460 .639 .313 9.352E-02 .104 4.062E-02 .309 1.469E-02 -.118 -.084 
P2 8.446E-02 .592 8.372E-02 .398 .267 7.627E-02 .296 -.160 -.183 .000 
P10 .482 .567 6.878E-02 6.998E-02 .285 -.020 -.188 2.292E-02 .260 -.046 
P18 .229 .521 4.359E-02 .295 .381 .136 -.052 .324 -.175 .232 
P33 .418 .466 .118 .196 .267 .335 .216 .103 -.020 -.239 
P5 -.057 .448 .207 .350 -.007 .417 9.842E-02 .245 1.580E-02 .218 
P42 .242 .418 .264 .193 .252 .211 .210 -.252 .117 -.396 
P16 .374 .411 .393 -.021 .331 .210 .258 .176 4.583E-02 -.090 
P14 .289 .398 .366 .287 .146 .211 -.227 .283 .138 7.397E-03 
P17 8.069E-02 .265 .815 4.509E-02 7.743E-02 2.899E-02 -.023 -.028 3.541E-02 -.156 
P24 -.003 .133 .773 9.155E-02 -.032 .212 8.469E-02 -.004 .185 1.344E-02 
P36 .433 .132 .637 .202 .110 -.071 .132 .118 -.046 -.066 
P25 .462 .107 .563 .264 8.699E-02 6.505E-02 .173 -.102 4.756E-03 -.170 
P31 .110 .219 .131 .707 3.476E-02 1.858E-02 .259 .125 .122 2.139E-02 
P13 .126 .190 .153 .702 .292 .171 -.112 .193 6.952E-02 -.191 
P22 .107 .324 .234 .568 .253 .262 .180 9.260E-02 4.125E-03 .157 
P23 .364 .281 .121 .516 6.213E-02 .216 .224 .121 .374 -.006 
P1 .489 .216 -.015 .515 .264 .202 -.121 -.394 .116 -.004 
P39 .132 .293 -.159 9.419E-02 .692 .175 .121 .247 9.412E-03 -.058 
P21 .132 .143 .298 .244 .625 .140 .160 -.042 5.878E-03 3.430E-02 
P4 -.141 6.902E-02 .160 .318 .543 .104 -.061 -.227 .174 .445 
P26 -.453 -.089 -.054 -.042 .517 -.278 -.064 -.281 -.255 -.291 
P7 5.291E-03 .106 .113 .128 .178 .818 .162 -.024 -.043 8.183E-02 
P11 .280 7.406E-02 7.838E-02 8.287E-02 .170 .654 5.614E-02 .272 .344 -.008 
P3 6.132E-03 .322 8.028E-02 .108 .128 .144 .643 8.233E-02 .136 .173 
P15 .271 .127 -.019 .340 .380 .433 .486 .109 -.009 .123 
P38 -.066 .344 .399 .381 .253 .141 .401 .186 -.073 -.087 
P37 .305 .340 .316 .208 .368 3.463E-02 .400 1.050E-04 .230 .274 
P8 .166 5.299E-02 9.626E-03 .269 .142 .216 .102 .791 5.810E-02 4.686E-03 
P12 .261 .402 .170 .174 2.999E-02 6.851E-02 7.721E-02 1.833E-02 .664 .165 
P6 .309 .156 .160 .145 .404 .169 .341 5.878E-03 .493 -.280 
P35 4.987E-02 8.501E-02 -.226 -.049 8.077E-02 8.461E-02 .187 1.903E-02 2.940E-02 .736 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
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Appendix A6 
Consent Form 
I am a postgraduate student at the University college Northampton. I am 
conducting a Q study which will investigate people’s understandings of sexual 
harassment. If you agree to participate in this research you have the right to 
withdraw during the study. You can also request that your final contribution be 
withdrawn up to seven days after you have taken part in the study. Your identity 
will not be revealed in the research. If you agree to participate in this research 
please sign below. 
 
I agree to participate in this research................................................................... 
 
If you have any further questions or queries please do not hesitate to contact 
me. My contact details are provided below: 
 
 
Work number: 01604 735500 (ext 2490) 
Email: lisa.lazard@northampton.ac.uk 
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Appendix B1 
Consent form 
 
I am a PhD student attending the University College Northampton. I am 
undertaking a research project that is investigating people’s opinions regarding 
how sexual harassment should be dealt with. The first part of this project involves 
conducting a pilot study. If you consent to participating in the pilot study, you will 
be given a form that contains a number of statements about how sexual 
harassment could be dealt with. Next to each statement are four boxes labelled 
“agree”, “disagree”, “neutral” and “not clear”. You will be asked to tick the most 
suitable box according to whether you: 
1. Agree with the statement (“Agree” box) 
2. Disagree with the statement (“Disagree” box) 
3. Hold a neutral position with regard to a statement (“Neutral” box) 
4. Find a statement to be unclear (“Not clear” box) 
 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to these statements. If you have any further 
questions please do not hesitate to contact me. Please find my contact details 
below. 
Contact details 
Lisa Lazard 
University College Northampton 
Park Campus 
Boughton Green Road 
Northampton 
 
Telephone numbers 
Work: 01604 735500 (ext 2490) 
 
Email 
lisa.lazard@northampton.ac.uk 
 
 
I consent to being a participant in this research……………………………
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Pilot study 
Please read the statements below and tick the most suitable box according to whether you: 
1) Agree with the statement (Agree box) 
2) Disagree with the statement (Disagree box) 
3) Hold a neutral position with regard to the statement (Neutral box) 
4) Find the statement to be unclear (Not clear box) 
 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to these statements. A space is provided at the end of this form for comments that you may 
want to make about these statements. For example, you may find that some statements are similar. Or have ideas about this topics 
that have not been included in the statements. 
Your comments would be very valuable to the project and any suggestions that you have would be very much appreciated. 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
1)  Sexual harassment should be a criminal offence [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
2)  Injunctions are a good way of stopping sexual harassment [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
3)  A person who breaches a sexual harassment injunction 
should be arrested 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
4)  The authorities should only get involved if sexual harassment 
occurred on more than one occasion 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
5)  The courts should take steps to protect the recipient of sexual 
harassment. 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
6)  The police are powerless to stop sexual harassment [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
7)  Fines are a good way to stop sexual harassment [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
8)  A person who is found guilty of workplace sexual harassment 
should be denied promotion opportunities 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
9)  There should be specialist organizations that provide support 
to those who have been sexual harassed 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
10) The government should provide training on how to deal with 
sexual harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
11) The courts are powerless to stop sexual harassment [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
12) The government should explain to everyone how they can 
make a sexual harassment complaint 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
13) Everyone should be provided with training on how to deal with [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
sexual harassment 
14) Prison sentences  are a good way to deal with sexual 
harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
15) People who have made a sexual harassment complaint 
should be protected from negative comments about their 
actions 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
16) Recipients of sexual harassment should receive practical 
support 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
17) Staff should be supportive of an employee who has made a 
sexual harassment complaint 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
18) Employers who knew about and failed to stop workplace [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
sexual harassment should be held legally responsible 
19) Sexual harassment complaints should be taken seriously [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
20) Employers should explain to staff how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
21) Those who complain about sexual harassment should be 
protected against retaliation by the accused 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
22) The recipient should ask the initiator of sexual harassment to 
stop 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
23) Verbal warnings from the police are a good way of stopping 
sexual harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
24) Employers who were unaware of workplace sexual [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
harassment should be held legally responsible 
25) The courts should concerned with the protection of the 
recipient of sexual harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
26) Sexual harassment companies should be investigated fully [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
27) Sexual harassment cases should only be pursued if the 
initiator intentionally set out to harm the recipient 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
28) It is far too difficult to prove that sexual harassment occurred [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
29) Laws about sexual harassment are unnecessary [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
30) Verbal warnings from an employer is a good way of stopping 
sexual harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
  357 
  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
31) People should learn to deal with sexual harassment 
themselves 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
32) There is a need for specific protection against sexual 
harassment in the workplace 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
33) Employers should assure that a person complaining of sexual 
harassment is treated sympathetically by all staff 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
34) The courts should be concerned with the rights of the person 
accused of sexual harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
35) People should be sympathetic to recipients of sexual 
harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
36) An employee who is found guilty of sexual harassment should 
be sacked 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
37) Investigating sexual harassment cases is a misuse of police 
time 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
38) The identity of the person making a complaint about sexual 
harassment should be kept secret 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
40) The police should deal with sexual harassment cases [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
41) A person who deliberately makes a false complaint above 
sexual harassment should be punished 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
42) A good way to stop sexual harassment is to make sure that 
the guilty party receives counseling 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
43) Less serious complaints of sexual harassment should be 
referred to the authorities 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
44) A person’s motives for complaining about sexual harassment 
should be checked 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
45) A person found guilty of sexual harassment should be allowed 
to appeal 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
46) Compensation is the incentive for complaining about sexual 
harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
47) Recipients of sexual harassment should be given 
compensation 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
48) The police should take in to account the recipients’ past 
sexual behaviour 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
49) Courts should consider whether a reasonable person would 
have found behaviours to be sexually harassing 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
50) People are adequately protected from sexual harassment by 
the police 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
51) The identity of the person accused of sexual harassment 
should be kept secret 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
52) There is a need for specific protection against sexual 
harassment that happens in public places 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
53) People are adequately protected from sexual harassment by 
employers 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
54) Sexual harassment laws have create a victim culture [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
55) The police should treat recipients of sexual harassment 
sympathetically 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
  361 
  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
56) One should intervene if they suspect their partner is being 
sexually harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
57) The police should be given training for dealing with recipients 
of sexual harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
58) Police questioning of the recipient of sexual harassment 
should be non-threatening 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
59) There is a need for specific protection against sexual 
harassment that happens in the home 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
60) People who make false complaints about sexual harassment 
should be arrested 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
61) Recipients of sexual harassment should be allowed to request 
that a same sex police officer deals with their case 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
62) People that witness sexual harassment should report it [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
63) The police should deal with sexual harassment that happens 
in the home 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
64) One should intervene if they suspect that their friend is being 
sexually harassed 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
65) Recipients of sexual harassment that happens in the home 
should report it 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
66) The police should take steps to make sure that recipients of 
sexual harassment are questioned in a non-threatening 
environment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
67) Recipients should not be victimised for complaining about [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
sexual harassment 
68) Sexual harassment is a serious issue [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
69) The recipient’s word is not enough for a sexual harassment 
complaint to be pursued. 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
70) Recipients of sexual harassment that happens in public 
places should report it 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
71) People should be sympathetic to those accused of sexual 
harassment 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
72) Dealing with sexual harassment cases is a misuse of 
employers’ time 
[    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
73) The police should deal with sexual harassment that happens [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] 
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  Agree Disagree Neutral Not Clear 
in public places 
 
Comments
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Appendix B2 
Q Response Booklet 
It would be extremely useful if you could comment on the reason for your sorting 
of the items or to comment on the items that you feel strongly about (e.g. those 
items that you least agreed/most agreed with). 
 
1  I feel that making sexual harassment a 
criminal offence if taking things too far 
 
2  Injunctions are a good way of stopping 
sexual harassment 
 
3  A person who breaches a sexual 
harassment injunction should be arrested 
 
4  The authorities should only get involved if 
sexual harassment occurred on more than 
one occasion 
 
5  The courts should not be responsible for 
providing protection for recipients of 
sexual harassment 
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6  The police are powerless to stop sexual 
harassment 
 
7  Fines are a good way to stop sexual 
harassment 
 
8  It is unfair to deny promotion 
opportunities to those found guilty of 
sexual harassment 
 
9  There should be specialist organisations 
that provide support to those who have 
been sexually harassed 
 
10  It should not be the government’s 
responsibility to provide training on how 
to deal with sexual harassment 
 
11  The courts are powerless to stop sexual 
harassment 
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12  Everyone should be made aware of how 
they can make a sexual harassment 
complaint 
 
13  I feel that providing everyone with 
training on how to deal with sexual 
harassment is unnecessary 
 
14  Prison sentences are a good way to deal 
with sexual harassment 
 
15  People who have made a sexual 
harassment complaint should be protected 
from negative comments about their 
actions 
 
16  Recipients of sexual harassment should 
receive practical support 
 
17  Employers should be held legally 
responsible for workplace sexual 
harassment whether they knew about it or 
not 
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18  Sexual harassment complaints should be 
taken with a grain of salt 
 
19  Those who complain about sexual 
harassment should be protected against 
retaliation by the accused 
 
20  The recipient should ask the initiator of 
sexual harassment to stop 
 
21  Verbal warnings from the police are a 
good way of stopping sexual harassment 
 
22  It is far too difficult to prove that sexual 
harassment occurred 
 
23  Laws about sexual harassment are 
unnecessary 
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24  Verbal warnings from an employer is a 
good way of stopping sexual harassment 
 
25  People should learn to deal with sexual 
harassment themselves 
 
26  There is no need for protection against 
sexual harassment in the workplace 
 
27  The courts should be unconcerned with 
the rights of the person accused of sexual 
harassment 
 
28  People should be sympathetic to 
individuals who claim that they have been 
sexually harassed 
 
29  An employee who is found guilty of 
sexual harassment should be sacked 
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30  Investigating sexual harassment cases is a 
misuse of police time 
 
31  The identity of the person making a 
complaint about sexual harassment should 
be revealed 
 
32  Sexual harassment cases should be dealt 
with by the police 
 
33  A person who deliberately makes a false 
complaint about sexual harassment should 
be punished 
 
34  A good way to stop sexual harassment is 
to make sure that the guilty party receives 
counselling 
 
35  All complaints of sexual harassment 
should be referred to the authorities 
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36  A person’s motives for complaining about 
sexual harassment should be checked 
 
37  Recipients of sexual harassment should be 
given compensation 
 
38  The police should take in to account the 
recipient’s past sexual behaviour 
 
39  People are adequately protected from 
sexual harassment by the police 
 
40  The identity of the person accused of 
sexual harassment should be kept secret 
 
41  There is need for specific protection 
against sexual harassment that happens in 
public places 
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42  People are adequately protected from 
sexual harassment by employers 
 
43  One should intervene if they suspect their 
partner is being sexually harassment 
 
44  There is no need to provide the police 
with specific training for dealing with 
sexual harassment cases 
 
45  The police should question recipients of 
sexual harassment in a sensitive manner 
 
46  There is no need for specific protection 
against sexual harassment that happens in 
the home 
 
47  Recipients of sexual harassment should be 
allowed to request that a same sex police 
officer deals with their case 
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48  People that witness sexual harassment 
should report it 
 
49  Sexual harassment that happens in the 
home is better dealt with privately 
 
50  One should intervene if they suspect that 
their friend is being sexually harassed 
 
51  Occurrences of sexual harassment in the 
home should be reported 
 
52  The police should take steps to make sure 
that recipients of sexual harassment are 
questioned in a non-threatening 
environment 
 
53  Recipients should not be victimised for 
complaining about sexual harassment 
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54  Sexual harassment is a minor issue  
55  The recipient’s word is insufficient cause 
for a sexual harassment complaint to be 
pursued 
 
56  Sexual harassment that happens in a 
public place should be reported 
 
57  People should be sympathetic to those 
accused of sexual harassment 
 
58  Dealing with sexual harassment cases is a 
misuse of employers’ time 
 
59  Sexual harassment in public places should 
be dealt with by the police 
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60  The government should provide 
instructions on how to make a sexual 
harassment complaint 
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Appendix B3 
Q grid 
    
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
     
     
       
       
         
           
           
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Most Disagree          Most Agree 
You might find it helpful to cross out the numbers as you write them in the grid: 
 
1       2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10   11    12    13    14    15    16    17    18    19    20     
21    22    23    24    25    26    27    28    29    30   31    32    33    34    35    36    37    38    39    40 
41    42    43    44    45    46    47    48    49    50   51    52    53    54    55    56    57    58    59    60 
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Appendix B4 
Table of Factor Loadings for Q Study 2 
 Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
P4 .790 .230 9.782E-03 -8.558E-03 .158 9.941E-02 .107 1.656E-02 -.130 
P27 .784 -2.847E-02 .105 .321 -9.591E-02 -9.673E-02 -5.226E-02 9.300E-02 -.116 
P43 .693 .366 .206 -5.871E-02 .267 .289 -5.184E-02 -.120 -7.967E-02 
P3 .635 .429 .237 .186 .240 .175 .174 2.708E-02 .111 
P22 .633 .158 .460 .118 .210 -4.235E-02 5.283E-02 .184 7.169E-02 
P36 .632 .391 .273 .279 -.131 .258 8.359E-02 -4.188E-02 5.987E-02 
P45 .618 .318 .342 .215 8.546E-02 -4.538E-02 9.156E-02 1.386E-02 .253 
P23 .617 .533 9.641E-02 6.724E-02 8.686E-02 4.129E-02 3.031E-02 -.150 .111 
P5 .587 .359 .105 -2.590E-03 .521 -1.274E-02 .126 .142 2.969E-02 
P25 .586 .247 .420 .302 9.478E-02 .178 4.730E-02 -4.032E-02 .172 
P1 .571 2.241E-03 -3.868E-02 -3.673E-02 .284 -.293 -.107 .419 -.254 
P32 .556 .488 .303 .292 -5.007E-03 .171 .149 .208 -1.551E-02 
P26 .548 .364 .184 5.736E-02 -.261 .202 .331 2.488E-02 .315 
P44 .538 .397 .192 .186 -.141 .163 -.198 9.209E-02 .327 
P34 .504 .458 .189 .213 9.874E-02 .152 .121 1.153E-02 .258 
P28 .501 .389 .265 .199 .107 .495 -8.572E-02 7.960E-02 .178 
P38 .467 .455 .288 .365 -9.461E-02 .151 .266 -.161 4.052E-02 
P29 .463 .296 .375 6.882E-02 .161 .348 .346 -.231 -.146 
P19 .460 .360 .171 .273 3.204E-02 -1.628E-02 .326 -2.040E-02 .194 
P9 .138 .802 .169 2.465E-02 -3.066E-02 .285 -.135 .102 .136 
P8 .241 .715 .355 .164 -3.474E-03 -2.467E-02 .107 -.124 2.983E-02 
P12 .337 .688 4.945E-02 .348 -3.389E-02 5.380E-02 -5.591E-02 -.106 -8.048E-03 
P35 .295 .635 .315 .136 .104 -.187 .146 -.306 5.623E-02 
P7 .340 .615 .193 .167 9.364E-02 .366 .266 .152 1.323E-02 
P17 -3.335E-02 .569 .398 .121 -1.146E-02 -6.127E-02 .120 9.438E-03 .346 
P14 .369 .545 5.523E-02 .292 .118 .236 .237 -6.934E-02 .220 
P24 .418 .494 .454 6.705E-02 .239 .160 .132 7.335E-02 1.892E-02 
P30 .420 .483 .346 6.809E-02 .319 -6.512E-02 -6.574E-02 -.429 -.179 
P21 .140 .320 .733 -9.671E-02 4.500E-02 3.935E-02 -8.590E-02 -.246 4.178E-02 
P10 .121 9.513E-02 .666 .153 .232 .230 -.105 6.146E-02 -.151 
P15 .462 .140 .562 .369 -.138 8.318E-02 5.289E-02 .103 .128 
P37 .176 .326 .541 .224 -.185 .158 .333 -8.323E-02 .230 
P42 .336 .470 .540 -1.898E-02 -1.714E-03 -.202 .136 3.631E-02 .120 
P40 .440 .447 .520 9.917E-02 2.916E-02 .304 .117 7.191E-02 .146 
P41 .474 .408 .509 .166 -9.671E-03 .244 9.996E-02 -.201 .150 
P6 .288 .409 .433 .278 .269 .167 3.3038E-02 .261 -.132 
P16 8.313E-02 .236 .257 .701 -9.250E-02 -8.123E-03 .208 -.181 .134 
P20 .309 .226 -8.755E-02 .651 .324 .136 .143 5.466E-02 7.387E-03 
P11 .369 .282 .249 .511 .133 .194 -.269 .274 -.215 
P39 4.184E-02 -3.682E-02 6.534E-02 4.322E-02 .893 7.333E-02 -1.223E-02 3.540E-04 .163 
P33 .439 -3.540E-02 .410 .107 .468 -.100 -.169 .233 2.259E-02 
P18 4.206E-02 6.942E-02 .106 6.395E-02 2.502E-02 .822 .196 -8.250E-02 4.438E-02 
P13 -5.434E-02 -6.018E-02 3.360E-02 -.136 1.130E-02 -.176 -.847 -8.240E-02 .127 
P2 .108 -4.539E-02 -1.238E-02 -3.369E-02 6.271E-02 -5.709E-02 6.698E-02 .875 6.558E-02 
P31 2.095E-02 .189 1.624E-02 1.975E-02 .197 6.167E-02 -.127 -.102 .885 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
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Appendix B5 
Consent Form 
I am a postgraduate student at the University college Northampton. I am 
conducting a Q study which will investigate how people think sexual harassment 
should be dealt with. If you agree to participate in this research you have the right 
to withdraw during the study. You can also request that your final contribution be 
withdrawn up to seven days after you have taken part in the study. Your identity 
will not be revealed in the research. If you agree to participate in this research 
please sign below. 
 
I agree to participate in this research................................................................... 
If you have any further questions or queries please do not hesitate to contact 
me. My contact details are provided below: 
 
Work number: 01604 735500 (ext 2490) 
Email: lisa.lazard@northampton.ac.uk 
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Appendix C1 
Interview Questions 
1. What does the phrase unwanted sexual attention mean to you? 
 
2. Are there are forms of unwanted sexual attention that are more serious 
than others? 
 
3. What leads someone to give unwanted sexual attention to someone else? 
 
4. What’s the best way of dealing with it? 
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Appendix C2 
Consent form 
I am a PhD student attending the university college Northampton. I am 
undertaking a research project that is investigating unwanted sexual attention. To 
explore this topic I am conducting interviews. During the interview you will be 
asked about your thoughts and opinions about unwanted sexual attention. The 
interview will be tape-recorded. The tape recordings will be written down word 
for word and extracts from the interviews will be used in my research project. I 
will ensure that your identity will not be revealed in this work. Given that this 
might be a sensitive issue, there is no pressure whatsoever for you to agree to 
participate in this research. Do not participate unless you feel completely 
comfortable in doing so. If you agree to participate and at a later stage you do not 
want to be involved in the research, you have every right to withdraw from the 
study. If you have participated in the research decide you no longer wish for you 
contribution to be included in the final project, you can withdraw your 
contribution up to seven days after the interview has taken place and ask for it to 
be destroyed. You also have every right to be present when your contribution is 
destroyed. 
 
Contact details 
Lisa Lazard 
University College Northampton 
Park Campus 
Boughton Green Road 
Northampton 
 
Telephone Numbers 
Work: 01604 735500 (ext 2490) 
 
Email 
lisa.lazard@northampton.ac.uk 
 
I consent to being a participant in this research…………………………. 
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Appendix C3 
Transcription Notation 
Symbols Description 
Bold Emphasis 
(.) Pause 
[info] Description of paralinguistic and 
situational information  
? Indicative of speakers intonation 
Xxx 
 
Untranscribable  
  
 
